90295 sc low maxmint can return an unmintable share amount causing mint to revert and violating erc 4626
Submitted on Aug 24th 2026 at 09:21:27 UTC by @TrynX for Audit Comp | Firelight
- Report ID: #90295
- Report Type: Smart Contract
- Report severity: Low
- Target: https://github.com/immunefi-team/audit-comp-firelight/blob/v1\\_audit\\_ready/contracts/core/FirelightVault.sol
- Impacts:
- Contract fails to deliver promised returns, but doesn't lose value
Description
Description
Summary
maxMint() is intended to return the maximum number of shares mintable via mint() without exceeding depositLimit. However, maxMint() converts the full depositLimit into shares and then subtracts the existing totalSupply, instead of deriving the maximum shares from the remaining asset capacity. Once totalAssets > totalSupply, this can cause maxMint() to return more shares than the vault can actually accept, causing mint(maxMint(receiver), receiver) to revert with DepositLimitExceeded().
Finding description
maxMint() computes:
uint256 sharesLimit = convertToShares(depositLimit); // rounds down
return sharesLimit - shares; // shares = totalSupply()
mint() later converts the returned share amount back into assets using Math.Rounding.Ceil, then checks the result against depositLimit:
if (_totalAssets > depositLimit) revert DepositLimitExceeded();
Root cause. maxMint() computes its share limit from the entire depositLimit, converted at the vault's current share price, and only then subtracts totalSupply. This is not equivalent to computing the share limit directly from the remaining capacity (depositLimit - totalAssets) due to the vault's conversion formula and rounding. This can cause the floored result to exceed the number of shares the vault can actually accept, which the subsequent ceil-rounded mint() then exposes as a revert.
Impact
This violates the EIP-4626 requirement that maxMint() return a share amount mint() can accept without reverting in the same transaction (EIP-4626). Impact is limited to a reverted mint() call and inaccurate deposit-capacity reporting for integrators.
Recommendation
Derive maxMint() directly from the remaining asset capacity:
function maxMint(address receiver) public view override returns (uint256 amount) {
- uint256 shares = totalSupply();
- uint256 sharesLimit = convertToShares(depositLimit);
+ uint256 assets = totalAssets();
if (
isBlocklisted[receiver] ||
paused() ||
_hasActiveIncident() ||
- shares > sharesLimit
+ assets >= depositLimit
) {
return 0;
} else {
- return sharesLimit - shares;
+ return convertToShares(depositLimit - assets);
}
}
References
FirelightVault::maxMintFirelightVault::mint- EIP-4626
Link to Proof of Concept
https://gist.github.com/Tryn0x0/7222434ecef9cfff638c4aa30630db5e
Proof of Concept
Proof of Concept
The test demonstrates that
maxMint()can return a share amount thatmint()subsequently rejects withDepositLimitExceeded().
Add the following function to audit-comp-firelight/test/deposit_and_withdraw.js:
(Also provided in the Gist)
describe.only('L-03 PoC — maxMint() can return more shares than the vault can actually accept', function () {
const DECIMALS = 6
function randBig(min, max) {
const range = max - min + 1n
const r = BigInt(Math.floor(Math.random() * Number(range)))
return min + r
}
it('proves the issue with a deterministic case and validates it across randomized post-yield states', async () => {
{
const { token_contract, firelight_vault, limit_updater, users, utils } =
await loadFixture(
deployVault.bind(null, {
decimals: DECIMALS,
initial_deposit_limit: 10_000_000n
})
)
const depositor = users[0]
await utils.mintAndApprove(900_000n, depositor)
await firelight_vault
.connect(depositor)
.deposit(900_000n, depositor.address)
await token_contract.mintTo(
firelight_vault.target,
90_000n
)
expect(await firelight_vault.totalSupply()).to.equal(900_000n)
expect(await firelight_vault.totalAssets()).to.equal(990_000n)
await firelight_vault
.connect(limit_updater)
.updateDepositLimit(1_000_000n)
const totalSupply = await firelight_vault.totalSupply()
const totalAssets = await firelight_vault.totalAssets()
const depositLimit = await firelight_vault.depositLimit()
