#46984 [SC-Low] Incomplete Token Supply Check After Token Share Recalculation in `_selfCloseExitTo`
Submitted on Jun 7th 2025 at 08:43:37 UTC by @light279 for Audit Comp | Flare | FAssets
- Report ID: #46984
- Report Type: Smart Contract
- Report severity: Low
- Target: https://github.com/flare-foundation/fassets/blob/main/contracts/assetManager/implementation/CollateralPool.sol
- Impacts:
- Smart contract unable to operate due to lack of token funds
Description
Brief/Intro
In the CollateralPool::_selfCloseExitTo function, after the recalculation of _tokenShare due to insufficient agent redemption capacity, no validation is performed to ensure the updated _tokenShare satisfies the minimum token supply constraint (MIN_TOKEN_SUPPLY_AFTER_EXIT). This breaks an important invariant enforced earlier in the function and could result in an invalid or inconsistent state post-exit.
Vulnerability Details
The CollateralPool::_selfCloseExitTo function initially validates the following condition:
function _selfCloseExitTo(
uint256 _tokenShare,
bool _redeemToCollateral,
address payable _recipient,
string memory _redeemerUnderlyingAddress,
address payable _executor
)
private
{
require(_tokenShare > 0, "token share is zero");
require(_tokenShare <= token.balanceOf(msg.sender), "token balance too low");
AssetData memory assetData = _getAssetData();
@> require(assetData.poolTokenSupply == _tokenShare ||
assetData.poolTokenSupply - _tokenShare >= MIN_TOKEN_SUPPLY_AFTER_EXIT,
"token supply left after exit is too low and non-zero");
uint256 natShare = assetData.poolNatBalance.mulDiv(
_tokenShare, assetData.poolTokenSupply); // poolTokenSupply >= _tokenShare > 0
require(natShare > 0, "amount of sent tokens is too small");
require(assetData.poolNatBalance == natShare ||
assetData.poolNatBalance - natShare >= MIN_NAT_BALANCE_AFTER_EXIT,
"collateral left after exit is too low and non-zero");
uint256 maxAgentRedemption = assetManager.maxRedemptionFromAgent(agentVault);
uint256 requiredFAssets = _getFAssetRequiredToNotSpoilCR(assetData, natShare);
// rare case: if agent has too many low-valued open tickets they can't redeem the requiredFAssets
// in one transaction. In that case we lower/correct the amount of spent tokens and nat share.
...........
This check ensures that either:
- The user is exiting the entire pool (draining all tokens), or
- The remaining pool token supply after exit stays above a configured minimum.
However, if the (maxAgentRedemption < requiredFAssets), the function recalculates natShare and _tokenShare:
function _selfCloseExitTo(
uint256 _tokenShare,
bool _redeemToCollateral,
address payable _recipient,
string memory _redeemerUnderlyingAddress,
address payable _executor
)
private
{
................
if (maxAgentRedemption < requiredFAssets) {
// natShare and _tokenShare decrease!
requiredFAssets = maxAgentRedemption;
@> natShare = _getNatRequiredToNotSpoilCR(assetData, requiredFAssets);
@> require(natShare > 0, "amount of sent tokens is too small after agent max redemption correction");
require(assetData.poolNatBalance == natShare ||
assetData.poolNatBalance - natShare >= MIN_NAT_BALANCE_AFTER_EXIT,
"collateral left after exit is too low and non-zero");
// poolNatBalance >= previous natShare > 0
@> _tokenShare = assetData.poolTokenSupply.mulDiv(natShare, assetData.poolNatBalance);
emit IncompleteSelfCloseExit(_tokenShare, requiredFAssets);
}
// get owner f-asset fees to be spent (maximize fee withdrawal to cover the potentially necessary f-assets)
uint256 fAssetFees = _fAssetFeesOf(assetData, msg.sender);
(uint256 debtFAssetFeeShare, uint256 freeFAssetFeeShare) = _getDebtAndFreeFAssetFeesFromTokenShare(
assetData, msg.sender, _tokenShare, TokenExitType.MAXIMIZE_FEE_WITHDRAWAL);
// if owner f-asset fees do not cover the required f-assets, require additional f-assets
................
