74427 sc low permanent freezing of first game bonds with no recovery path cascading liveness halt on descendants proof threshold 2

Submitted on Apr 22nd 2026 at 13:38:04 UTC by @stendal for Audit Comp | Base Azul

• Report ID: #74427
• Report Type: Smart Contract
• Report severity: Low
• Target: https://github.com/base/contracts/tree/v8.1.0/src/multiproof
• Impacts:
  • Permanent freezing of funds in the bridge or in dispute game bonds with no available recovery path

Description

With PROOF_THRESHOLD=2 (valid per the InvalidProofThreshold guard in the constructor), any first game whose parent is ANCHOR_STATE_REGISTRY and that reaches gameOver() with a single proof submitted cannot be resolved, cannot have credit claimed, and has no admin escape. The bond locks forever.

The exact chain through the code:

• resolve() reverts at AggregateVerifier.sol:458 with NotEnoughProofs because proofCount == 1 < PROOF_THRESHOLD == 2.
• claimCredit() at :613-617 branches on expectedResolution == type(uint64).max. That equality comes from _getDelay() at :821 only when proofCount == 0. With proofCount == 1, _getDelay() returns SLOW_FINALIZATION_DELAY (7 days) — a finite value — so claimCredit stays on the resolvedAt != 0 branch and reverts with GameNotResolved. The 14-day timeout fallback is unreachable.
• verifyProposalProof() at :339 contains if (gameOver()) revert GameOver(). Once the 7-day window lapses, the missing proof type cannot be supplied — even if the second prover comes back online the next block.
• challenge() does not rescue the game either. _checkIntermediateRoot at :1003 requires intermediateRootToProve != intermediateOutputRoot(index). A late, honest proof that agrees with the claim is rejected.
• nullify() needs a second valid proof for a different state. Without a soundness break in SP1 or Nitro attestation, that path is closed.

Admin-level actions I checked all fail for first games:

• blacklistDisputeGame(stuckGame): resolve() consults isGameBlacklisted(parentGame) inside _getParentGameStatus at :938. For a first game parentAddress() == ANCHOR_STATE_REGISTRY, so execution falls into the return GameStatus.DEFENDER_WINS branch at :943 without ever checking the stuck game's own blacklist flag. Blacklisting is a no-op.
• setRespectedGameType(other): irrelevant — _getParentGameStatus returns DEFENDER_WINS for parent == ASR regardless of the respected type.
• updateRetirementTimestamp(): retirement is checked only on parent games. The parent here is ASR, which is not a game.
• setImplementation(newImpl) on the factory: affects newly-created clones only. Existing EIP-1167 minimal proxies carry the old implementation address hardcoded in runtime bytecode and cannot be upgraded.

The comment inside _increaseExpectedResolution at :809-811 reads:

"we give enough time to resolve the issue and possibly blacklist this game"

The developer-documented recovery expectation does not hold for first games. Blacklisting the stuck game itself is a no-op (see above); the comment describes a mechanism the contract does not provide in this scenario.

Cascade to descendant games

Stuck first games freeze the subtree built on top of them. Any child game that declares the stuck parent as its parentAddress() has _getParentGameStatus return IN_PROGRESS (live call to the stuck parent), and resolve() on the child reverts with ParentGameNotResolved. The child cannot close regardless of its own proofCount.

The only way to unblock descendants is an off-chain admin call to blacklistDisputeGame(stuckParent). After that, the child's _getParentGameStatus hits the blacklist branch at AggregateVerifier.sol:941-943 and returns CHALLENGER_WINS, the child's resolve() takes the branch at :453-454 and sets status = CHALLENGER_WINS without overwriting bondRecipient (which was set to gameCreator() at :408 during initialization). Descendant proposers get their bonds back after the manual admin step. The first game's bond remains frozen.

Net effect: a proof-system hiccup that leaves one first game with proofCount=1 forces a manual admin response before the dispute tree below it can progress.

