#41528 [SC-High] When claiming rewards in native Bera via `StakeV2.claimRewardsInNative`, excess `token0Debt` or/and `token1Debt` is not returned to the kodiak vault but stuck in `StakeV2` contract.

Submitted on Mar 16th 2025 at 09:46:33 UTC by @X0sauce for Audit Comp | Yeet

  • Report ID: #41528

  • Report Type: Smart Contract

  • Report severity: High

  • Target: https://github.com/immunefi-team/audit-comp-yeet/blob/main/src/StakeV2.sol

  • Impacts:

    • Permanent freezing of unclaimed yield

Description

Vulnerability Details

When claiming rewards in the form of native Bera tokens through StakeV2.claimRewardsInNative, any surplus unused token0Debt and token1Debt is not sent back to the kodiak vault. Instead, it is returned to the StakeV2 contract, where it becomes stuck and cannot be utilized for future reward claims.

In StakeV2.claimRewardsInNative

    function claimRewardsInNative(
        uint256 amountToWithdraw,
        IZapper.SingleTokenSwap calldata swapData0,
        IZapper.SingleTokenSwap calldata swapData1,
        IZapper.KodiakVaultUnstakingParams calldata unstakeParams,
        IZapper.VaultRedeemParams calldata redeemParams
    ) external nonReentrant {
        _updateRewards(msg.sender);

        IZapper.VaultRedeemParams memory updatedRedeemParams = _verifyAndPrepareClaim(amountToWithdraw, redeemParams);

        IERC20(redeemParams.vault).approve(address(zapper), amountToWithdraw);
@>        uint256 receivedAmount =
                            zapper.zapOutNative(msg.sender, swapData0, swapData1, unstakeParams, updatedRedeemParams); //@audit zaps out of ERC4626 vaultto native Bera Token to be given to staker as rewards

        emit Claimed(msg.sender, receivedAmount);
    }

In Zapper.zapOutNative

    function zapOutNative(
        address receiver,
        SingleTokenSwap calldata swapData0,
        SingleTokenSwap calldata swapData1,
        IZapper.KodiakVaultUnstakingParams calldata unstakeParams,
        IZapper.VaultRedeemParams calldata redeemParams
    ) public nonReentrant onlyWhitelistedKodiakVaults(unstakeParams.kodiakVault) returns (uint256 totalNativeOut) {
@>        (IERC20 token0, IERC20 token1, uint256 token0Debt, uint256 token1Debt) = _yeetOut(redeemParams, unstakeParams); //@audit withdraws island token from ERC4626 vault and retrieves underlying token0 and token1 from kodiak vault
        if (token0Debt == 0 && token1Debt == 0) {
            return (0);
        }

        totalNativeOut = _swapToWBERA(token0, token1, token0Debt, token1Debt, swapData0, swapData1);
        _sendNativeToken(receiver, totalNativeOut);
    }

In Zapper._yeetOut

    function _yeetOut(
        IZapper.VaultRedeemParams calldata redeemParams,
        IZapper.KodiakVaultUnstakingParams calldata unstakeParams
    ) internal returns (IERC20 token0, IERC20 token1, uint256 token0Debt, uint256 token1Debt) {
@>        uint256 islandTokensReceived = _withdrawFromVault(redeemParams); //@audit withdraws island token from ERC4626 vault and retrieves underlying token0 and token1 from kodiak vault
        if (redeemParams.receiver == address(this)) {
            (token0, token1, token0Debt, token1Debt) =
@>            _approveAndUnstakeFromKodiakVault(unstakeParams, islandTokensReceived); // @audit removes token0 and token1 from kodiak vault by transferring islandToken
            if (unstakeParams.receiver != address(this)) {
                return (IERC20(address(0)), IERC20(address(0)), 0, 0);
            }
        }
    }

In Zapper_approveAndUnstakeFromKodiakVault

    function _approveAndUnstakeFromKodiakVault(
        IZapper.KodiakVaultUnstakingParams calldata unstakeParams,
        uint256 islandTokenDebt
    ) internal returns (IERC20, IERC20, uint256, uint256) {
        // unstake from destination Island
        IERC20 _token0 = IKodiakVaultV1(unstakeParams.kodiakVault).token0();
        IERC20 _token1 = IKodiakVaultV1(unstakeParams.kodiakVault).token1();
        require(unstakeParams.receiver != address(0), "Zapper: zero address beneficiary");
        IERC20(address(unstakeParams.kodiakVault)).safeIncreaseAllowance(address(kodiakStakingRouter), islandTokenDebt);
        (uint256 _amount0, uint256 _amount1,) = kodiakStakingRouter.removeLiquidity(
            IKodiakVaultV1(unstakeParams.kodiakVault),
            islandTokenDebt,
            unstakeParams.amount0Min,
            unstakeParams.amount1Min,
            unstakeParams.receiver
        );

