#38225 [SC-Insight] user funds will get stuck if `removeDestination` executes before notarization an

Submitted on Dec 28th 2024 at 08:15:12 UTC by @OxAnmol for Audit Comp | Lombard

• Report ID: #38225

• Report Type: Smart Contract

• Report severity: Insight

• Target: https://github.com/lombard-finance/evm-smart-contracts/blob/main/contracts/bridge/Bridge.sol

• Impacts:

  • Temporary freezing of funds for at least 30 days

  • Permanent freezing of funds

Description

Brief/Intro

If Bridge:removeDestination is called before Bridge:authNotary or Bridge:withdraw, and the removed destination is the user's source chain, subsequent transactions to notarise will revert—causing user funds to become stuck.

Vulnerability Details

Admins have the ability to remove configured destinations at any time. If a user has recently deposited from a chain that is about to be removed and their deposit is in the consortium for validation, a subsequent removeDestination call can occur without anyone's knowledge. When the user's deposit is later validated and the consortium attempts to notarize the deposit, the transaction will revert due to this check:

 function authNotary(
        bytes calldata payload,
        bytes calldata proof
    ) external nonReentrant {
        ...SKIP...
 
        // Ensure that fromContract matches the bridgeContract
        // This make sure that call is not comming from unsupported bridge contract
        DestinationConfig memory destConf = getDestination(
            bytes32(action.fromChain)
        );

        if (destConf.bridgeContract != action.fromContract) {
@>            revert UnknownOriginContract(
                bytes32(action.fromChain),
                action.fromContract
            );
        }

        ...SKIP...
    }

Example Scenario

1. User calls BridgeInBsc:deposit with 1 LBTC to bridge from BSC to Base.

2. Admin calls Bridge:removeDestination in Base to remove support for BSC to Base bridging.

3. User's 1 LBTC is burned in BSC chain and their deposit enters consortium validation.

4. While the deposit is in consortium validation, removeDestination executes and the Base→BSC bridge is removed.

5. When authNotary is called after deposit validation, the transaction reverts because the source chain (BSC) is no longer supported, leaving the user's 1 LBTC stuck until BSC support is restored.

Impact Details

User funds will remain stuck until support for the removed destination is added again. I believe this is a temporary.

According to the immunefi severity guide this should be high because it is Temporary freezing of funds

References

https://github.com/lombard-finance/evm-smart-contracts/blob/a818ea0489178ccd00019edab24637c38501af7b/contracts/bridge/Bridge.sol#L237

Proof of Concept

Proof of Concept

Paste this test in Bridge.ts → Actions/Flows

it('should demonstrate funds getting stuck when destination removed during consortium validation', async function () {
            const amount = AMOUNT;
            const fee = amount / 10n;
            const amountWithoutFee = amount - fee;
            const receiver = signer2.address;

            // 1. First approve and deposit LBTC
            await lbtcSource
                .connect(signer1)
                .approve(await bridgeSource.getAddress(), amount);

            const tx = await bridgeSource
                .connect(signer1)
                .deposit(CHAIN_ID, encode(['address'], [receiver]), amount);

            // Get the deposit payload from the event
            const receipt = await tx.wait();

            // 2. Admin removes the destination before consortium validation
            await bridgeDestination.removeDestination(CHAIN_ID);

            // 3. Get consortium signature
            const data = await signDepositBridgePayload(
                [signer1],
                [true],
                CHAIN_ID,
                await bridgeSource.getAddress(),
                CHAIN_ID,
                await bridgeDestination.getAddress(),
                receiver,
                amountWithoutFee
            );

            // 4. Try to notarize - this should fail
            await expect(
                bridgeDestination
                    .connect(signer1)
                    .authNotary(data.payload, data.proof)
            ).to.be.revertedWithCustomError(
                bridgeDestination,
                'UnknownOriginContract'
            );

            // 5. Verify funds are effectively stuck
            expect(await lbtcSource.balanceOf(signer1.address)).to.equal(0); // User lost their funds
            expect(await lbtcDestination.balanceOf(receiver)).to.equal(0); // Receiver never got the funds
        });