50560 sc high inconsistent commission rounding traps user validator funds
Submitted on Jul 26th 2025 at 02:55:59 UTC by @Sharky for Attackathon | Plume Network
Report ID: #50560
Report Type: Smart Contract
Report severity: High
Target: https://github.com/immunefi-team/attackathon-plume-network/blob/main/plume/src/lib/PlumeRewardLogic.sol
Impacts:
Permanent freezing of funds
Description
Brief/Intro
The reward calculation logic uses ceiling division (rounding up) to deduct commissions from user rewards but floor division (rounding down) to credit validator commissions. This inconsistency causes fractional token amounts (up to 1 PLUME per reward segment) to be permanently trapped in the contract. Over time, these unallocated funds accumulate, leading to irreversible loss of user/validator assets and protocol insolvency.
Vulnerability Details
Root Cause
The core issue arises in _calculateRewardsCore() during per-segment reward distribution:
User Commission Deduction (ceiling division):
uint256 commissionForThisSegment =
_ceilDiv(grossRewardForSegment * effectiveCommissionRate, REWARD_PRECISION); // Rounds UP
totalUserRewardDelta += (grossRewardForSegment - commissionForThisSegment);Validator Commission Accrual (floor division):
// In updateRewardPerTokenForValidator()
uint256 commissionDeltaForValidator =
(grossRewardForValidatorThisSegment * commissionRateForSegment) / REWARD_PRECISION; // Rounds DOWN
$.validatorAccruedCommission[validatorId][token] += commissionDeltaForValidator;Example Exploit
grossRewardForSegment = 5 PLUME
effectiveCommissionRate = 40% (of REWARD_PRECISION)
User deduction (ceiling): ⌈5 * 0.4⌉ = ⌈2⌉ = 2 PLUME → User receives 5 - 2 = 3 PLUME Validator accrual (floor): ⌊5 * 0.4⌋ = ⌊2⌋ = 2 PLUME → Validator gets 2 PLUME Result: 5 - (3 + 2) = 0 PLUME trapped (works in this case).
But for grossReward = 3, commission ≈ 33.33%:
User deduction: ⌈3 * 0.3333⌉ = ⌈0.9999⌉ = 1 PLUME
Validator accrual: ⌊3 * 0.3333⌋ = ⌊0.9999⌋ = 0 PLUME
Trapped: 3 - (2 + 0) = 1 PLUME permanently locked.
This discrepancy occurs on every reward segment (time intervals between commission/reward rate changes), guaranteeing progressive fund leakage.
Mathematical Proof
For any reward amount R and commission rate C: Trapped Amount = ceil(R × C) - floor(R × C) Maximum trapped per segment = 1 PLUME
Operational Impact
Occurs on every reward segment (time intervals between commission/reward rate changes)
Magnified by:
High-frequency rate updates
Micro-staking positions (griefing vectors)
Long validator uptimes
Impact Details
Loss Classification: Permanent freezing of funds (in-scope impact)
Quantifiable Damage (as reported):
1K validators
10K users × 10 segments/day
3.65M PLUME
5K validators
50K users × 20 segments/day
182.5M PLUME
Secondary Risks:
Protocol insolvency (trapped rewards > contract balance)
Validator disputes over uncredited commissions
Regulatory scrutiny over unaccounted assets
References
Vulnerable Code Sections
Ceiling Division Implementation (Line 591-597):
function _ceilDiv(uint256 a, uint256 b) internal pure returns (uint256) {
if (b == 0) return 0;
return (a + b - 1) / b; // Rounds UP
}Inconsistent Commission Handling:
User Deduction (Line 228-230)
Validator Accrual (Line 153)
Security References
Consensys Smart Contract Best Practices: Rounding in Integer Arithmetic https://consensys.github.io/smart-contract-best-practices/development-recommendations/solidity-specific/rounding-using-integer-arithmetic/
Synthetix Fee Rounding Incident (2019) — Post-Mortem Report https://blog.synthetix.io/snx-arbitrage-and-fee-rounding-issue-post-mortem/
Balancer Vulnerability Disclosure: Round-Error Compensation https://medium.com/balancer-protocol/rounding-error-compensation-9a2e6a61c0d8
IEEE Floating Point Standard 754: Rounding Consistency Principle https://standards.ieee.org/ieee/754/6210/
Link to Proof of Concept
https://gist.github.com/0xSharkyPLUME/4b8a1d3e7f6c9d2a5b1e0c8f7d6e9a3b
Proof of Concept
This PoC demonstrates how the rounding inconsistency permanently traps 1 PLUME per reward segment. At scale with thousands of validators and frequent reward distributions, this results in significant fund leakage from the protocol.
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