Flare FAssets

Reports by Severity

High
  • #46985 [SC-High] CollateralPool::totalCollateral can be increased to arbitrary value

  • #47060 [SC-High] Unchecked Partial Payout on selfCloseExit Allows User Underpayment

  • #46378 [SC-High] Unconditional F-Asset burn during partial collateral redemptions enables direct theft of user funds

  • #46437 [SC-High] Agent can circumvent double payment challenge on XRP chain using other types of transaction (Bypass fix of #41764)

  • #46949 [SC-High] Top-up discount miscalculation allows minting excess pool tokens via repeated small deposits in `CollateralPool::enter`

  • #46592 [SC-High] The return value of redeemFromAgent/redeemFromAgentInCollateral in the selfCloseExitTo is not checked

  • #45893 [SC-High] Agent role can stolen nat token from protocol users

  • #46121 [SC-High] Malicious agent can manipulate the totalCollateral to cause damage to the protocol

  • #45979 [SC-High] Agent can steal funds from FLR holders who have deposited in agent's collateral pool

  • #47108 [SC-High] selfCloseExitTo() can cause users to receive partial payments without validation, leading to permanent asset loss

  • #46688 [SC-High] `claimAirdropDistribution()` Allows Arbitrary Inflation of `totalCollateral`

  • #46858 [SC-High] The agent owner can exploit a malicious rewardManager to steal tokens from the protocol

  • #47020 [SC-High] A malicious agent can extract funds from the collateral pool by diluting the value of existing collateral providers' shares.

  • #45904 [SC-High] Malicious agent can forge a non-payment proof despite user's valid payment and fraudulently trigger `mintingPaymentDefault`

  • #46953 [SC-High] AGENTS WHO CREATE AGENTS WITH PRIOR TRANSACTIONS CAN BE INSTANTLY UNFAIRLY LIQUIDATED

  • #46282 [SC-High] Wrong implementation of `payout` would lead to loss of fee share of `AgentVault`

  • #46541 [SC-High] Historical Payment Transaction Exploitation Leading to Instant Agent Liquidation

Medium
  • #46929 [SC-Medium] Incorrect required underlying value check used in mintFromFreeUnderlying function

  • #46943 [SC-Medium] Agents can prevent user CoreVault redemptions by sandwiching them with a requestReturnFromCoreVault and a cancelReturnFromCoreVault

  • #46247 [SC-Medium] Token transfer can revert in unstickMinting because of insufficient funds in the vault.

  • #46326 [SC-Medium] Incorrect Minting Cap Check in Minting Process

  • #45478 [SC-Medium] Minting Cap Check Doesn't Include `poolFeeUBA` in `selfMint` and `mintFromUnderlying`

  • #45550 [SC-Medium] [H-01] `illegalPaymentChallenge` is vulnerable to frontrunning by external challengers stealing the reward

  • #45554 [SC-Medium] Fee loss during Agent's feeBIPS reduction in `selfMint` function

  • #45769 [SC-Medium] Permanent blocking of Agent's fund by allowed minters

  • #46826 [SC-Medium] Agents can game the system by ensuring they always have `msg.value > transferFeeWei + Transfers.TRANSFER_GAS_ALLOWANCE` when `CoreVault::transferToCoreVault()` is called.

  • #46271 [SC-Medium] Rewards claiming functionality is broken.

  • #45910 [SC-Medium] Changing collateral ratio makes Agents prone to liquidation

  • #46265 [SC-Medium] Logic flaw in transferToCoreVault allows creation of zero-value redemption request

  • #45447 [SC-Medium] Executor cannot execute minting while the agent can execute the transaction and steal executor fee

  • #45665 [SC-Medium] [H-02] Minting Cap Bypass via Pool Fee Exclusion during Self Mint

  • #46714 [SC-Medium] Agent can frontrun executor to steal unclaimed executor fee in minting process

  • #45514 [SC-Medium] Malicious agents can trap stakers by raising the exit collateral ratio

  • #47034 [SC-Medium] check minting cap function checks on incorrect amount in mintFromFreeUnderlying function

