57399 sc critical erc4626 staking lockbook breaks share fungibility partial transfers can dos withdrawals
Submitted on Oct 25th 2025 at 20:36:18 UTC by @TECHFUND_inc for Audit Comp | Belong
- Report ID: #57399
- Report Type: Smart Contract
- Report severity: Critical
- Target: https://github.com/immunefi-team/audit-comp-belong/blob/main/contracts/v2/periphery/Staking.sol
- Impacts: Permanent freezing of funds
Critical: transferred shares are not tracked in the per-deposit lockbook. This can permanently freeze balances or force users into penalized emergency flows.
Description
Brief/Intro
The Staking vault enforces time-locks via per-deposit “Stake” entries that are only created on deposit. Withdraw/redeem consume only unlocked Stake entries. Since share transfers do not create Stake entries for recipients, transferred-in sLONG are invisible to the unlock logic. This breaks ERC4626 share fungibility and causes stuck balances or forces users into penalized emergency flows.
Vulnerability Details
- Root cause
- On deposit:
_depositpushesStake({shares, timestamp})tostakes[to]. - On withdraw/redeem:
_withdrawcalls_consumeUnlockedSharesOrRevert(owner, shares), which iteratesstakes[owner]and must fully cover the requested shares from unlocked entries. - On transfer: no Stake entries are created/updated; the receiver’s transferred shares have no corresponding Stake entries, so they can never be “consumed” by the unlock logic.
- On deposit:
BUG — transferred-in sLONG are non-redeemable
Scenario:
- Alice holds 100 sLONG and transfers 50 to Bob.
- Bob deposits 100 LONG (mints 100 sLONG). Even after unlocking, Bob’s stakes sum to 100 (his deposit only).
redeem(150)reverts withMinStakePeriodNotMet; the extra 50 sLONG (received by transfer) are irredeemable via withdraw/redeem and only convertible via emergency flow with penalty.
Impact:
- Recipients of transferred sLONG can end up with permanent or penalized-only access to those shares.
BUG — partial transfer can DoS standard withdrawals before unlock
Scenario:
- Alice deposits 100 sLONG (single stake entry).
- Alice transfers 50 away.
- Alice then attempts to withdraw/redeem 50 (the remaining balance). The call reverts with
MinStakePeriodNotMetbecause the single Stake entry (100) remains locked and the algorithm cannot source unlocked shares from any other entry.
Impact:
- Legitimate positions become partially inaccessible via standard withdraw/redeem paths until the original stake entry unlocks.
- Demonstrates brittle coupling between balance and per-deposit stake entries.
Recommendations
- Ensure transferred shares are represented in the lockbook (e.g., create/merge Stake entries on incoming transfers), or track a single per-user lock bucket that follows the shares on transfer.
- Alternatively, disallow transferring locked shares (enforce transfer restrictions) to prevent creation of irredeemable balances.
Impact Details
- Funds stuck for recipients of sLONG; only recoverable via
emergencyWithdraw/emergencyRedeemwith penalty. - Legitimate positions can become partially inaccessible via standard withdraw/redeem.
References
Proof of Concept
Include the below code in staking.test.ts file:
staking.test.ts
describe('Bug reproductions', () => {
it('BUG-1: transferred sLONG received cannot be withdrawn/redeemed by receiver', async () => {
const { staking, long, admin, user1: alice, user2: bob } = await loadFixture(fixture);
const oneHundred = ethers.utils.parseEther('100');
const fifty = ethers.utils.parseEther('50');
// Alice deposits 100 LONG and receives 100 sLONG
await long.connect(admin).transfer(alice.address, oneHundred);
await long.connect(alice).approve(staking.address, oneHundred);
await staking.connect(alice).deposit(oneHundred, alice.address);
// Alice transfers 50 sLONG to Bob
await staking.connect(alice).transfer(bob.address, fifty);
// Bob deposits 100 LONG and receives 100 sLONG
await long.connect(admin).transfer(bob.address, oneHundred);
await long.connect(bob).approve(staking.address, oneHundred);
await staking.connect(bob).deposit(oneHundred, bob.address);
// Unlock shares
await staking.connect(admin).setMinStakePeriod(1);
// Bob tries to redeem 150 sLONG (100 deposited + 50 transferred) -> reverts; only deposited shares are withdrawable
await expect(
staking.connect(bob).redeem(oneHundred.add(fifty), bob.address, bob.address),
).to.be.revertedWithCustomError(staking, 'MinStakePeriodNotMet');
// Bob can redeem his own deposited 100 sLONG
const expectedAssets = await staking.previewRedeem(oneHundred);
const tx = await staking.connect(bob).redeem(oneHundred, bob.address, bob.address);
await expect(tx)
.to.emit(staking, 'Withdraw')
.withArgs(bob.address, bob.address, bob.address, expectedAssets, oneHundred);
// Remaining transferred 50 sLONG at Bob are now stuck (cannot be redeemed/withdrawn)
expect(await staking.balanceOf(bob.address)).to.eq(fifty);
await expect(staking.connect(bob).redeem(fifty, bob.address, bob.address)).to.be.revertedWithCustomError(
staking,
'MinStakePeriodNotMet',
);
});
it('BUG-2: after transferring out some sLONG, withdrawing the remaining 50 via withdraw/redeem reverts', async () => {
const { staking, long, admin, user1: alice, user2: bob } = await loadFixture(fixture);
const oneHundred = ethers.utils.parseEther('100');
const fifty = ethers.utils.parseEther('50');
// Alice deposits 100 LONG and receives 100 sLONG
await long.connect(admin).transfer(alice.address, oneHundred);
await long.connect(alice).approve(staking.address, oneHundred);
await staking.connect(alice).deposit(oneHundred, alice.address);
// Alice transfers 50 sLONG to Bob
await staking.connect(alice).transfer(bob.address, fifty);
// Alice attempts to withdraw her remaining 50 LONG via withdraw/redeem -> reverts due to stake tracking
await expect(
staking.connect(alice).withdraw(fifty, alice.address, alice.address),
).to.be.revertedWithCustomError(staking, 'MinStakePeriodNotMet');
await expect(
staking.connect(alice).redeem(fifty, alice.address, alice.address),
).to.be.revertedWithCustomError(staking, 'MinStakePeriodNotMet');
});
});
Observed test output:
✔ BUG-1: transferred sLONG received cannot be withdrawn/redeemed by receiver (762ms)
✔ BUG-2: after transferring out some sLONG, withdrawing the remaining 50 via withdraw/redeem reverts
2 passing (785ms)