Immunefi Audit Competitions
Plume | Attackathon

51132 sc low tellerwithmultiassetsupportpredicateproxy cannot be paused unpaused

Submitted on Jul 31st 2025 at 12:32:34 UTC by @holydevoti0n for Attackathon | Plume Network

Description

Vulnerability Details

TellerWithMultiAssetSupportPredicateProxy inherits from OZ Pausable contract but does not expose any function to allow pause/unpause the contract. See OpenZeppelin Pausable implementation:

https://github.com/OpenZeppelin/openzeppelin-contracts/blob/c3961a45380831135b37e55bc3ed441f678a4f5e/contracts/utils/Pausable.sol#L96-L111

However, TellerWithMultiAssetSupportPredicateProxy uses the paused check to prevent deposits in case of emergency:

https://github.com/immunefi-team/attackathon-plume-network-nucleus-boring-vault/blob/0ee676b5715075c26db6706960fd49ab59b587fc/src/base/Roles/TellerWithMultiAssetSupportPredicateProxy.sol#L78-L80

@> import { Pausable } from "@openzeppelin/contracts/utils/Pausable.sol";
...
@> contract TellerWithMultiAssetSupportPredicateProxy is Pausable {
...
    function deposit(
        ERC20 depositAsset,
        uint256 depositAmount,
        uint256 minimumMint,
        address recipient,
        CrossChainTellerBase teller,
        PredicateMessage calldata predicateMessage
    )
        external
        nonReentrant
        returns (uint256 shares)
    {
@>        if (paused()) {
            revert TellerWithMultiAssetSupportPredicateProxy__Paused();
        }
...

Impact Details

Because the contract does not expose pause/unpause functions, the paused check can never be activated by governance or an authorized party. Deposits will continue to be accepted in situations where pausing the contract is desired (e.g., compromise or emergency), preventing mitigation via pausing.

Recommendation

Add pause and unpause functions to the contract and restrict them (for example with onlyOwner or appropriate access control) so governance or the designated admin can pause deposits in emergencies.

Proof of Concept

Context

Governance needs to pause the contract because the vault has been compromised.

Attempt to pause

Governance tries to call the pause function, but it does not exist in the TellerWithMultiAssetSupportPredicateProxy contract.

Unable to pause

Governance cannot pause the contract because no pause/unpause functions are exposed.

Continued deposits

Funds continue to flow into the compromised vault (also impacting other contracts that use this one, like DexAggregatorWrapperWithPredicateProxy).

References

https://github.com/OpenZeppelin/openzeppelin-contracts/blob/c3961a45380831135b37e55bc3ed441f678a4f5e/contracts/utils/Pausable.sol#L96-L111