Trigger conditions

PROOF_THRESHOLD=2 plus one-of:

• ZK prover (SP1 / Succinct gateway) downtime past the 7-day window
• TEE outage (AWS Nitro availability, enclave key issues) with ZK in first
• Cert-chain expiry on Nitro between proof generation attempts
• Any deployment event where one proof type is available within 7 days and the other is not

The 7-day SLOW_FINALIZATION_DELAY is the grace period. If the second proof lands inside that window, resolve() closes normally. The bug is only reachable when the window elapses with proofCount == 1.

Impact scaling

• Per game: bondAmount frozen, permanently.
• Partial prover outage of N days at rate K first-games/day: roughly N × K × bondAmount permanently frozen, plus the full subtree below each stuck game requires manual admin blacklist to unblock.
• proofThreshold == 2 is one of two branches explicitly admitted by the constructor. Whatever branch the contract admits must be safe under the audit scope.

Proof of Concept

Target

• Repo: github.com/base/contracts at tag v8.1.0 (commit 01dad230390cd69bcf130b5fc7a7a580b31650a7)
• File under test: src/multiproof/AggregateVerifier.sol
• Test file to add: test/multiproof/StuckBond_PROOF_THRESHOLD_2.t.sol
• Tooling: Foundry forge 1.5.1-stable, solc 0.8.15 (matches the contract pragma)

The PoC exercises the full production stack — real AnchorStateRegistry, DisputeGameFactory, DelayedWETH, and AggregateVerifier — all from src/dispute/ and src/multiproof/ of the audited repository. The only substitution is src/multiproof/mocks/MockVerifier.sol, whose verify() returns true. The stuck-bond mechanics live entirely inside the AggregateVerifier state machine (proofCount tracking, expectedResolution progression, gameOver gating, parent-status dispatch) and do not depend on TEE/ZK proof internals. Plugging in SP1 + Nitro in place of MockVerifier produces the same revert sequence.

Setup

git clone https://github.com/base/contracts
cd contracts
git checkout v8.1.0
make deps    # or manually: forge install … (see Makefile `deps` target)

Save the file below as test/multiproof/StuckBond_PROOF_THRESHOLD_2.t.sol, then:

forge test --ffi \
  --match-path "test/multiproof/StuckBond_PROOF_THRESHOLD_2.t.sol" -vv

Test file (runnable, complete)

// SPDX-License-Identifier: MIT
pragma solidity ^0.8.0;

import { BaseTest } from "./BaseTest.t.sol";
import { AggregateVerifier } from "src/multiproof/AggregateVerifier.sol";
import { IAnchorStateRegistry } from "interfaces/dispute/IAnchorStateRegistry.sol";
import { IDelayedWETH } from "interfaces/dispute/IDelayedWETH.sol";
import { IDisputeGame } from "interfaces/dispute/IDisputeGame.sol";
import { IVerifier } from "interfaces/multiproof/IVerifier.sol";
import { Claim, GameStatus, GameType, Hash, Timestamp } from "src/dispute/lib/Types.sol";
import { GameNotResolved } from "src/dispute/lib/Errors.sol";

/// @title StuckBondProofThreshold2Test
/// @notice Reproduces the PROOF_THRESHOLD=2 permanent bond freeze against the
///         real Base Azul multiproof infrastructure. Extends BaseTest and
///         overrides PROOF_THRESHOLD to 2 in setUp.
contract StuckBondProofThreshold2Test is BaseTest {
    uint256 internal constant OVERRIDE_PROOF_THRESHOLD = 2;

    function setUp() public override {
        _deployContractsAndProxies();
        _initializeProxies();

