#37500 [BC-Low] Blocklist can be circumvented due to incorrect blocking logic in `request_decider::c

Submitted on Dec 6th 2024 at 12:31:58 UTC by @n4nika for Attackathon | Stacks

• Report ID: #37500

• Report Type: Blockchain/DLT

• Report severity: Low

• Target: https://github.com/stacks-network/sbtc/tree/immunefi_attackaton_0.9/signer

• Impacts:

  • A bug in the respective layer 0/1/2 network code that results in unintended smart contract behavior with no concrete funds at direct risk

Description

Note to immunefi

This issue was discussed with the Stacks team on discord and I was asked by @Evonide to submit it without the need for a PoC, which is why none is provided on this issue

Summary

request_decider::can_accept_deposit_request currently returns Ok(true) if there is at least one non-blocklisted address as an input to a deposit UTXO. This means anyone can circumvent the blocklist by adding a tiny non-blocklisted UTXO as an input to their deposit request.

Finding Description

can_accept_deposit_request uses the following code to determine whether a certain UTXO can be accepted:

async fn can_accept_deposit_request(&self, req: &model::DepositRequest) -> Result<bool, Error> {

    // [getting addresses from the request]

    let responses = futures::stream::iter(&addresses)
        .then(|address| async { client.can_accept(&address.to_string()).await })
        .inspect_err(|error| tracing::error!(%error, "blocklist client issue"))
        .collect::<Vec<_>>()
        .await;

    // If any of the inputs addresses are fine then we pass the deposit
    // request.
    let can_accept = responses.into_iter().any(|res| res.unwrap_or(false));
    Ok(can_accept)
}

As we can see, we create a responses vector with elements for each input address, either being true if the address can be accepted or false if it should be rejected.

Then can_accept is determined by using .any on the responses. any returns true if there is at least one true element in responses.

Impact

Say a user has a big UTXO which is blacklisted but wants to deposit it. They can just create a deposit request including a very small UTXO from a non-blocklisted address, allowing them to successfully deposit their bitcoins to Stacks from an address which should not be allowed to do so.

Mitigation

Consider using .all instead of .any to ensure none of the inputs to the UTXO come from blocklisted addresses.

Proof of Concept

Omitted due to direct request from Stacks team