  • #45987 [SC-Medium] A malicious user can fill up the redemption queue with the minimum size (1 lot), making legitimate redeemers to redeem always multiple times

  • #46081 [SC-Medium] Wrong check in `redeemFromCoreVault` will result in unnecessary revert

  • #46108 [SC-Medium] Minting Cap can by bypassed while self minting

  • #45830 [SC-Medium] Incorrect amount passed to checkMintingCap in self-minting allows bypassing of config minting cap

  • #47039 [SC-Medium] `poolMintFee` is not considered for or checked against the`mintingCapAMG` limits.

Low
  • #45897 [SC-Low] Executor Fee Lost in `rejectInvalidRedemption()` Due to Missing Handling Logic

  • #47033 [SC-Low] Incorrect calculation of total available amount in core vault in a certain case when a user redeems from the core vault

  • #47082 [SC-Low] Zero collateral payout despite burned fAssets

  • #47106 [SC-Low] Collateral Reservation Fee distribution uses current poolFeeShareBips instead of value stored during during time of collateral reservation

  • #46993 [SC-Low] Malicious agent with large capital can abuse `cancelReturnFromCoreVault` to block access to core vault liquidity during high redemption demand

  • #47053 [SC-Low] `transferToCoreVault()` allows agents to have unbacked synthetic assets by extracting underlying value without burning

  • #47010 [SC-Low] `CollateralPool::donateNat` manipulation enables arbitrary pool‐token value inflation and fee‐debt evasion

  • #46442 [SC-Low] Agent collateral pool is vulnerable to inflation attack

  • #46486 [SC-Low] Faulty logic in `transferToCoreVault` makes users pay more for the refund transaction than the amount being refunded.

  • #46758 [SC-Low] Collateral Reservation Fee Calculation Inconsistent with Actual Reserved Value

  • #46520 [SC-Low] ETH loss on `selfCloseExitTo` when redeeming to collateral

  • #46847 [SC-Low] executor fee is not paid or burned in `rejectInvalidRedemption`

  • #46836 [SC-Low] buybackAgentCollateral will revert due to overflow

  • #46068 [SC-Low] selfCloseExitTo is lack of slippage protect

  • #46071 [SC-Low] Ultra-low amount of total shares in collateral pool

  • #46886 [SC-Low] `destroyAgent()` functionality can easily be bricked due to Frontrunning Attack

  • #46462 [SC-Low] Malicious collateral provider can steal funds from agent collateral pool by donating a large amount of native token to the pool (inflation attack)

  • #46681 [SC-Low] malicious actor can prevent agent from being destroyed

  • #46976 [SC-Low] Agent Destruction Can Permanently Lock Unclaimed Transfer Fees

  • #46119 [SC-Low] Incorrect `msg.Value` check in `CoreVault` Transfer

  • #46984 [SC-Low] Incomplete Token Supply Check After Token Share Recalculation in `_selfCloseExitTo`

  • #45533 [SC-Low] Incorrect gas allowance comparison in CoreVault transfer function leads to user fund loss

  • #46643 [SC-Low] `destroyAgent` in `AgentsCreateDestroy` is prone to DOS

  • #45604 [SC-Low] User Overpayment in `transferToCoreVault` Fee Handling

  • #45379 [SC-Low] Frontrunning Vulnerability in createAgentVault Suffix Reservation

  • #46969 [SC-Low] Inconsistent Use of poolFeeShareBIPS Between Collateral Reservation and Distribution

  • #46320 [SC-Low] Executor fee will be stuck in the contract when rejectInvalidRedemption is called

  • #46930 [SC-Low] `depositNat()` in `CollateralPool` Fails to Notify Asset Manager, By not calling the `updateCollateral`

  • #45499 [SC-Low] Malicious user can prevent agent to be destroyed and lock up his funds

  • #46838 [SC-Low] Agent Destruction Can Be Blocked by Malicious Collateral Pool Entries

  • #45943 [SC-Low] rejectInvalidRedemption fee is not awarded to agent, resulting in stuck or misallocated funds

