57703 sc medium dos with revert via unbounded loop
Submitted on Oct 28th 2025 at 10:07:09 UTC by @lllll for Audit Comp | Belong
- Report ID: #57703
- Report Type: Smart Contract
- Report severity: Medium
- Target: https://github.com/immunefi-team/audit-comp-belong/blob/main/contracts/v2/periphery/Staking.sol
- Impacts:
- Permanent freezing of funds
Vulnerability: Potential Denial of Service (DoS) — unbounded loop in _removeAnySharesFor may cause transactions to run out of gas and revert, preventing legitimate withdrawals or other operations that rely on this function.
Description
Brief / Intro
The function _removeAnySharesFor contains an unbounded loop that iterates over the stakes[staker] array and removes shares until the requested shares amount is satisfied. If a user accumulates a very large number of stake entries (i.e., stakes[staker].length becomes very large), calling _removeAnySharesFor can consume an arbitrarily large amount of gas and eventually run out of gas and revert.
Vulnerability Details
The implementation iterates over userStakes and removes elements via swap-and-pop or decrements an element. The loop condition is unbounded:
for (uint256 i; i < userStakes.length && remaining > 0;) {
...
}
Each iteration can modify the array length, and in the worst case (many small stakes), the number of iterations grows with the number of entries. A malicious or inadvertent accumulation of many small stakes can therefore make the function revert due to gas exhaustion.
Impact Details
If this function is used during withdraw/exit flows, affected users may be unable to withdraw staked assets, potentially resulting in permanent freezing of funds for those users.
References
Vulnerable snippet:
function _removeAnySharesFor(address staker, uint256 shares) internal {
Stake[] storage userStakes = stakes[staker];
uint256 remaining = shares;
for (uint256 i; i < userStakes.length && remaining > 0;) {
uint256 stakeShares = userStakes[i].shares;
if (stakeShares <= remaining) {
remaining -= stakeShares;
userStakes[i] = userStakes[userStakes.length - 1];
userStakes.pop();
// don't ++i: a new element is now at index i
} else {
userStakes[i].shares = stakeShares - remaining;
remaining = 0;
unchecked {
++i;
}
}
}
}
Proof of Concept
function _addStake(address staker, uint256 shares) external {
stakes[staker].push(Stake({shares: shares, timestamp: block.timestamp}));
}
function _removeAnySharesFortest(address staker, uint256 shares) external {
_removeAnySharesFor(staker, shares);
}
function testDoS_removeAnySharesFor() public {
address staker = address(0x123);
for(uint160 i = 0; i < 2000; i++) {
staking._addStake(staker, 1e18);
}
uint256 gasBefore = gasleft();
staking._removeAnySharesFortest(staker, 2000 * 1e18);
uint256 gasUsed = gasBefore - gasleft();
console.log("gas used:", gasUsed);
assertLt(gasUsed, 1_000_000, "Gas too high, DoS potential!");
}