#41283 [SC-Low] Contract fails to deliver promised returns, due to changed `MAX_CAP_PER_WALLET_PER_EPOCH_FACTOR`
Submitted on Mar 13th 2025 at 10:34:06 UTC by @Oxl33 for Audit Comp | Yeet
- Report ID: #41283
- Report Type: Smart Contract
- Report severity: Low
- Target: https://github.com/immunefi-team/audit-comp-yeet/blob/main/src/Reward.sol
- Impacts:
- Contract fails to deliver promised returns, but doesn't lose value
Description
Description:
In the documentation it is stated:
There is a cap each day on what percentage of the daily emissions that an individual address can receive, set at 30%
But in reality MAX_CAP_PER_WALLET_PER_EPOCH_FACTOR is initialized as 30 and acts as a denominator, so maxClaimable is only ~3.3% of epoch rewards, not 30%.
This is where the value gets set initially:
contract RewardSettings is Ownable2Step {
/// @dev The max rewards a wallet can get per epoch
uint256 public MAX_CAP_PER_WALLET_PER_EPOCH_FACTOR;
event YeetRewardSettingsChanged(uint256 indexed maxCapPerWalletPerEpoch);
constructor() Ownable(msg.sender) {
/// @dev this is in percentage, 1/10 of the total rewards
@> MAX_CAP_PER_WALLET_PER_EPOCH_FACTOR = 30;
}
This is how the value gets used:
function getClaimableAmount(address user) public view returns (uint256) {
uint256 totalClaimable;
// Fixed-point arithmetic for more precision
uint256 scalingFactor = 1e18;
for (uint256 epoch = lastClaimedForEpoch[user] + 1; epoch < currentEpoch; epoch++) {
if (totalYeetVolume[epoch] == 0) continue; // Avoid division by zero
uint256 userVolume = userYeetVolume[epoch][user];
uint256 totalVolume = totalYeetVolume[epoch];
uint256 userShare = (userVolume * scalingFactor) / totalVolume;
@> uint256 maxClaimable = (epochRewards[epoch] / rewardsSettings.MAX_CAP_PER_WALLET_PER_EPOCH_FACTOR()); // max cap initially set to 30, so `maxClaimable` will be ~3.3% of epoch rewards
uint256 claimable = (userShare * epochRewards[epoch]) / scalingFactor;
if (claimable > maxClaimable) {
claimable = maxClaimable;
}
totalClaimable += claimable;
}
return totalClaimable;
}
Of course the owner is able to change the value by calling RewardSettings::setYeetRewardsSettings, but still I am letting you know about it, because code and docs don't match.
Another issue arises due to the fact, that MAX_CAP_PER_WALLET_PER_EPOCH_FACTOR value is the same for every epoch when calculating maxClaimable amount.
Consider this scenario:
- current max cap is 30%, user yeets big amounts of BERA in several different epochs, expecting to receive 30% of total rewards for each epoch they participated in
- user waits a few days before claiming, which can happen due to various reasons (it is not mentioned in docs that users can get punished for waiting before they claim)
- owner changes the max cap to e.g. 10%. This can be done due to various reasons, such as community/protocol team decision, rewarding smaller game participants, etc.
- when user tries to claim,
claimablewill get set tomaxClaimable, which is 10% of epoch rewards, even though the user has shares that represent 30%+ of the rewards - user will get less rewards than they expected, due to owner being able to set the cap at any time and this cap being used for all previous epochs
Impact:
Users will get smaller than expected rewards.
Recommended Mitigation:
Consider implementing a mechanism where each epoch can have its own MAX_CAP_PER_WALLET_PER_EPOCH_FACTOR value, or at least make it clear in the documentation that this value can be changed at any time and that it affects all previous epochs.
Proof of Concept
N/A