  • #46924 [SC-Low] Last user may exit with almost all of his values, but he'll purposefully leave a small 1e18 or a little more to grief `destroy()`

  • #46587 [SC-Low] Overpayment loss in `transferToCoreVault` due to incorrect refund condition

  • #45336 [SC-Low] Malicious Agent could repeatedly create and destroy vaults reserving different suffixes and grief other agents

  • #45439 [SC-Low] Empty String Allowed as Pool Token Suffix in _reserveAndValidatePoolTokenSuffix

Insight
  • #45978 [SC-Insight] Failed Transactions Trigger Invalid Double Payment Challenges Causing Loss of Funds for Legitimate Agents

  • #47094 [SC-Insight] Missing Event Emission in `AgentVault` and `CollateralPoolToken` Factory Contracts

  • #45377 [SC-Insight] Missing pause modifier in `beforeCollateralWithdrawal` allows collateral theft during a pause

  • #47150 [SC-Insight] XRP Deposit Authorization Griefing Attack on Minting Process

  • #46220 [SC-Insight] Missing Documented Function in the CollateralPool Contract

  • #45450 [SC-Insight] Outdated underlying chain data lead to shortened minting windows or DoS when minting fAssets

  • #45674 [SC-Insight] `executeMinting()` allows impersonation of minter during chain-reorg due to deterministic `crtId` and lack of minter binding

  • #46702 [SC-Insight] `executeMinting()` Enables Cross-Contract Reentrancy to Manipulate Collateral Pool Pricing

  • #46721 [SC-Insight] Inconsistencies for agentTimelockedOperationWindowSeconds value checks between SettingsInitializer.sol::_validateSettings and SettingsManagementFacet.sol::setAgentTimelockedOpera...

  • #45961 [SC-Insight] `selfMint()` Can Lead to Permanent Loss of Agents' Funds During Emergency Pause

  • #46848 [SC-Insight] Minters can grief agents by deliberately fragmenting the agent's redemption ticket queue with minimal size tickets, preventing or delaying large transfers to core vault

  • #45357 [SC-Insight] Increase in the usedTokens array

  • #46210 [SC-Insight] Incorrect timestamp comparison in function "beforeCollateralWithdrawal" allows agent to withdraw at last second without being challenged

  • #46534 [SC-Insight] Missing Validation to Prevent Self-Assignment of Work Address

  • #45956 [SC-Insight] EOA only on smart contract chains bypassed on ETH

  • #46218 [SC-Insight] Documentation-Implementation Discrepancy in Agent Vault Access Control

  • #45485 [SC-Insight] Comments above `reserveCollateral` indicate collateral reservation fee is burned, which is not the case

  • #46999 [SC-Insight] Absence of event emission in critical functions

  • #47087 [SC-Insight] CollateralTypesFacet.sol::deprecateCollateralType allows to break CollateralTypes.sol::initialize invariant because it allows to deprecate all token collateral vaults leading to ...

  • #46546 [SC-Insight] Accounting Mismatches in AgentVault.sol Due to Non-Standard ERC20 Tokens

  • #45368 [SC-Insight] Corruptible Upgradability Pattern

  • #46122 [SC-Insight] Incorrect Minimum Lots Validation in CoreVault Redemption

  • #47116 [SC-Insight] Undocumented Redemption Pool Fee Share potentially leading to confusion

  • #45864 [SC-Insight] Minter's underlying token can get stuck if the agent calls mintingDefault before the minter’s transaction is recorded on the underlying blockchain.

