69673 sc low users cannot revoke a migration permit after role removal

Submitted on Mar 16th 2026 at 07:47:51 UTC by @Athenea for Audit Comp | Folks Finance: Staking Contracts

• Report ID: #69673

• Report Type: Smart Contract

• Report severity: Low

• Target: https://github.com/Folks-Finance/folks-staking-contracts/blob/main/src/Staking.sol

Description

Brief/Intro

This insight highlights a user-control issue in the migration permission system. Once a migrator loses MIGRATOR_ROLE, users who had previously approved it can no longer explicitly revoke that approval, leaving stale permissions in storage.

Vulnerability Details

setMigrationPermit() requires the target address to currently hold MIGRATOR_ROLE for both enabling and disabling a permit:

function setMigrationPermit(address _migrator, bool _isMigrationPermitted) external {
    if (!hasRole(MIGRATOR_ROLE, _migrator)) revert MigratorNotFound(_migrator);

    migrationPermits[_migrator][msg.sender] = _isMigrationPermitted;
    emit MigrationPermitUpdated(_migrator, msg.sender, _isMigrationPermitted);
}

As a result, once a migrator loses MIGRATOR_ROLE, users who previously approved it can no longer explicitly revoke that approval.

Impact Details

This is not an immediate exploit, because a role-revoked migrator cannot call migratePositionsFrom() while the role is absent. Still, the behavior weakens user control and leaves stale approvals in place until role configuration changes again.

References

https://github.com/Folks-Finance/folks-staking-contracts/blob/3131a2d46b5afa76f606bf08adfd85452a47e2d8/src/Staking.sol#L166-L210

Recommendation

Require MIGRATOR_ROLE only when enabling a permit, not when disabling one:

function setMigrationPermit(address _migrator, bool _isMigrationPermitted) external {
    if (_isMigrationPermitted && !hasRole(MIGRATOR_ROLE, _migrator)) {
        revert MigratorNotFound(_migrator);
    }

    migrationPermits[_migrator][msg.sender] = _isMigrationPermitted;
    emit MigrationPermitUpdated(_migrator, msg.sender, _isMigrationPermitted);
}

Proof of Concept

Steps

1. Deploy Staking.

2. Grant MIGRATOR_ROLE to migrator.

3. User enables migration permit for migrator.

4. Admin revokes MIGRATOR_ROLE from migrator.

5. User tries to disable the permit.

Code

Git Url: https://github.com/breakAIDev/fork-staking-poc.git

pragma solidity ^0.8.23;

import {console2} from "forge-std/console2.sol";
import {BaseInsightScript, PoCToken} from "../src/InsightPoCHelpers.sol";
import {Staking} from "repo-src/Staking.sol";

contract RevokePermitAfterRoleRemoval is BaseInsightScript {
    function run() external {
        _selectForkIfConfigured();

        console2.log("=== Insight 1: Revoke permit fails after role removal ===");

        (Staking staking, PoCToken token) = _deployStakingFixture();
        token;

        bytes32 migratorRole = staking.MIGRATOR_ROLE();

        vm.prank(USER_A);
        staking.setMigrationPermit(MIGRATOR, true);
        console2.log("Step 1: USER_A enabled migration permit for MIGRATOR");

        vm.prank(ADMIN);
        staking.revokeRole(migratorRole, MIGRATOR);
        console2.log("Step 2: ADMIN revoked MIGRATOR_ROLE");

        vm.prank(USER_A);
        (bool success, bytes memory lowLevelData) =
            address(staking).call(abi.encodeCall(staking.setMigrationPermit, (MIGRATOR, false)));

        if (success) {
            console2.log("Unexpected: permit revocation succeeded");
        } else {
            console2.log("Step 3: USER_A tried to disable the permit and the call reverted");
            console2.logBytes(lowLevelData);
        }
    }
}

Result

Script ran successfully.

Gas used: 5623713

== Logs ==

  Fork selected from BSC_RPC_URL

  === Insight 1: Revoke permit fails after role removal ===

  Step 1. USER_A enabled migration permit for MIGRATOR

  Step 2. ADMIN revoked MIGRATOR_ROLE

  Step 3. USER_A tried to disable the permit and the call reverted
  
0x881da127000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000e