Shardeum Core III
Reports by Severity
Critical
#39979 [BC-Critical] Total network shutdown via fixDeserializedWrappedEVMAccount call through binary_repair_oos_accounts endpoint
#40007 [BC-Critical] Drain node staking account due to improper validation of SetCertTime internal transaction
#39191 [BC-Critical] JoinRoute: Attacker reachable input serialization
#39465 [BC-Critical] Lack of authorization on InitClaimReward transaction allows attacker to prevent all nodes from being rewarded
#39511 [BC-Critical] Malicious node can drain balance of other node's nominator evm address
#40000 [BC-Critical] Improper input validation in fixDeserializedWrappedEVMAccount leads to DOS and total network shutdown
#39973 [BC-Critical] Standard node rewarding flow can be blocked
#40005 [BC-Critical] Removal of node out of network via remove by app gossip and signature duplications
#39994 [BC-Critical] Tricking nodes into signing nearly-arbitrary data
#39355 [BC-Critical] Tricking Legit node to sign their own apoptosis request payload
#39812 [BC-Critical] Bypass `SetCertTime` transaction signature check #1
#39507 [BC-Critical] Insufficient validation on ClaimReward transaction allows attacker to claim an inflated reward OR prevent all nodes from being rewarded
#39364 [BC-Critical] Trusting heavily on "appData" enables infinite SHM duplication through double-spend exploit
#39875 [BC-Critical] Lack of validation of node deactivation time in `ClaimRewards` allows to steal rewards
#39675 [BC-Critical] Reward Exploitation via Unvalidated Node Status in "initRewardTX"
#39678 [BC-Critical] Bypass certificate signing validation by double counting signatures due to capitalization
#39679 [BC-Critical] Bypass certificate signing validation by double counting signatures due to ignored suffixes
#39791 [BC-Critical] Filling the queue with "setCertTime" stop the network from processing new transactions
#39813 [BC-Critical] Bypass `SetCertTime` transaction signature check #2
#39838 [BC-Critical] Bypass certificate signing validation by double counting signatures due to signature malleability
#39871 [BC-Critical] Lack of consensus voting in best cycle calculation allows a malicious validator to fake cycle data and crash all nodes
#39876 [BC-Critical] Receiving rewards multiple times for the same period
#39885 [BC-Critical] Signature forgery on behalf of network nodes using binary_sign_app_data endpoint
#39921 [BC-Critical] accountDeserializer isn't type safe
#39873 [BC-Critical] Lack of validation of node activation time in `InitRewardTimes` allows to steal rewards
#39811 [BC-Critical] Inducing large memory allocation via /join endpoint
High
#39149 [BC-High] EIP-2930 transactions with 20k-address overload the nodes and force the network into "safety" mode
Medium
#39395 [BC-Medium] got.get without response limit
#39850 [BC-Medium] Bypass TransferFromSecureAccount transaction validations
#39913 [BC-Medium] No rate Limiting in resource-intensive endpoint
Insight
#39752 [BC-Insight] There is an issue related to incorrect version parsing and comparison logic lead to incorrect node validation,
#39463 [BC-Insight] `multiSendWithHeader` and `sendWithHeader` have JSON injection vulnerability
#39027 [BC-Insight] Abusive Join request handler node
#39882 [BC-Insight] Data unsubscribe same node replay
#39164 [BC-Insight] Service point exhaustion
#39103 [BC-Insight] Unchecked data size in "getStakeTxBlobFromEVMTx()" can use lots of CPU resources
Reports by Type
Blockchain/DLT
#39979 [BC-Critical] Total network shutdown via fixDeserializedWrappedEVMAccount call through binary_repair_oos_accounts endpoint
#40007 [BC-Critical] Drain node staking account due to improper validation of SetCertTime internal transaction
#39191 [BC-Critical] JoinRoute: Attacker reachable input serialization
#39752 [BC-Insight] There is an issue related to incorrect version parsing and comparison logic lead to incorrect node validation,
#39395 [BC-Medium] got.get without response limit
#39465 [BC-Critical] Lack of authorization on InitClaimReward transaction allows attacker to prevent all nodes from being rewarded
#39463 [BC-Insight] `multiSendWithHeader` and `sendWithHeader` have JSON injection vulnerability
#39511 [BC-Critical] Malicious node can drain balance of other node's nominator evm address
#40000 [BC-Critical] Improper input validation in fixDeserializedWrappedEVMAccount leads to DOS and total network shutdown
#39973 [BC-Critical] Standard node rewarding flow can be blocked
#40005 [BC-Critical] Removal of node out of network via remove by app gossip and signature duplications
#39994 [BC-Critical] Tricking nodes into signing nearly-arbitrary data
#39355 [BC-Critical] Tricking Legit node to sign their own apoptosis request payload
#39812 [BC-Critical] Bypass `SetCertTime` transaction signature check #1
#39507 [BC-Critical] Insufficient validation on ClaimReward transaction allows attacker to claim an inflated reward OR prevent all nodes from being rewarded
#39364 [BC-Critical] Trusting heavily on "appData" enables infinite SHM duplication through double-spend exploit
#39850 [BC-Medium] Bypass TransferFromSecureAccount transaction validations
#39149 [BC-High] EIP-2930 transactions with 20k-address overload the nodes and force the network into "safety" mode
#39027 [BC-Insight] Abusive Join request handler node
#39882 [BC-Insight] Data unsubscribe same node replay
#39875 [BC-Critical] Lack of validation of node deactivation time in `ClaimRewards` allows to steal rewards
#39164 [BC-Insight] Service point exhaustion
#39675 [BC-Critical] Reward Exploitation via Unvalidated Node Status in "initRewardTX"
#39678 [BC-Critical] Bypass certificate signing validation by double counting signatures due to capitalization
#39679 [BC-Critical] Bypass certificate signing validation by double counting signatures due to ignored suffixes
#39791 [BC-Critical] Filling the queue with "setCertTime" stop the network from processing new transactions
#39103 [BC-Insight] Unchecked data size in "getStakeTxBlobFromEVMTx()" can use lots of CPU resources
#39813 [BC-Critical] Bypass `SetCertTime` transaction signature check #2
#39838 [BC-Critical] Bypass certificate signing validation by double counting signatures due to signature malleability
#39871 [BC-Critical] Lack of consensus voting in best cycle calculation allows a malicious validator to fake cycle data and crash all nodes
#39876 [BC-Critical] Receiving rewards multiple times for the same period
#39885 [BC-Critical] Signature forgery on behalf of network nodes using binary_sign_app_data endpoint
#39913 [BC-Medium] No rate Limiting in resource-intensive endpoint
#39921 [BC-Critical] accountDeserializer isn't type safe
#39873 [BC-Critical] Lack of validation of node activation time in `InitRewardTimes` allows to steal rewards
#39811 [BC-Critical] Inducing large memory allocation via /join endpoint
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