  • #45813 [SC-Insight] Missing `setAutoClaiming` Function

  • #47121 [SC-Insight] Incorrect documentation on pool Top-up feature

  • #45309 [SC-Insight] Gas Optimization in `_burnForAtNow` Function for efficient balance retrieval

  • #46266 [SC-Insight] Cannot use a pool token suffix of MAX_SUFFIX_LEN

  • #46241 [SC-Insight] Misleading definition in Core-Vault documentation (“CV operators submit proof”)

  • #45949 [SC-Insight] Mismatch between doc and implementation for `confirmationByOthersAfterSeconds` minimum on XRP

  • #46493 [SC-Insight] ADDRESS_STORAGE_POSITION is not ERC7201 compliant

  • #46311 [SC-Insight] Unbacked Redemptions Due to Donation- Attack on CoreVault Can Freeze Agent Collateral

  • #46198 [SC-Insight] Redemption Blocked if Agent Refuses to Confirm Core Vault Payment

  • #45405 [SC-Insight] Insufficient Documentation for Governance-Controlled Functions and Critical Parameters in 'CoreVaultManager.sol'

  • #45772 [SC-Insight] NatSpec Mismatch in CoreVault Redemption Logic

  • #47091 [SC-Insight] `setWorkAddress()` enables front-running attacks to hijack work addresses

  • #47159 [SC-Insight] Lack of Access Control on `triggerInstructions()` Allows Unauthorized Transfers Post-Deletion

  • #45685 [SC-Insight] Incorrect comments in finishRedemptionWithoutPayment

  • #45517 [SC-Insight] Partial Documentation for Self-Close Exit Fee Handling and Redemption Workflow in 'CollateralPool.sol'

  • #45574 [SC-Insight] Redundant Per‑Item Upper Bound Check in `validateLiquidationFactors`

  • #46092 [SC-Insight] AgentVault::destroy mismatch between comment documentation and contract behavior

  • #45310 [SC-Insight] `IWNat(address(token)).governanceVotePower().undelegate()` is redundant after `undelegateGovernance()`

  • #46677 [SC-Insight] Wrong comment in _getFAssetRequiredToNotSpoilCR

  • #46982 [SC-Insight] Spread calculation discrepancy allows wildly divergent prices to be accepted

  • #46771 [SC-Insight] Incorrect Collateral Ratio Check Due to Rounding Error

  • #45731 [SC-Insight] Off-by-One Logic in Escrow End Timestamp Calculation May Cause Unintended Escrow Delay

Reports by Type

Smart Contract
  • #46929 [SC-Medium] Incorrect required underlying value check used in mintFromFreeUnderlying function

  • #46985 [SC-High] CollateralPool::totalCollateral can be increased to arbitrary value

  • #45897 [SC-Low] Executor Fee Lost in `rejectInvalidRedemption()` Due to Missing Handling Logic

  • #46943 [SC-Medium] Agents can prevent user CoreVault redemptions by sandwiching them with a requestReturnFromCoreVault and a cancelReturnFromCoreVault

  • #47033 [SC-Low] Incorrect calculation of total available amount in core vault in a certain case when a user redeems from the core vault

  • #47060 [SC-High] Unchecked Partial Payout on selfCloseExit Allows User Underpayment

  • #47082 [SC-Low] Zero collateral payout despite burned fAssets

  • #45978 [SC-Insight] Failed Transactions Trigger Invalid Double Payment Challenges Causing Loss of Funds for Legitimate Agents

  • #47094 [SC-Insight] Missing Event Emission in `AgentVault` and `CollateralPoolToken` Factory Contracts

  • #47106 [SC-Low] Collateral Reservation Fee distribution uses current poolFeeShareBips instead of value stored during during time of collateral reservation

  • #46247 [SC-Medium] Token transfer can revert in unstickMinting because of insufficient funds in the vault.

  • #46993 [SC-Low] Malicious agent with large capital can abuse `cancelReturnFromCoreVault` to block access to core vault liquidity during high redemption demand

  • #47053 [SC-Low] `transferToCoreVault()` allows agents to have unbacked synthetic assets by extracting underlying value without burning

  • #46326 [SC-Medium] Incorrect Minting Cap Check in Minting Process

  • #47010 [SC-Low] `CollateralPool::donateNat` manipulation enables arbitrary pool‐token value inflation and fee‐debt evasion

  • #45377 [SC-Insight] Missing pause modifier in `beforeCollateralWithdrawal` allows collateral theft during a pause

