60586 sc high incorrect double reduction of effective stake in stargate sol
Submitted on Nov 24th 2025 at 08:05:31 UTC by @T0nraq for Audit Comp | Vechain | Stargate Hayabusa
- Report ID: #60586
- Report Type: Smart Contract
- Report severity: High
- Target: https://github.com/immunefi-team/audit-comp-vechain-stargate-hayabusa/tree/main/packages/contracts/contracts/Stargate.sol
- Impacts:
- Permanent freezing of funds
Description
Description:
When a user requests a delegation exit and subsequently unstakes their NFT after the validator has exited, the contract logic can trigger a double reduction of the validator's effective stake for the same token. This occurs because both requestDelegationExit() and unstake() call _updatePeriodEffectiveStake() to decrease the validator's effective stake, but for overlapping periods and the same token.
Relevant Code Snippets:
requestDelegationExit()
// decrease the effective stake
// Get the latest completed period of the validator
(, , , uint32 completedPeriods) = $.protocolStakerContract.getValidationPeriodDetails(
delegation.validator
);
// decrease the effective stake
_updatePeriodEffectiveStake($, delegation.validator, _tokenId, completedPeriods + 2, false);
unstake()
if (
currentValidatorStatus == VALIDATOR_STATUS_EXITED ||
delegation.status == DelegationStatus.PENDING
) {
// get the completed periods of the previous validator
(, , , uint32 oldCompletedPeriods) = $.protocolStakerContract.getValidationPeriodDetails(delegation.validator);
// decrease the effective stake of the previous validator
_updatePeriodEffectiveStake(
$,
delegation.validator,
_tokenId,
oldCompletedPeriods + 2,
false // decrease
);
}
_updatePeriodEffectiveStake()
function _updatePeriodEffectiveStake(
StargateStorage storage $,
address _validator,
uint256 _tokenId,
uint32 _period,
bool _isIncrease
) private {
// calculate the effective stake
uint256 effectiveStake = _calculateEffectiveStake($, _tokenId);
// get the current effective stake
uint256 currentValue = $.delegatorsEffectiveStake[_validator].upperLookup(_period);
// calculate the updated effective stake
uint256 updatedValue = _isIncrease
? currentValue + effectiveStake
: currentValue - effectiveStake;
// push the updated effective stake
$.delegatorsEffectiveStake[_validator].push(_period, SafeCast.toUint224(updatedValue));
}
Steps to Reproduce/Attack path:
- Stake and delegate an NFT to a validator.
- Call
requestDelegationExit(tokenId)for the NFT. - Advance the validator to
VALIDATOR_STATUS_EXITED. - Call
unstake(tokenId)for the same NFT. - Observe that the validator's effective stake is reduced twice for the same token in future periods.
Expected Behavior:
The validator's effective stake should only be reduced once per token exit event, regardless of whether the user unstakes after requesting a delegation exit.
Actual Behavior:
The effective stake is reduced twice: once during requestDelegationExit() and again during unstake(), resulting in an incorrect accounting of the validator's effective stake.
Impact:
- Will affect reward calculations.
- Over-penalizes the validator's effective stake.
- May lead to inconsistencies in protocol accounting and user expectations.
- Some users may not be able to exit delegations as it could cause an underflow
Suggested Fix:
- Track whether the effective stake has already been reduced for a given token/period, and prevent redundant reductions in
unstake(). - Refactor the logic so that only one reduction occurs per exit/unstake lifecycle.
Proof of Concept
Proof of Concept
Add the following unit test to stake.test.ts
it.only("should show double reduction of effective stake when unstaking after validator exit", async () => {
// stake an NFT for user1
const levelSpec = await stargateNFTMockContract.getLevel(LEVEL_ID);
await stargateContract.connect(user).stake(LEVEL_ID, {
value: levelSpec.vetAmountRequiredToStake,
});
const tokenId1 = await stargateNFTMockContract.getCurrentTokenId();
await stargateContract.connect(user).delegate(tokenId1, validator.address);
// stake an NFT for user2 (second staker/delegator)
const user2 = otherAccounts[2];
await stargateContract.connect(user2).stake(LEVEL_ID, {
value: levelSpec.vetAmountRequiredToStake,
});
const tokenId2 = await stargateNFTMockContract.getCurrentTokenId();
await stargateContract.connect(user2).delegate(tokenId2, validator.address);
// set validator completed periods to 10 so is active
await protocolStakerMockContract.helper__setValidationCompletedPeriods(validator.address, 10);
// get effective stake before exit
let period = 12; // oldCompletedPeriods + 2 after exit
const stakeBefore = await stargateContract.getDelegatorsEffectiveStake(validator.address, period);
// request delegation exit for user1
await stargateContract.connect(user).requestDelegationExit(tokenId1);
// get effective stake after exit
const stakeAfterExit = await stargateContract.getDelegatorsEffectiveStake(validator.address, period + 2);
await protocolStakerMockContract.helper__setValidationCompletedPeriods(validator.address, 15);
// Exit Validator
await protocolStakerMockContract.helper__setValidatorStatus(
validator.address,
VALIDATOR_STATUS_EXITED
);
// advance some periods so is exited
await protocolStakerMockContract.helper__setValidationCompletedPeriods(validator.address, 20);
// unstake the NFT for user1
await stargateContract.connect(user).unstake(tokenId1);
// get effective stake after unstake
period = 22; // oldCompletedPeriods + 2
const stakeAfterUnstake = await stargateContract.getDelegatorsEffectiveStake(validator.address, period);
await protocolStakerMockContract.helper__setValidationCompletedPeriods(validator.address, 23);
// await stargateContract.connect(user2).requestDelegationExit(tokenId2);
// Print the values to show double reduction
console.log("Stake before exit:", stakeBefore.toString());
console.log("Stake after exit:", stakeAfterExit.toString());
console.log("Stake after unstake:", stakeAfterUnstake.toString());
// The bug: stakeAfterUnstake should equal stakeAfterExit, but will be reduced again
expect(stakeAfterUnstake).to.be.lt(stakeAfterExit);
});