const remainingCapacity = depositLimit - totalAssets
expect(remainingCapacity).to.equal(10_000n)
console.log('\n--- Deterministic reproduction ---')
console.log(`totalSupply = ${totalSupply}`)
console.log(`totalAssets = ${totalAssets}`)
console.log(`depositLimit = ${depositLimit}`)
console.log(`remainingCapacity = ${remainingCapacity}`)
const maxMint =
await firelight_vault.maxMint(depositor.address)
const assetsRequired =
await firelight_vault.previewMint(maxMint)
console.log('\n--- maxMint() result ---')
console.log(`maxMint() = ${maxMint} shares`)
console.log(`assets required = ${assetsRequired} assets`)
console.log(`remaining capacity = ${remainingCapacity} assets`)
console.log(
`overshoot = ${assetsRequired - remainingCapacity} assets`
)
expect(assetsRequired).to.be.gt(remainingCapacity)
await utils.mintAndApprove(
assetsRequired,
depositor
)
console.log('\n--- Calling mint(maxMint()) ---')
await expect(
firelight_vault
.connect(depositor)
.mint(maxMint, depositor.address)
).to.be.revertedWithCustomError(
firelight_vault,
'DepositLimitExceeded'
)
console.log(
'mint(maxMint()) = reverted with DepositLimitExceeded'
)
}
{
const N = 60
const { token_contract, firelight_vault, limit_updater, users, utils } =
await loadFixture(
deployVault.bind(null, {
decimals: DECIMALS,
initial_deposit_limit: 10_000_000_000n
})
)
const depositor = users[0]
let tested = 0
let hits = 0
let controlTested = 0
let controlHits = 0
let maxOvershoot = 0n
const outerSnapshot =
await network.provider.send('evm_snapshot')
for (let i = 0; i < N; i++) {
const snap =
await network.provider.send('evm_snapshot')
const totalSupplyTarget =
randBig(1_000n, 2_000_000n)
const isControl = i % 10 === 0
const donation = isControl
? 0n
: randBig(1n, totalSupplyTarget)
const depositLimit =
totalSupplyTarget +
donation +
randBig(1n, 1_000_000n)
await utils.mintAndApprove(
totalSupplyTarget,
depositor
)
await firelight_vault
.connect(depositor)
.deposit(
totalSupplyTarget,
depositor.address
)
if (donation > 0n) {
await token_contract.mintTo(
firelight_vault.target,
donation
)
}
await firelight_vault
.connect(limit_updater)
.updateDepositLimit(depositLimit)
const maxMint =
await firelight_vault.maxMint(
depositor.address
)
if (maxMint > 0n) {
const remainingCapacity =
depositLimit -
(await firelight_vault.totalAssets())
const assetsRequired =
await firelight_vault.previewMint(maxMint)
tested++
if (isControl) {
controlTested++
}
if (assetsRequired > remainingCapacity) {
hits++
if (isControl) {
controlHits++
}
const overshoot =
assetsRequired - remainingCapacity
if (overshoot > maxOvershoot) {
maxOvershoot = overshoot
}
await utils.mintAndApprove(
assetsRequired,
depositor
)
await expect(
firelight_vault
.connect(depositor)
.mint(
maxMint,
depositor.address
)
).to.be.revertedWithCustomError(
firelight_vault,
'DepositLimitExceeded'
)
}
}
await network.provider.send(
'evm_revert',
[snap]
)
}
await network.provider.send(
'evm_revert',
[outerSnapshot]
)
console.log('\n--- Randomized fuzz validation ---')
console.log(
`tested states = ${tested}`
)
console.log(
`mint(maxMint()) reverts = ${hits}/${tested} ` +
`= ${((100 * hits) / tested).toFixed(2)}%`
)
console.log(
`largest overshoot = ${maxOvershoot} asset units`
)
console.log(
`1:1 control group = ${controlHits}/${controlTested} hits`
)
}
})
})
And run:
npx hardhat test deposit_and_withdraw.js
The output i obtain:
L-03 PoC — maxMint() can return more shares than the vault can actually accept
--- Deterministic reproduction ---
totalSupply = 900000
totalAssets = 990000
depositLimit = 1000000
remainingCapacity = 10000
--- maxMint() result ---
maxMint() = 9091 shares
assets required = 10001 assets
remaining capacity = 10000 assets
overshoot = 1 assets
--- Calling mint(maxMint()) ---
mint(maxMint()) = reverted with DepositLimitExceeded
--- Randomized fuzz validation ---
tested states = 60
mint(maxMint()) reverts = 20/60 = 33.33%
largest overshoot = 1 asset units
1:1 control group = 0/6 hits
Note: The randomized fuzzing results may vary between runs because the test uses randomly generated states. The deterministic reproduction should produce the same result.