Boost _ Shardeum_ Ancillaries 34492 - [Websites and Applications - Insight] DoS via unbounded tx id

Submitted on Tue Aug 13 2024 22:19:03 GMT-0400 (Atlantic Standard Time) by @Minato7namikazi for Boost | Shardeum: Ancillaries

Report ID: #34492

Report type: Websites and Applications

Report severity: Insight

Target: https://github.com/shardeum/relayer-distributor/tree/dev

Impacts:

• Taking down the application/website

• Temporarily disabling user to access target site, such as: Locking up the victim from login, Cookie bombing, etc.

Description

In api.ts in relayer-distributor

there is critical missed check in the validateRequestData function within the handling of the txIdList parameter for the /originalTx and /receipt endpoints.

Vulnerability Details

The code correctly parses the txIdList string into an array of transaction IDs. However, it doesn't check the length of the resulting array. This means a malicious actor could submit a very large txIdList, potentially causing a denial-of-service (DoS) attack by overwhelming the server with database queries.

1. The code does parse the txIdList string into an array:

let txIdListArr: string[] = [];
try {
  txIdListArr = StringUtils.safeJsonParse(txIdList);
} catch (e) {
  reply.send(
    Crypto.sign({
      success: false,
      error: `Invalid txIdList ${txIdList}`,
    })
  );
  return;
}

1. The code then iterates over each txId in the array:

for (const txId of txIdListArr) {
  // ... (validation and database query for each txId)
}

1. there is indeed no check on the length of txIdListArr before starting the loop.

Solution

Add a check to limit the number of transaction IDs allowed in the txIdList array. This limit should be consistent with the other limits imposed by the API like ( MAX_ORIGINAL_TXS_PER_REQUEST and MAX_RECEIPTS_PER_REQUEST )

Impact Details

Denial of Service (DoS):

• An attacker could send a request with an extremely large number of transaction IDs.

• The server would attempt to process each ID, leading to a high number of database queries.

• This could overwhelm the database, causing slowdowns or crashes.

• The affected endpoint could become unresponsive, denying service to legitimate users.

Resource Exhaustion:

• Processing a large number of IDs could consume significant CPU and memory resources.

• This could impact the performance of the entire server, affecting other services and users.

Proof of concept

Minimal PoC

import crypto from 'crypto';

// Simulated database query function
async function simulateDbQuery(txId: string): Promise<any> {
  await new Promise(resolve => setTimeout(resolve, 100)); // Simulate 100ms database query
  return { id: txId, data: 'Some data' };
}

// Vulnerable function similar to the original code
async function processTransactionList(txIdList: string): Promise<any[]> {
  let txIdListArr: string[];
  try {
    txIdListArr = JSON.parse(txIdList);
  } catch (e) {
    throw new Error(`Invalid txIdList ${txIdList}`);
  }

  const results = [];
  for (const txId of txIdListArr) {
    if (typeof txId !== 'string' || txId.length !== 64) {
      throw new Error(`Invalid txId ${txId} in the List`);
    }
    const result = await simulateDbQuery(txId);
    results.push(result);
  }

  return results;
}

// Function to generate a large list of fake transaction IDs
function generateLargeTxIdList(count: number): string[] {
  return Array(count).fill(0).map(() => crypto.randomBytes(32).toString('hex'));
}

// PoC demonstration
async function runPoC() {
  console.time('Processing time');

  const smallList = generateLargeTxIdList(10);
  const largeList = generateLargeTxIdList(1000);

  try {
    console.log('Processing small list (10 items)...');
    await processTransactionList(JSON.stringify(smallList));
    console.log('Small list processed successfully.');

    console.log('\nProcessing large list (1000 items)...');
    await processTransactionList(JSON.stringify(largeList));
    console.log('Large list processed successfully.');
  } catch (error) {
    console.error('Error:', error.message);
  }

  console.timeEnd('Processing time');
}

runPoC();

To run this PoC:

1. Save it as a .ts file (e.g., txListVulnerabilityPoC.ts)

2. (npm install -g typescript ts-node)

3. Run it with ts-node txListVulnerabilityPoC.ts

This is a minimal PoC to demonstrates the difference from high level :

1. A small list of 10 transaction IDs processes quickly.

2. A large list of 1000 transaction IDs takes significantly longer to process, simulating the potential for a DoS attack.

Expected output will be similar to:

Processing small list (10 items)...
Small list processed successfully.

Processing large list (1000 items)...
Large list processed successfully.
Processing time: ~100100ms

The large difference in processing time between the small and large lists demonstrates how an attacker could potentially overwhelm the server by sending a request with a very large number of transaction IDs.

This minimal PoC proves from high level that without a limit on the number of transaction IDs that can be processed in a single request, an attacker could cause significant resource consumption and potentially a denial of service.