        // require(islandTokenDebt == _liqBurned, "Invalid island token burn amount");
@>        return (_token0, _token1, _amount0, _amount1); //@audit actual token0 and token1 amounts (amount0 and amount1) used for swap for Wbera that will be converted back to native Bera to be rewarded to staker
    }

Going back to Zapper.zapOutNative

    function zapOutNative(
        address receiver,
        SingleTokenSwap calldata swapData0,
        SingleTokenSwap calldata swapData1,
        IZapper.KodiakVaultUnstakingParams calldata unstakeParams,
        IZapper.VaultRedeemParams calldata redeemParams
    ) public nonReentrant onlyWhitelistedKodiakVaults(unstakeParams.kodiakVault) returns (uint256 totalNativeOut) {
@>        (IERC20 token0, IERC20 token1, uint256 token0Debt, uint256 token1Debt) = _yeetOut(redeemParams, unstakeParams); //@audit withdraws island token from ERC4626 vault and retrieves underlying token0 and token1 from kodiak vault
        if (token0Debt == 0 && token1Debt == 0) {
            return (0);
        }

@>        totalNativeOut = _swapToWBERA(token0, token1, token0Debt, token1Debt, swapData0, swapData1); //@audit Swap token0 and token1 for Wbera
        _sendNativeToken(receiver, totalNativeOut);
    }

In Zapper._swapToWBERA

    function _swapToWBERA(
        IERC20 token0,
        IERC20 token1,
        uint256 token0Debt,
        uint256 token1Debt,
        SingleTokenSwap calldata swapData0,
        SingleTokenSwap calldata swapData1
    ) internal returns (uint256 wBeraDebt) {
        if (address(token0) == address(wbera)) {
            wBeraDebt += token0Debt;
            token0Debt = 0;
        } else {
            wBeraDebt += _verifyTokenAndSwap(swapData0, address(token0), address(wbera), address(this));
            token0Debt -= swapData0.inputAmount;
        }

        if (address(token1) == address(wbera)) {
            wBeraDebt += token1Debt;
            token1Debt = 0;
        } else {
            wBeraDebt += _verifyTokenAndSwap(swapData1, address(token1), address(wbera), address(this));
            token1Debt -= swapData1.inputAmount;
        }
        // log yeetBalance
@>        _clearUserDebt(token0, token1, token0Debt, token1Debt, _msgSender()); //@audit unused token0 or token1 amount is returned back to StakeV2 and stuck
    }

Root Cause

Lack of mechanism in place to return any unused surplus of token0 or token1 to the Kodiak vault.

Impact

Any surplus of token0 or token1 remains stuck in StakeV2 and cannot be utilized for subsequent reward claims.

Mitigation

Implement a mechasim to return the surplus token0Debt or token1Debt back to the Kodiak vaults for future reward claims.

Proof of Concept

POC

Consider the below simplistic scenario

  1. Bob, a staker, initiates a call to StakeV2.claimRewardsInNative to claim rewards equivalent to 100 vault shares.

  2. He proceeds to call zapper.zapOutToToken0, which leads him to zapper._yeetOut.

  3. During this process, he calls zapper._withdrawFromVault and receives 10 islandTokens in exchange for the 100 vault shares redeemed from the ERC4626 vault.

  4. The redeemParams.receiver is designated as the Zapper address, allowing Bob to enter Zapper._approveAndUnstakeFromKodiakVault to redeem the underlying token0 and token1 in exchange for the island tokens. In this process, he receives:

    • _token0 = Wbera

    • _token1 = USDC (the specific token type is not critical)

    • _amount0 = 10

    • _amount1 = 10

  5. Afterwards, he returns to Zapper.zapOutNative and calls Zapper._swapToWBERA with the following parameters:

    • token0 = WBERA

    • token1 = USDC

    • token0Debt = _token0 = 10

    • token1Debt = _token1 = 10

  6. Suppose the Zapper._swapToWBERA function is executed with a vault where token0 is WBERA, and the subsequent call result in:

    • Only 5 out of the 10 token1 (USDC) utilized to swap for 0.5 WBERA.

    • The remaining token1Debt = 10 - 5 = 5 USDC will be sent to StakeV2 and become stuck instead of being returned to the Kodiak vault, where it could be used for future reward claims.

    • The total wberaDebt = 10 + 0.5 = 10.5 WBERA.

  7. Ultimately, the total wberaDebt of 10.5 WBERA is transferred to Bob, while 5 USDC remains trapped in StakeV2.

A similar scenario can happen if token1 is the WBERA token

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