#46108 [SC-Medium] Minting Cap can by bypassed while self minting
Submitted on May 25th 2025 at 00:34:50 UTC by @Oxgritty for Audit Comp | Flare | FAssets
- Report ID: #46108
- Report Type: Smart Contract
- Report severity: Medium
- Target: https://github.com/flare-foundation/fassets/blob/main/contracts/assetManager/library/Minting.sol
- Impacts:
- Griefing (e.g. no profit motive for an attacker, but damage to the users or the protocol)
Description
Brief/Intro
- Minting Cap can be bypassed when Agent Owner does self minting, due to lack of proper checks in
Minting.sol::selfMint.
Vulnerability Details
- When minting is done for a normal user or agent does self minting, two amounts are minted mintValueUBA and _poolFeeUBA.
- So its important that, before minting we account for both the amounts while checking minting cap, but in
Minting.sol::selfMintthis check is only done formintValue, meaningpoolFeewill be minted over the limit.
Impact Details
- Minting Cap plays an important role in ensuring proper functioning of the protocol and this bug allows the agent vault owner to do bypass it.
References
- Correct checking when a user mints
- Flawed minting cap check when agent owner self mints
Proof of Concept
POC [Note: All units are in AMG for simplicity]
Step 1: Assumptions we are making:
- mintingCapAMG = 10000000000
- mintValueAMG = 10000000000
- Agent Owner has sufficient collateral in the system to self mint.
- mintFee = 1000000000 (10% of mintValueAMG)
- poolFee = 400000000 (40% of mintFee)
Step 2: Agent Owner calls MintingFacet.sol::selfMint
- When control flow will reach
Minting.sol::selfMint, minting cap check will be done formintValueand notmintValue + poolFee. - mintValue worth of fassets will be minted to minter address and poolFee worth of fassets will be minted to collateral pool, effectively bypassing the minting cap.