        // Redeploy AggregateVerifier with PROOF_THRESHOLD=2 (valid per InvalidProofThreshold guard)
        AggregateVerifier impl = new AggregateVerifier(
            AGGREGATE_VERIFIER_GAME_TYPE,
            IAnchorStateRegistry(address(anchorStateRegistry)),
            IDelayedWETH(payable(address(delayedWETH))),
            IVerifier(address(teeVerifier)),
            IVerifier(address(zkVerifier)),
            TEE_IMAGE_HASH,
            AggregateVerifier.ZkHashes(ZK_RANGE_HASH, ZK_AGGREGATE_HASH),
            CONFIG_HASH,
            L2_CHAIN_ID,
            BLOCK_INTERVAL,
            INTERMEDIATE_BLOCK_INTERVAL,
            OVERRIDE_PROOF_THRESHOLD
        );

        factory.setImplementation(AGGREGATE_VERIFIER_GAME_TYPE, IDisputeGame(address(impl)));
        factory.setInitBond(AGGREGATE_VERIFIER_GAME_TYPE, INIT_BOND);
        anchorStateRegistry.setRespectedGameType(AGGREGATE_VERIFIER_GAME_TYPE);
        vm.warp(block.timestamp + 1);
    }

    function _createFirstGameWithTeeOnly() internal returns (AggregateVerifier game) {
        currentL2BlockNumber = BLOCK_INTERVAL;
        Claim rootClaim = Claim.wrap(keccak256(abi.encode("root", currentL2BlockNumber)));
        bytes memory teeProof = _generateProof(bytes("tee"), AggregateVerifier.ProofType.TEE);

        // parent = AnchorStateRegistry → first game
        game = _createAggregateVerifierGame(
            address(this),
            rootClaim,
            currentL2BlockNumber,
            address(anchorStateRegistry),
            teeProof
        );

        assertEq(game.proofCount(), 1, "initial TEE proof submitted");
        assertEq(game.PROOF_THRESHOLD(), OVERRIDE_PROOF_THRESHOLD, "threshold=2");
    }

    /// Core: at gameOver() with proofCount=1, both resolve() and claimCredit() revert.
    function test_StuckBond_ResolveAndClaimCreditBothRevert() public {
        AggregateVerifier game = _createFirstGameWithTeeOnly();
        vm.warp(game.expectedResolution().raw() + 1);
        assertTrue(game.gameOver());

        vm.expectRevert(AggregateVerifier.NotEnoughProofs.selector);
        game.resolve();

        vm.expectRevert(GameNotResolved.selector);
        game.claimCredit();
    }

    /// The 14-day timeout fallback is unreachable when expectedResolution != max.
    function test_StuckBond_StillStuckAfter14Days() public {
        AggregateVerifier game = _createFirstGameWithTeeOnly();
        vm.warp(game.expectedResolution().raw() + 1 + 14 days);

        vm.expectRevert(AggregateVerifier.NotEnoughProofs.selector);
        game.resolve();
        vm.expectRevert(GameNotResolved.selector);
        game.claimCredit();

        assertEq(game.bondAmount(), INIT_BOND);
    }

    /// verifyProposalProof blocks late second proof via `if (gameOver()) revert GameOver()`.
    function test_StuckBond_CannotAddSecondProofAfterGameOver() public {
        AggregateVerifier game = _createFirstGameWithTeeOnly();
        vm.warp(game.expectedResolution().raw() + 1);

        bytes memory zkProof = _generateProof(bytes("zk"), AggregateVerifier.ProofType.ZK);
        vm.expectRevert(AggregateVerifier.GameOver.selector);
        vm.prank(ZK_PROVER);
        game.verifyProposalProof(zkProof);
    }

    /// Admin blacklist of the stuck game is a no-op for first games.
    function test_StuckBond_BlacklistSelfDoesNotUnstick() public {
        AggregateVerifier game = _createFirstGameWithTeeOnly();
        vm.warp(game.expectedResolution().raw() + 1);

        anchorStateRegistry.blacklistDisputeGame(IDisputeGame(address(game)));
        assertTrue(anchorStateRegistry.isGameBlacklisted(IDisputeGame(address(game))));

        vm.expectRevert(AggregateVerifier.NotEnoughProofs.selector);
        game.resolve();
        vm.expectRevert(GameNotResolved.selector);
        game.claimCredit();
    }