  • #47150 [SC-Insight] XRP Deposit Authorization Griefing Attack on Minting Process

  • #46378 [SC-High] Unconditional F-Asset burn during partial collateral redemptions enables direct theft of user funds

  • #46220 [SC-Insight] Missing Documented Function in the CollateralPool Contract

  • #45450 [SC-Insight] Outdated underlying chain data lead to shortened minting windows or DoS when minting fAssets

  • #46437 [SC-High] Agent can circumvent double payment challenge on XRP chain using other types of transaction (Bypass fix of #41764)

  • #45478 [SC-Medium] Minting Cap Check Doesn't Include `poolFeeUBA` in `selfMint` and `mintFromUnderlying`

  • #46442 [SC-Low] Agent collateral pool is vulnerable to inflation attack

  • #45550 [SC-Medium] [H-01] `illegalPaymentChallenge` is vulnerable to frontrunning by external challengers stealing the reward

  • #46486 [SC-Low] Faulty logic in `transferToCoreVault` makes users pay more for the refund transaction than the amount being refunded.

  • #45554 [SC-Medium] Fee loss during Agent's feeBIPS reduction in `selfMint` function

  • #45674 [SC-Insight] `executeMinting()` allows impersonation of minter during chain-reorg due to deterministic `crtId` and lack of minter binding

  • #46702 [SC-Insight] `executeMinting()` Enables Cross-Contract Reentrancy to Manipulate Collateral Pool Pricing

  • #45769 [SC-Medium] Permanent blocking of Agent's fund by allowed minters

  • #46721 [SC-Insight] Inconsistencies for agentTimelockedOperationWindowSeconds value checks between SettingsInitializer.sol::_validateSettings and SettingsManagementFacet.sol::setAgentTimelockedOpera...

  • #46758 [SC-Low] Collateral Reservation Fee Calculation Inconsistent with Actual Reserved Value

  • #46949 [SC-High] Top-up discount miscalculation allows minting excess pool tokens via repeated small deposits in `CollateralPool::enter`

  • #46520 [SC-Low] ETH loss on `selfCloseExitTo` when redeeming to collateral

  • #45961 [SC-Insight] `selfMint()` Can Lead to Permanent Loss of Agents' Funds During Emergency Pause

  • #46826 [SC-Medium] Agents can game the system by ensuring they always have `msg.value > transferFeeWei + Transfers.TRANSFER_GAS_ALLOWANCE` when `CoreVault::transferToCoreVault()` is called.

  • #46848 [SC-Insight] Minters can grief agents by deliberately fragmenting the agent's redemption ticket queue with minimal size tickets, preventing or delaying large transfers to core vault

  • #45357 [SC-Insight] Increase in the usedTokens array

  • #46847 [SC-Low] executor fee is not paid or burned in `rejectInvalidRedemption`

  • #46836 [SC-Low] buybackAgentCollateral will revert due to overflow

  • #46210 [SC-Insight] Incorrect timestamp comparison in function "beforeCollateralWithdrawal" allows agent to withdraw at last second without being challenged

  • #46271 [SC-Medium] Rewards claiming functionality is broken.

  • #46592 [SC-High] The return value of redeemFromAgent/redeemFromAgentInCollateral in the selfCloseExitTo is not checked

  • #46534 [SC-Insight] Missing Validation to Prevent Self-Assignment of Work Address

  • #45956 [SC-Insight] EOA only on smart contract chains bypassed on ETH

  • #46218 [SC-Insight] Documentation-Implementation Discrepancy in Agent Vault Access Control

  • #45485 [SC-Insight] Comments above `reserveCollateral` indicate collateral reservation fee is burned, which is not the case

  • #46068 [SC-Low] selfCloseExitTo is lack of slippage protect

  • #46071 [SC-Low] Ultra-low amount of total shares in collateral pool

  • #45910 [SC-Medium] Changing collateral ratio makes Agents prone to liquidation

  • #46886 [SC-Low] `destroyAgent()` functionality can easily be bricked due to Frontrunning Attack

