Shutdown of greater than or equal to 30% of network processing nodes without brute force actions, but does not shut down the network
Unintended chain split (network partition)
Description
Brief/Intro
Privileged admin_* and opp2p_* methods are exposed on the node’s public JSON-RPC interface instead of a separate authenticated operator-only endpoint, turning a reachable RPC port into an unauthenticated control plane for node administration and peer-management actions.
Vulnerability Details
Privileged admin_* and opp2p_* control methods are exposed on the main JSON-RPC listener for full nodes instead of being kept behind a dedicated, authenticated operator interface. The runtime registers these namespaces based on the presence of network_admin and p2p_network channels, while full-node startup wiring always provides those channels and RpcActor::start does not enforce the documented enable_admin boundary. The server stack described in the findings also lacks request authentication, and the default listener configuration can make the RPC socket network reachable. Once mounted, the handlers forward attacker-controlled inputs directly into sequencer-control, payload-ingestion, and swarm-management operations. As a result, normal public RPC exposure becomes an unauthenticated control plane for both node administration and peer-network policy.
Impact Details
A remote caller that can reach the RPC port can stop or start sequencing, flip recovery mode, override leadership behavior, reset derivation, and inject attacker-chosen unsafe payload work into the engine path. The same caller can also block or disconnect honest peers, blacklist IPs or subnets, protect attacker-controlled peers, and force outbound dials, letting them isolate the node, bias its peer set, or repeatedly degrade availability.
PoC uses an in-process RpcActor with stubbed engine/sequencer clients and local channel receivers to verify that unauthenticated HTTP callers can invoke admin_* and opp2p_* methods when enable_admin=false. It demonstrates public exposure and forwarding of privileged control messages.
Remediation
Gate registration of the privileged admin_* and opp2p_* RPC namespaces on RpcBuilder.enable_admin, so channel presence alone no longer exposes operator control methods on the public listener.