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Ethereum Protocol | Attackathon

#37186 [BC-Insight] Missing Validation for Fixed-Size bytes Types in ABI Parsing

Submitted on Nov 27th 2024 at 22:43:54 UTC by @CertiK for Attackathon | Ethereum Protocol

  • Report ID: #37186
  • Report Type: Blockchain/DLT
  • Report severity: Insight
  • Target: https://github.com/ledgerwatch/erigon
  • Impacts:
    • (Specifications) A bug in specifications with no direct impact on client implementations

Description

Brief/Intro

In the NewType function within type.go, there is a lack of validation for the size of fixed-length bytes types.

Vulnerability Details

According to the argument encoding for the solidity, the bytes should limited to 32 bytes:
https://docs.soliditylang.org/en/v0.8.23/abi-spec.html

| bytes: binary type of M bytes, 0 < M <= 32.

However, such limitation is missing in the accounts/abi/type.go:

   case "bytes":
       if varSize == 0 {
           typ.T = BytesTy
       } else {
           typ.T = FixedBytesTy
           typ.Size = varSize
       }

Also, it should be noted the validation has been added in Geth: https://github.com/ethereum/go-ethereum/pull/26075

Impact Details

Without validation, the code might accept invalid bytes types with sizes outside the allowed range and break the spec.

References

Proof of Concept

Proof of Concept

func TestNewFixedBytesOver32(t *testing.T) {
   _, err := NewType("bytes64", "", nil)
   if err == nil {
       t.Errorf("fixed bytes with size over 32 is mistakenly allowed")
   }
}
--- FAIL: TestNewFixedBytesOver32 (0.00s)
   /Users/xxx/erigon/accounts/abi/type_test.go:376: fixed bytes with size over 32 is mistakenly allowed
FAIL
FAIL    github.com/erigontech/erigon/accounts/abi   0.321s
FAIL