  • #45893 [SC-High] Agent role can stolen nat token from protocol users

  • #46265 [SC-Medium] Logic flaw in transferToCoreVault allows creation of zero-value redemption request

  • #46121 [SC-High] Malicious agent can manipulate the totalCollateral to cause damage to the protocol

  • #46462 [SC-Low] Malicious collateral provider can steal funds from agent collateral pool by donating a large amount of native token to the pool (inflation attack)

  • #46999 [SC-Insight] Absence of event emission in critical functions

  • #47087 [SC-Insight] CollateralTypesFacet.sol::deprecateCollateralType allows to break CollateralTypes.sol::initialize invariant because it allows to deprecate all token collateral vaults leading to ...

  • #46546 [SC-Insight] Accounting Mismatches in AgentVault.sol Due to Non-Standard ERC20 Tokens

  • #45368 [SC-Insight] Corruptible Upgradability Pattern

  • #46681 [SC-Low] malicious actor can prevent agent from being destroyed

  • #46122 [SC-Insight] Incorrect Minimum Lots Validation in CoreVault Redemption

  • #45979 [SC-High] Agent can steal funds from FLR holders who have deposited in agent's collateral pool

  • #47116 [SC-Insight] Undocumented Redemption Pool Fee Share potentially leading to confusion

  • #46976 [SC-Low] Agent Destruction Can Permanently Lock Unclaimed Transfer Fees

  • #46119 [SC-Low] Incorrect `msg.Value` check in `CoreVault` Transfer

  • #45447 [SC-Medium] Executor cannot execute minting while the agent can execute the transaction and steal executor fee

  • #46984 [SC-Low] Incomplete Token Supply Check After Token Share Recalculation in `_selfCloseExitTo`

  • #45533 [SC-Low] Incorrect gas allowance comparison in CoreVault transfer function leads to user fund loss

  • #45864 [SC-Insight] Minter's underlying token can get stuck if the agent calls mintingDefault before the minter’s transaction is recorded on the underlying blockchain.

  • #47108 [SC-High] selfCloseExitTo() can cause users to receive partial payments without validation, leading to permanent asset loss

  • #46643 [SC-Low] `destroyAgent` in `AgentsCreateDestroy` is prone to DOS

  • #45813 [SC-Insight] Missing `setAutoClaiming` Function

  • #46688 [SC-High] `claimAirdropDistribution()` Allows Arbitrary Inflation of `totalCollateral`

  • #47121 [SC-Insight] Incorrect documentation on pool Top-up feature

  • #45665 [SC-Medium] [H-02] Minting Cap Bypass via Pool Fee Exclusion during Self Mint

  • #45309 [SC-Insight] Gas Optimization in `_burnForAtNow` Function for efficient balance retrieval

  • #45604 [SC-Low] User Overpayment in `transferToCoreVault` Fee Handling

  • #46714 [SC-Medium] Agent can frontrun executor to steal unclaimed executor fee in minting process

  • #46858 [SC-High] The agent owner can exploit a malicious rewardManager to steal tokens from the protocol

  • #45379 [SC-Low] Frontrunning Vulnerability in createAgentVault Suffix Reservation

  • #46266 [SC-Insight] Cannot use a pool token suffix of MAX_SUFFIX_LEN

  • #46241 [SC-Insight] Misleading definition in Core-Vault documentation (“CV operators submit proof”)

  • #45949 [SC-Insight] Mismatch between doc and implementation for `confirmationByOthersAfterSeconds` minimum on XRP

  • #46493 [SC-Insight] ADDRESS_STORAGE_POSITION is not ERC7201 compliant

  • #47020 [SC-High] A malicious agent can extract funds from the collateral pool by diluting the value of existing collateral providers' shares.

