89322 w a medium call parsing in quantus sdk freezes mobile wallet

Submitted on Aug 18th 2026 at 15:24:16 UTC by @quasar for Audit Comp | Quantus

• Report ID: #89322

• Report Type: Websites & Apps

• Report severity: Medium

• Target: https://github.com/immunefi-team/audit-comp-quantus-apps/tree/audit-comp-ready/quantus_sdk

• Impacts:

  • Taking down the application/website

Description

Brief/Intro

The shared call decoder in quantus_sdk describes the main sub-call of utility.if_else twice, so a chain of N nested if_else calls costs 2^N describe() invocations. A 230-byte payload freezes any consumer of the decoder, including the mobile wallet's multisig proposal sheet.

Vulnerability Details

      case utility.IfElse(:final main, :final fallback):   // (A)
        return DecodedCall(
          pallet: 'Utility',
          call: 'if_else',
          fields: [
            NestedCallField('Primary call', describe(main)),   // (B)
            NestedCallField('Fallback call', describe(fallback)),
          ],
          summary: describe(main).summary,   // (C)
        );

• (A) quantus_sdk/lib/src/chain/call_decoder.dart:572: the describe() recursion has no depth counter, so nesting is unbounded.

• (B) First of the two traversals of the main subtree.

• (C) The same subtree is traversed a second time just to read summary, so each level doubles the work: T(N) = 2*T(N-1) + O(1).

  static DecodedCall decodeBytes(List<int> bytes) {
    ...
    return describe(call);   // (D)
  }

• (D) call_decoder.dart:59: the multisig sheet feeds stored proposal bytes into this sink, where the linear codec decode hands off to the exponential describe().

Attack path

1

Submit a nested call

A multisig co-signer submits Multisig.propose whose inner call is N=30 nested utility.if_else wrappers (pallet 9, call 6) around a system.remark leaf. The call encodes to 153 bytes: 30 levels at 5 bytes each (2 variant bytes plus the 3-byte fallback leaf), plus the 3-byte innermost leaf.

2

Store the proposal

The chain stores the proposal; execution is not required for the bug.

3

Open the proposal

The victim opens the proposal in the mobile app. multisig_action_confirm_sheet.dart:189 runs CallDecoder.decodeBytes(bytes) on the stored call bytes.

4

Trigger exponential parsing

describe() performs 2^30 = 1,073,741,824 invocations for a 153-byte call.

5

Freeze the application

The sheet decodes synchronously on the UI isolate during build (multisig_action_confirm_sheet.dart:353). The app stops responding; reopening the proposal repeats the freeze as long as the proposal exists on chain.

6

Reach the same sink through signing payloads

QuantusPayloadParser.parsePayload reaches the same describe() sink at quantus_payload_parser.dart:159 on attacker-supplied signing payloads.

7

Bypass the payload-size cap

The parser's size cap is 8192 bytes (maxPayloadBytes), which admits ~1600 nesting levels. A full signing payload is 230 bytes (153-byte call plus the 77-byte extensions suffix), and depth 30 doesn't finish.

Impact Details

A multisig co-signer freezes the mobile wallet of every member who opens the malicious proposal, and the freeze repeats on every open for as long as the proposal exists on chain.

Proof of Concept

Get poc.txt, gist link - https://gist.github.com/lgprbs/3b5c53cb748c746972267db996498f45

Unpack it:

base64 -d poc.txt > poc.tgz && tar zxf poc.tgz

How to repro

1

Enter the packaged PoC folder

The Dockerfile pins the frozen program snapshot d5fc4d6 and adds the test file, so the suite runs on a clean checkout.

2

Build and run

$ docker build -t quantus-ifelse-dos .
$ docker run --rm quantus-ifelse-dos

3

Verify the expected output

The same-size batch_all control finishes in about a second; both PoC tests pass only after their 15-second kill budget expires, and the suite ends with All tests passed!:

sizes: attack payloads are tiny ... +1
control: 30-deep batch_all chain parses quickly ... +2
PoC A-1: 30-deep if_else chain (~160-byte call) never finishes parsing ... +3 (after 15s)
PoC A-2: mobile-app path CallDecoder.decodeBytes also freezes (30-deep if_else) ... +4 (after 15s)
probe: 2000-deep batch_all (~8KB) decode path outcome ... deep batch_all 2000: crashed ... +5
All tests passed!

4

Verify payload construction

The test file builds payloads with the repo's own generated runtime codecs, so every payload is encodable on chain as-is.