88834 sc low maxmint overstates the executable mint limit after exchange rate changes
Submitted on Aug 15th 2026 at 05:51:28 UTC by @QED for Audit Comp | Firelight
- Report ID: #88834
- Report Type: Smart Contract
- Report severity: Low
- Target: https://github.com/immunefi-team/audit-comp-firelight/blob/v1\\_audit\\_ready/contracts/core/FirelightVault.sol
- Impacts:
- Contract fails to deliver promised returns, but doesn't lose value
Description
Brief/Intro
FirelightVault can return a positive ERC-4626 maxMint quote whose exact share amount cannot fit within the remaining asset capacity, causing compliant integrations to submit reverting mints.
Vulnerability Details
Affected target: FirelightVault at commit 42f9ea5e43d88b35197b901acc2a8c24b314fa62
Severity: Low
Asset: contracts/core/FirelightVault.sol
Root Cause
maxMint computes convertToShares(depositLimit) - totalSupply() instead of deriving the executable share amount from remaining asset capacity. The vault's virtual-asset/share conversion is not additive, while mint ceil-rounds the asset cost and _depositFunds rejects the resulting total when it exceeds depositLimit.
Attack Path
Deposit one asset
A depositor deposits one asset and receives one share.
Transfer an additional asset to the vault
Any underlying holder directly transfers one more asset to the vault, changing the state to one share backed by two assets under a three-asset limit.
Read the maximum mint quote
An ERC-4626 integration reads maxMint(receiver) = 1.
Preview the mint
previewMint(1) ceil-rounds the cost to two assets, although only one asset of capacity remains.
Attempt to mint
The integration calls mint(1, receiver), and the cap check reverts with DepositLimitExceeded.
Impact Details
ERC-4626 routers, allocators, frontends, and batched transactions can suffer reliable availability failures when they mint the advertised maximum after exchange-rate changes, but the defect does not enable theft or bypass the deposit limit.
References
FirelightVault.maxMintFirelightVault.mintFirelightVault._depositFundsFirelightVaultconversion formulas- ERC-4626 specification
Recommended Fix
Compute maxMint from remaining asset capacity with mint-equivalent rounding and enforce with regression tests that previewMint(maxMint(receiver)) <= maxDeposit(receiver) across exchange-rate changes.
Link to Proof of Concept
https://gist.github.com/w-qedaudit/b8c9f3d72bf1c47f73955da7adaf1ed2
Proof of Concept
PoC gist: https://gist.github.com/w-qedaudit/b8c9f3d72bf1c47f73955da7adaf1ed2
Prerequisite: Git, Node.js, and npm must be installed with network access available for cloning and dependency installation.
The supplied poc.js is a temporary focused reproducer copied into the checked-out repository at runtime; it is not an in-tree project test or modification.
cd firelight/igtok1p3-maxmint-unexecutable
chmod +x run.sh
./run.sh
Expected successful output includes:
STATE totalSupply=1 totalAssets=2 depositLimit=3
QUOTE maxDeposit=1 maxMint=1 previewMint(maxMint)=2
RESULT mint(maxMint) reverted error=DepositLimitExceeded
POST totalSupply=1 totalAssets=2
The complete output from the verified execution is included in poc_output.txt.