    /// Changing respectedGameType cannot rescue — _getParentGameStatus hardcodes DEFENDER_WINS.
    function test_StuckBond_ChangeRespectedGameTypeDoesNotUnstick() public {
        AggregateVerifier game = _createFirstGameWithTeeOnly();
        vm.warp(game.expectedResolution().raw() + 1);

        anchorStateRegistry.setRespectedGameType(GameType.wrap(999));

        vm.expectRevert(AggregateVerifier.NotEnoughProofs.selector);
        game.resolve();
    }

    /// Retirement timestamp is parent-only; ASR parent is not a game.
    function test_StuckBond_RetirementTimestampDoesNotUnstick() public {
        AggregateVerifier game = _createFirstGameWithTeeOnly();
        vm.warp(game.expectedResolution().raw() + 1);

        anchorStateRegistry.updateRetirementTimestamp();

        vm.expectRevert(AggregateVerifier.NotEnoughProofs.selector);
        game.resolve();
    }

    /// Factory impl upgrade only affects new clones; existing EIP-1167 clones are immutable.
    function test_StuckBond_SetImplementationDoesNotUnstickExistingGame() public {
        AggregateVerifier game = _createFirstGameWithTeeOnly();
        vm.warp(game.expectedResolution().raw() + 1);

        // Deploy a hypothetical "fixed" impl with threshold=1
        AggregateVerifier fixedImpl = new AggregateVerifier(
            AGGREGATE_VERIFIER_GAME_TYPE,
            IAnchorStateRegistry(address(anchorStateRegistry)),
            IDelayedWETH(payable(address(delayedWETH))),
            IVerifier(address(teeVerifier)),
            IVerifier(address(zkVerifier)),
            TEE_IMAGE_HASH,
            AggregateVerifier.ZkHashes(ZK_RANGE_HASH, ZK_AGGREGATE_HASH),
            CONFIG_HASH,
            L2_CHAIN_ID,
            BLOCK_INTERVAL,
            INTERMEDIATE_BLOCK_INTERVAL,
            1
        );
        factory.setImplementation(AGGREGATE_VERIFIER_GAME_TYPE, IDisputeGame(address(fixedImpl)));

        vm.expectRevert(AggregateVerifier.NotEnoughProofs.selector);
        game.resolve();

        assertEq(game.PROOF_THRESHOLD(), 2, "old impl threshold baked into clone bytecode");
    }

    /// expectedResolution is finite (7d) — the 14-day recovery branch is unreachable.
    function test_StuckBond_ExpectedResolutionNotMax() public {
        AggregateVerifier game = _createFirstGameWithTeeOnly();

        uint64 er = game.expectedResolution().raw();
        assertTrue(er != type(uint64).max);
        assertTrue(er > 0);
    }

    /// Cascade: stuck parent blocks children via ParentGameNotResolved.
    /// Admin blacklist of parent unblocks children as CHALLENGER_WINS.
    /// Parent's own bond remains frozen.
    function test_StuckBond_CascadeToChildren() public {
        AggregateVerifier parent = _createFirstGameWithTeeOnly();
        vm.warp(parent.expectedResolution().raw() + 1);

        currentL2BlockNumber = BLOCK_INTERVAL * 2;
        Claim childClaim = Claim.wrap(keccak256(abi.encode("child-root", currentL2BlockNumber)));
        bytes memory teeProof = _generateProof(bytes("child-tee"), AggregateVerifier.ProofType.TEE);

        AggregateVerifier child = _createAggregateVerifierGame(
            address(this),
            childClaim,
            currentL2BlockNumber,
            address(parent),
            teeProof
        );

