52277 sc low race condition in streak calculation leads to unfair streak reset for users spinning near utc day change

• Submitted on: Aug 9th 2025 at 11:19:27 UTC by @Orionn for Attackathon | Plume Network

• Report ID: #52277

• Report Type: Smart Contract

• Severity: Low

• Target: https://github.com/immunefi-team/attackathon-plume-network/blob/main/plume/src/spin/Spin.sol

• Impacts: Contract fails to deliver promised returns, but doesn't lose value

A race condition in streak calculation can unfairly reset a user's daily streak when the oracle callback is mined after a UTC day boundary, even if the user initiated their spin before the boundary.

Description

Brief / Intro

A race condition exists in the daily streak calculation logic within Spin.sol. The _computeStreak function uses the block.timestamp from the oracle's callback transaction (handleRandomness) to determine the day of the spin, rather than the block.timestamp of the user's initial startSpin transaction. If a user starts a spin shortly before a UTC day change, and the oracle callback is mined after the day change, the user's streak can be unfairly reset.

Vulnerability Details

The daily streak mechanic relies on comparing the day of the last spin (lastDaySpun) with the day of the current spin (today). The contract treats the oracle callback time as the spin time, which is asynchronous and outside the user's control.

• User's Transaction (startSpin): user initiates spin at timestamp A (the user's intended spin time).

• Oracle's Transaction (handleRandomness): oracle callback occurs at timestamp B (potentially later).

• Root Cause: _computeStreak is called in handleRandomness and uses nowTs (the callback's block.timestamp) to compute today. If A and B fall on different UTC days, the streak calculation can be incorrect and penalize the user.

Vulnerable code excerpt: Spin::_computeStreak

uint256 lastDaySpun = lastSpinTs / SECONDS_PER_DAY;
uint256 today = nowTs / SECONDS_PER_DAY; // `nowTs` is the block.timestamp of the handleRandomness callback
if (today == lastDaySpun + 1) { // This check fails if `today` is `lastDaySpun + 2` due to the timing gap
    return userData[user].streakCount + streakAdjustment;
}
return 0 + streakAdjustment; // The user's streak is unfairly reset

Impact Details

• Loss of Value: Users can lose their accumulated daily streak. Higher streaks yield higher "Raffle Ticket" rewards (baseRaffleMultiplier * streakForReward), so breaking a streak reduces future rewards.

• Loss of Opportunity: Users may lose eligibility for weekly Jackpot rewards that require a minimum streakCount.

References

https://github.com/immunefi-team/attackathon-plume-network/blob/main/plume/src/spin/Spin.sol?utm_source=immunefi

Proof of Concept

1

Scenario setup

• Actor: Alice, with streakCount = 9 and lastSpinTimestamp recorded on Day 9.

• Goal: Perform daily spin on Day 10 to reach streakCount = 10.

2

Step 1 — Alice starts spin just before UTC day change

• Time: Day 10, 23:59:50 UTC.

• Action: Alice calls startSpin(). Her transaction is mined in a block stamped on Day 10.

• From Alice's perspective, she completed the daily action for Day 10.

3

Step 2 — Oracle delay

• A small network/oracle delay occurs before the oracle processes the randomness request.

4

Step 3 — Oracle callback after UTC day change

• Time: Day 11, 00:00:10 UTC.

• The oracle's callback transaction is mined with a block timestamp on Day 11 and handleRandomness is executed.

5

Step 4 — Bug triggers in streak computation

• _computeStreak is called inside handleRandomness using nowTs from the callback (Day 11).

• Calculations:

  • lastDaySpun derived from Alice's lastSpinTimestamp → Day 9.

  • today derived from nowTs → Day 11.

  • Check if (today == lastDaySpun + 1) => checks 11 == 9 + 1 → false.

• Result: The function treats the spin as breaking the streak and returns 1.

6

Final result

• userData[alice].streakCount is set to 1 instead of 10. Alice's streak is lost due to an oracle timing race that is outside her control.