  • #45514 [SC-Medium] Malicious agents can trap stakers by raising the exit collateral ratio

  • #46311 [SC-Insight] Unbacked Redemptions Due to Donation- Attack on CoreVault Can Freeze Agent Collateral

  • #46198 [SC-Insight] Redemption Blocked if Agent Refuses to Confirm Core Vault Payment

  • #45405 [SC-Insight] Insufficient Documentation for Governance-Controlled Functions and Critical Parameters in 'CoreVaultManager.sol'

  • #47034 [SC-Medium] check minting cap function checks on incorrect amount in mintFromFreeUnderlying function

  • #45772 [SC-Insight] NatSpec Mismatch in CoreVault Redemption Logic

  • #47091 [SC-Insight] `setWorkAddress()` enables front-running attacks to hijack work addresses

  • #47159 [SC-Insight] Lack of Access Control on `triggerInstructions()` Allows Unauthorized Transfers Post-Deletion

  • #45685 [SC-Insight] Incorrect comments in finishRedemptionWithoutPayment

  • #45517 [SC-Insight] Partial Documentation for Self-Close Exit Fee Handling and Redemption Workflow in 'CollateralPool.sol'

  • #45574 [SC-Insight] Redundant Per‑Item Upper Bound Check in `validateLiquidationFactors`

  • #46092 [SC-Insight] AgentVault::destroy mismatch between comment documentation and contract behavior

  • #45310 [SC-Insight] `IWNat(address(token)).governanceVotePower().undelegate()` is redundant after `undelegateGovernance()`

  • #46677 [SC-Insight] Wrong comment in _getFAssetRequiredToNotSpoilCR

  • #46982 [SC-Insight] Spread calculation discrepancy allows wildly divergent prices to be accepted

  • #46771 [SC-Insight] Incorrect Collateral Ratio Check Due to Rounding Error

  • #45731 [SC-Insight] Off-by-One Logic in Escrow End Timestamp Calculation May Cause Unintended Escrow Delay

  • #45987 [SC-Medium] A malicious user can fill up the redemption queue with the minimum size (1 lot), making legitimate redeemers to redeem always multiple times

  • #46081 [SC-Medium] Wrong check in `redeemFromCoreVault` will result in unnecessary revert

  • #46969 [SC-Low] Inconsistent Use of poolFeeShareBIPS Between Collateral Reservation and Distribution

  • #46320 [SC-Low] Executor fee will be stuck in the contract when rejectInvalidRedemption is called

  • #46108 [SC-Medium] Minting Cap can by bypassed while self minting

  • #45830 [SC-Medium] Incorrect amount passed to checkMintingCap in self-minting allows bypassing of config minting cap

  • #45904 [SC-High] Malicious agent can forge a non-payment proof despite user's valid payment and fraudulently trigger `mintingPaymentDefault`

  • #46930 [SC-Low] `depositNat()` in `CollateralPool` Fails to Notify Asset Manager, By not calling the `updateCollateral`

  • #45499 [SC-Low] Malicious user can prevent agent to be destroyed and lock up his funds

  • #46838 [SC-Low] Agent Destruction Can Be Blocked by Malicious Collateral Pool Entries

  • #45943 [SC-Low] rejectInvalidRedemption fee is not awarded to agent, resulting in stuck or misallocated funds

  • #47039 [SC-Medium] `poolMintFee` is not considered for or checked against the`mintingCapAMG` limits.

  • #46953 [SC-High] AGENTS WHO CREATE AGENTS WITH PRIOR TRANSACTIONS CAN BE INSTANTLY UNFAIRLY LIQUIDATED

  • #46924 [SC-Low] Last user may exit with almost all of his values, but he'll purposefully leave a small 1e18 or a little more to grief `destroy()`

  • #46587 [SC-Low] Overpayment loss in `transferToCoreVault` due to incorrect refund condition

  • #45336 [SC-Low] Malicious Agent could repeatedly create and destroy vaults reserving different suffixes and grief other agents

  • #46282 [SC-High] Wrong implementation of `payout` would lead to loss of fee share of `AgentVault`

  • #45439 [SC-Low] Empty String Allowed as Pool Token Suffix in _reserveAndValidatePoolTokenSuffix

  • #46541 [SC-High] Historical Payment Transaction Exploitation Leading to Instant Agent Liquidation

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