        // Give child both proofs
        bytes memory zkProof = _generateProof(bytes("child-zk"), AggregateVerifier.ProofType.ZK);
        _provideProof(child, ZK_PROVER, zkProof);
        assertEq(child.proofCount(), 2);

        vm.warp(child.expectedResolution().raw() + 1);

        // Child can't resolve — parent stuck in IN_PROGRESS forever
        vm.expectRevert(AggregateVerifier.ParentGameNotResolved.selector);
        child.resolve();

        // Admin blacklists stuck parent → child resolves as CHALLENGER_WINS
        anchorStateRegistry.blacklistDisputeGame(IDisputeGame(address(parent)));
        GameStatus childStatus = child.resolve();
        assertEq(uint256(childStatus), uint256(GameStatus.CHALLENGER_WINS));
        assertEq(child.bondRecipient(), address(this));

        // Parent's own bond still stuck forever
        vm.expectRevert(AggregateVerifier.NotEnoughProofs.selector);
        parent.resolve();
    }

    /// Scale: N first games during partial prover outage all get stuck.
    /// Funds-at-risk quantified: 10 games × 1 ETH = 10 ETH on one 7-day outage.
    function test_StuckBond_MultipleGamesStuckDuringOutage() public {
        uint256 numGames = 10;
        AggregateVerifier[] memory games = new AggregateVerifier[](numGames);

        // All first games must be at l2Seq == BLOCK_INTERVAL (next anchor step).
        // Competing proposers submit games with different rootClaims — all get stuck.
        currentL2BlockNumber = BLOCK_INTERVAL;
        for (uint256 i = 0; i < numGames; i++) {
            Claim rootClaim = Claim.wrap(keccak256(abi.encode("outage-root", i)));
            bytes memory teeProof = _generateProof(
                bytes.concat("outage-tee", bytes(abi.encode(i))),
                AggregateVerifier.ProofType.TEE
            );

            games[i] = _createAggregateVerifierGame(
                address(this),
                rootClaim,
                currentL2BlockNumber,
                address(anchorStateRegistry),
                teeProof
            );
        }

        // 7-day ZK outage: no ZK proofs submitted
        vm.warp(games[0].expectedResolution().raw() + 1);

        uint256 totalStuckBonds;
        for (uint256 i = 0; i < numGames; i++) {
            vm.expectRevert(AggregateVerifier.NotEnoughProofs.selector);
            games[i].resolve();
            totalStuckBonds += games[i].bondAmount();
        }

        // Asserts 10 bonds permanently frozen
        assertEq(totalStuckBonds, numGames * INIT_BOND);
        // 10 × 1 ETH = 10 ETH permanently stuck on a single 7-day partial prover outage
    }
}

Expected output (actual forge test run against v8.1.0)

$ forge test --ffi --match-path "test/multiproof/StuckBond_PROOF_THRESHOLD_2.t.sol" -vvv

Compiling 1 files with Solc 0.8.15
Solc 0.8.15 finished in 3.36s
Compiler run successful!

Ran 10 tests for test/multiproof/StuckBond_PROOF_THRESHOLD_2.t.sol:StuckBondProofThreshold2Test
[PASS] test_StuckBond_BlacklistSelfDoesNotUnstick()                  (gas:   568 634)
[PASS] test_StuckBond_CannotAddSecondProofAfterGameOver()            (gas:   510 928)
[PASS] test_StuckBond_CascadeToChildren()                            (gas: 1 045 646)
[PASS] test_StuckBond_ChangeRespectedGameTypeDoesNotUnstick()        (gas:   522 030)
[PASS] test_StuckBond_ExpectedResolutionNotMax()                     (gas:   508 071)
[PASS] test_StuckBond_MultipleGamesStuckDuringOutage()               (gas: 4 224 409)
[PASS] test_StuckBond_ResolveAndClaimCreditBothRevert()              (gas:   535 562)
[PASS] test_StuckBond_RetirementTimestampDoesNotUnstick()            (gas:   521 875)
[PASS] test_StuckBond_SetImplementationDoesNotUnstickExistingGame()  (gas: 3 725 402)
[PASS] test_StuckBond_StillStuckAfter14Days()                        (gas:   535 569)

