#39678 [BC-Critical] Bypass certificate signing validation by double counting signatures due to capitalization
Submitted on Feb 4th 2025 at 18:37:25 UTC by @Blockian for Audit Comp | Shardeum: Core III
Report ID: #39678
Report Type: Blockchain/DLT
Report severity: Critical
Target: https://github.com/shardeum/shardus-core/tree/bugbounty
Impacts:
Bypassing Staking Requirements
Network not being able to confirm new transactions (total network shutdown)
Description
Impact
Bypass stake certificate validation, allowing for non-staking nodes and network take-over
Bypass nodes removal validation, allowing to remove nodes from the network
Root Cause
The function validateClosestActiveNodeSignatures counts unique signatures, but double counts duplicate signatures with different capitalization.
Attack Flow
Staking
Malicious node generates a fake
JoinRequestwith a fakeStakingCertificateIt brute-forces
StakingCertificatefields to make sure its one of the closest nodes to the hash of the staking certificates. This is easy, as only 1 node is needed to be close.
It creates the full
JoinRequest, with multiple copies of its signature, instead of signatures from many other nodes, changing only the capitalization of the signatures.It calls
gossip-join-requestOther nodes receive the join request, and validate it using
validateClosestActiveNodeSignatures.The validation bypasses, as the signatures are valid because capitalization is ignored.
The new node joins the network without staking.
Kicking a node
Malicious node generates a fake
RemoveCertificate.It fills it with multiple copies of its signature, instead of signatures from many other nodes, changing only the capitalization of the signatures.
It calls
remove-by-appgossip route.Other nodes receive the certificate, and validate it using
validateClosestActiveNodeSignatures.The validation bypasses, as the signatures are valid because capitalization is ignored.
The victim node is kicked from the network.
Deep Dive
The function validateClosestActiveNodeSignatures uses Crypto.verify which uses lib-crypto-utils' verifyObj which calls verify which calls ensureBuffer on the signature which runs
on the signatures, which ignore capitalization.
Suggested Fix
I suggest to do two think:
Ensure
lowercaseon any payload on any gossip and http endpoint.Count signers and not signatures.
Severity
This allows to take over the network (by kicking nodes / adding nodes) and so it critical.
In addition, this is the same as 33222 and 34252 which were treated as critical.
Message to the project
I feel like my time was spent roughly 20% on researching, and 80% on trying to create POCs that match your standard or to answer question you give on the reported bugs. I believe there are more bugs to be found in the project, and that the current approach is the reason that bugs keep being found. I suggest you do an invite only competition, without defaultly requesting a POC, and only requesting one if you truly believe there is no bug. This would allow whitehats to actually uncover bugs.
Proof of Concept
POC
Note: this strongly relies on infosec_us_team's POC for 33222 so thanks to them :)
Both
shardeumandcoreshould be on thebugbountybranchApply
debug-10-nodesas stated in the docsApply the following patch on core:
Apply the following patch on
shardeum(obviously the logs are just for convenience)
Run
http://NODE_EXTERNAL_IP:NODE_EXTERNAL_PORT/blockian_gossipRemoveNode/?pk=PUBLIC_KEY_OF_ACTIVE_NODE_WITHIN_YOUR_SHARD_TO_KICK
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