57189 sc high alchemistcurator contract not implement setforcedeallocatepenalty

Submitted on Oct 24th 2025 at 08:10:16 UTC by @ox9527 for Audit Comp | Alchemix V3arrow-up-right

  • Report ID: #57189

  • Report Type: Smart Contract

  • Report severity: High

  • Target: https://github.com/alchemix-finance/v3-poc/blob/immunefi_audit/src/AlchemistCurator.sol

  • Impacts:

    • Theft of unclaimed yield

Description

Brief/Intro

The AlchemistCurator contract is intended to act as the curator for VaultV2 (Morpho VaultV2). However, the setForceDeallocatePenalty function in VaultV2 is not implemented.

setForceDeallocatePenalty is supposed to be timelocked, meaning its data can only be submitted via VaultV2::submit(), and submit() can only be called by the curator.

If the forceDeallocatePenalty for a specific adapter is not configured, anyone can call VaultV2::forceDeallocate() without incurring any penalty. Consequently, anyone can deallocate assets from any adapter, which may result in the contract losing accrued yield.

Vulnerability Details

VaultV2.sol::setForceDeallocatePenalty() is supposed to be timelocked

VaultV2.sol::submit() is only called by curator

Impact Details

contract lost of yield

References

Proof of Concept

Proof of Concept

Out:

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