While the function re-checks the natShare constraint above:
require(assetData.poolNatBalance == natShare ||
assetData.poolNatBalance - natShare >= MIN_NAT_BALANCE_AFTER_EXIT,
"collateral left after exit is too low and non-zero");
It fails to re-validate _tokenShare against the MIN_TOKEN_SUPPLY_AFTER_EXIT constraint. As a result, it is possible for:
assetData.poolTokenSupply - _tokenShare < MIN_TOKEN_SUPPLY_AFTER_EXIT
to occur silently, breaking pool invariants and possibly leading to unintended or unsafe behavior in downstream logic that assumes this minimum is preserved.
Impact Details
- Users could unintentionally drain the pool below the minimum allowed token supply.
- Breaks protocol-level assumptions that rely on MIN_TOKEN_SUPPLY_AFTER_EXIT being respected.
Recommended Fix
Add any relevant links to documentation or code:
After _tokenShare is recalculated in the if (maxAgentRedemption < requiredFAssets) block in function CollateralPool::_selfCloseExitTo, reapply the token supply check:
function _selfCloseExitTo(
uint256 _tokenShare,
bool _redeemToCollateral,
address payable _recipient,
string memory _redeemerUnderlyingAddress,
address payable _executor
)
private
{
................
if (maxAgentRedemption < requiredFAssets) {
// natShare and _tokenShare decrease!
requiredFAssets = maxAgentRedemption;
natShare = _getNatRequiredToNotSpoilCR(assetData, requiredFAssets);
require(natShare > 0, "amount of sent tokens is too small after agent max redemption correction");
require(assetData.poolNatBalance == natShare ||
assetData.poolNatBalance - natShare >= MIN_NAT_BALANCE_AFTER_EXIT,
"collateral left after exit is too low and non-zero");
// poolNatBalance >= previous natShare > 0
_tokenShare = assetData.poolTokenSupply.mulDiv(natShare, assetData.poolNatBalance);
+ require(assetData.poolTokenSupply == _tokenShare ||
assetData.poolTokenSupply - _tokenShare >= MIN_TOKEN_SUPPLY_AFTER_EXIT,
"token supply left after exit is too low and non-zero");
emit IncompleteSelfCloseExit(_tokenShare, requiredFAssets);
}
// get owner f-asset fees to be spent (maximize fee withdrawal to cover the potentially necessary f-assets)
uint256 fAssetFees = _fAssetFeesOf(assetData, msg.sender);
(uint256 debtFAssetFeeShare, uint256 freeFAssetFeeShare) = _getDebtAndFreeFAssetFeesFromTokenShare(
assetData, msg.sender, _tokenShare, TokenExitType.MAXIMIZE_FEE_WITHDRAWAL);
// if owner f-asset fees do not cover the required f-assets, require additional f-assets
................
Proof of Concept
Proof of Concept
1: User initiates selfCloseExit
- User calls selfCloseExit(_tokenShare, ...) with some initial _tokenShare.
Checks performed:
- _tokenShare > 0
- _tokenShare <= user balance
- poolTokenSupply - _tokenShare >= MIN_TOKEN_SUPPLY_AFTER_EXIT ✅
- natShare = poolNatBalance * _tokenShare / poolTokenSupply
- poolNatBalance - natShare >= MIN_NAT_BALANCE_AFTER_EXIT ✅ All checks pass.
2: Required F-assets are too high
- requiredFAssets = _getFAssetRequiredToNotSpoilCR(...)
- But:
maxAgentRedemption < requiredFAssets
This triggers the fallback path to adjust.
3: Adjust natShare and recheck only collateral constraint
- requiredFAssets is capped to maxAgentRedemption
- A new natShare is computed via _getNatRequiredToNotSpoilCR(...)
- Now, natShare is lower than the original
- Check re-applied:
require(poolNatBalance - natShare >= MIN_NAT_BALANCE_AFTER_EXIT)
4: _tokenShare is recalculated — but no re-validation!
- _tokenShare is now recomputed:
_tokenShare = poolTokenSupply * natShare / poolNatBalance
- No check is done again to verify:
poolTokenSupply - _tokenShare >= MIN_TOKEN_SUPPLY_AFTER_EXIT
Therefore, the new _tokenShare could reduce the pool’s token supply below the minimum required threshold, violating the pool’s safety invariants.