Suite result: ok. 10 passed; 0 failed; 0 skipped; finished in 7.91ms (31.72ms CPU time)

What each test demonstrates

Test	Demonstrates
ResolveAndClaimCreditBothRevert	Core: at gameOver() with proofCount=1, both resolve() and claimCredit() revert. Bond inaccessible.
StillStuckAfter14Days	14-day timeout fallback in claimCredit is unreachable when expectedResolution != max.
CannotAddSecondProofAfterGameOver	verifyProposalProof blocks late second proof via if (gameOver()) revert GameOver(). Missing proof cannot be supplied.
BlacklistSelfDoesNotUnstick	Admin blacklist of the stuck game is a no-op — resolve consults isGameBlacklisted(parentGame) at AggregateVerifier.sol:941, not the game itself.
ChangeRespectedGameTypeDoesNotUnstick	_getParentGameStatus hardcodes DEFENDER_WINS for parent == ASR regardless of respected type.
RetirementTimestampDoesNotUnstick	Retirement check is parent-only; ASR parent is not a game.
SetImplementationDoesNotUnstickExistingGame	Factory impl upgrade applies to new clones only. Existing EIP-1167 proxies retain old bytecode and PROOF_THRESHOLD.
ExpectedResolutionNotMax	Confirms expectedResolution is finite (7d) — closes the only recovery branch in claimCredit.
CascadeToChildren	Stuck first game propagates to descendants. Child resolve reverts with ParentGameNotResolved. Admin must blacklist parent to unblock children. Parent's own bond stays frozen.
MultipleGamesStuckDuringOutage	Quantified funds-at-risk: 10 first games × 1 ETH = 10 ETH permanently locked on one 7-day partial prover outage. Asserted on-chain by totalStuckBonds == numGames * INIT_BOND.

Funds at risk

• Per stuck game: bondAmount frozen permanently.
• Outage-driven scaling: N_days × K_games_per_day × bondAmount frozen during a partial prover outage. Each stuck first game also requires off-chain admin blacklistDisputeGame to release its descendant subtree.
• Asserted in the PoC: 10 ETH locked per one 7-day outage with 10 first-games/day at 1 ETH bond. At mainnet production bond sizes (OP Stack precedent: 0.08–10 ETH per game) the impact grows proportionally.
• proofThreshold == 2 is one of two branches explicitly admitted by the constructor (InvalidProofThreshold guard permits only 1 or 2). Whatever configuration the contract admits must be safe under the audit scope.

Independent validation on live fork (secondary, optional)

The same revert sequence reproduces on a Hoodi fork against the deployed DGF / ASR / DelayedWETH (FindingB_LiveExploit.t.sol):

forge test --ffi \
  --match-path "test/multiproof/FindingB_LiveExploit.t.sol" \
  --fork-url https://ethereum-hoodi-rpc.publicnode.com -vv

Deployed addresses exercised: DGF 0x154972aB98A5e321a9c7aB7677973f1F501a8090, ASR 0x60A6C389F0BC5cE4269A40d9695927bC58700328, DelayedWETH from the live implementation. Result: NotEnoughProofs on resolve(), GameNotResolved on claimCredit(), bond 50000000000000000 wei stuck on-chain after vm.warp of 100+ days.

Environment

repo:      github.com/base/contracts
tag:       v8.1.0
commit:    01dad230390cd69bcf130b5fc7a7a580b31650a7
foundry:   forge 1.5.1-stable (b0a9dd9ce)
compiler:  solc 0.8.15 (matches AggregateVerifier pragma)
test file: test/multiproof/StuckBond_PROOF_THRESHOLD_2.t.sol
suite:     StuckBondProofThreshold2Test
result:    10 passed / 0 failed / 0 skipped