49800 sc insight yield distribution could encounter an unexpected revert

Submitted on Jul 19th 2025 at 14:19:28 UTC by @a16 for Attackathon | Plume Network

• Report ID: #49800

• Report Type: Smart Contract

• Report severity: Insight

• Target: https://github.com/immunefi-team/attackathon-plume-network/blob/main/arc/src/ArcToken.sol

• Impacts:

  • Function call could be DoS

Description

Brief/Intro

When calling distributeYield() or distributeYieldWithLimit(), the transaction might experience an unexpected revert as a result of a yield-token blacklisted token holder.

Vulnerability Details

As mentioned in ArcTokenFactory.sol, the yield token could be USDC:

param yieldToken Address of the yield token (e.g., USDC)

USDC is one example of a token with a blacklist, reverting whenever a blacklisted address is involved in a transaction. However, when distributeYield() or distributeYieldWithLimit() are being called, the function iterates over holders, transferring yield tokens to multiple addresses at the same time. Since yToken.safeTransfer() is not called using a try-catch scheme, any blacklisted user would revert the entire transaction.

Impact Details

Any blacklisted user would cause an unexpected revert without a clear event indicating the problem (and more importantly, the index of the problematic holder). While this holder could be skipped using the distributeYieldWithLimit() function, the lack of clear revert reason might cause a temporary DoS until the issue is identified.

Suggestion: Consider using a try-catch block around transfers of the yield-token, skipping holders that failed to receive the yield-token, and emitting an event describing the failure and the index (or address) of the problematic holder.

Proof of Concept

Proof of Concept

As per Attackathon rules, no PoC is necessary.