#38459 [BC-Low] erigon remote DoS
Submitted on Jan 3rd 2025 at 22:39:50 UTC by @gln for Attackathon | Ethereum Protocol
Report ID: #38459
Report Type: Blockchain/DLT
Report severity: Low
Target: https://github.com/ledgerwatch/erigon
Impacts:
Shutdown of less than 10% of network processing nodes without brute force actions, but does not shut down the network
Description
Brief/Intro
Erigon contains embedded consensus implementation called Caplin.
BlobSidecarsByRange handler does not validate incoming parameters.
Malformed p2p request allows an attacker to trigger infinite loop in erigon node.
Vulnerability Details
Let's look at the BlobSidecarsByRange p2p handler https://github.com/erigontech/erigon/blob/main/cl/sentinel/handlers/blobs.go#L32
req.StartSlot and req.Count are not validated
ReadCanonicalBlobkRoot() returns zero hash for invalid slot
the 'for' loop continues to run
Basially, if req.StarSlot and req.Count are large enough, erigon could enter into an infinite loop.
Impact Details
Attacker could trigger an infinite loop in erigon node with a single malformed p2p request.
Link to Proof of Concept
https://gist.github.com/gln7/c8106d435f0d1f3cde96f8d76e886e10
Proof of Concept
Proof of Concept
How to reproduce:
get erigon source
apply poc.patch (see gist link)
run test:
Golang enters into an infite loop and starts to output messages like these:
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