MYTStrategy.claimWithdrawalQueue declares a return value but drops the amount produced by the strategy-specific _claimWithdrawalQueue. Extenders such as SfrxETHStrategy correctly compute and return the assets they redeemed, yet callers of the public entrypoint always receive 0.
Vulnerability Details
claimWithdrawalQueue at src/MYTStrategy.sol:143-148 does not capture the value returned by _claimWithdrawalQueue, so the Solidity default return value 0 is forwarded. The interface IMYTStrategy.claimWithdrawalQueue explicitly promises a uint256 return, and concrete strategies (e.g., SfrxETHStrategy._claimWithdrawalQueue at src/strategies/SfrxETH.sol:72-82) produce a meaningful amount that is never surfaced to the caller.
Impact Details
vault accounting that relies on the returned amount (per the IMYTStrategy interface) will conclude that nothing was claimed, even while assets were actually withdrawn. That leads to stalled exit flows, double-withdraw attempts, or failure to re-integrate newly received assets into vault accounting. In the worst case, downstream code may revert because it believes there are no funds to settle, effectively freezing allocators until manual intervention.