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53059 sc low reward rate checkpoints are used but are never set

Submitted on Aug 14th 2025 at 18:30:04 UTC by @a16 for Attackathon | Plume Network

  • Report ID: #53059

  • Report Type: Smart Contract

  • Report severity: Low

  • Target: https://github.com/immunefi-team/attackathon-plume-network/blob/main/plume/src/facets/RewardsFacet.sol

  • Impacts: Contract fails to deliver promised returns, but doesn't lose value

Description

Brief / Intro

Several functions use the rewardRateCheckpoints[] mapping, but checkpoints are never set for a specific token — only for a token/validator pair.

Vulnerability Details

Functions like getRewardRateCheckpoint() and getRewardRateCheckpointCount() use rewardRateCheckpoints[token], but rewardRateCheckpoints[token].length is always 0 as it is never set.

Example snippets from the codebase that demonstrate the issue:

if (index >= $.rewardRateCheckpoints[token].length) {
    revert InvalidRewardRateCheckpoint(token, index);
}

Since rewardRateCheckpoints[token].length is always 0, this is effectively:

So getRewardRateCheckpointCount() will always return 0, and getRewardRateCheckpoint() will always revert.

Impact Details

  • Users calling these functions will either receive 0 for checkpoint counts or encounter a revert when attempting to read a checkpoint.

  • This results in functions failing to deliver the promised returns information (or related behavior) but does not directly cause loss of funds or contract value.

Suggestions

rewardRateCheckpoints[] appears to be vestigial (unused) or misused. Consider one of the following:

  • Remove rewardRateCheckpoints and all references to it if it is truly unused.

  • Or, if intended, ensure checkpoints are populated for tokens (not only token/validator pairs) and update the accessors to reference the correct storage structure.

Proof of Concept

1

Reproduce

  1. Call getRewardRateCheckpoint() for a token and any index.

Result: the call reverts due to the check against an always-zero length.

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