#57526 [SC-Medium] `StargateEthPoolStrategy` rounding mismatch freezes `VaultV2` allocations
Submitted on Oct 26th 2025 at 23:57:13 UTC by @pxng0lin for Audit Comp | Alchemix V3
- Report ID: #57526
- Report Type: Smart Contract
- Report severity: Medium
- Target: https://github.com/alchemix-finance/v3-poc/blob/immunefi\\_audit/src/strategies/optimism/StargateEthPoolStrategy.sol
- Impacts:
- Permanent freezing of funds
Description
Bug Description
StargateEthPoolStrategy._allocate floors deposits to 1e12 but returns the unfloored amount. VaultV2 return value records more assets than the adapter actually deploys. On withdrawal, StargateEthPoolStrategy._deallocate cannot supply the overstated amount and reverts with "Strategy balance is less than the amount needed", permanently freezing funds.
Brief/Intro
As shown in the sequence flow, the allocator sends amount WETH through VaultV2 into StargateEthPoolStrategy. The strategy unwraps, deposits only amountRounded, yet reports the full amount back to the vault. VaultV2 records that figure as live capital, so when the allocator later requests the same amount, _deallocate can only pull amountRounded from Stargate and reverts, locking the position.
Details
- Allocator calls
VaultV2.allocate. The vault transfersamountWETH to the adapter and invokesIAdapter.allocate. StargateEthPoolStrategy._allocateunwraps WETH, computesamountRounded = (amount / 1e12) * 1e12, deposits onlyamountRounded, yet returns the originalamount.VaultV2.allocateaddsamounttocaps[id].allocation, so vault accounting now exceeds real assets.- Later the allocator calls
VaultV2.deallocate(..., amount).StargateEthPoolStrategy._deallocateredeems LP foramountRounded, wraps back to WETH, then checks that its balance coversamount; the check fails and the function reverts. - The vault never reduces the inflated allocation, the dust remains idle on the adapter, and no withdrawals can succeed.
Sequence Diagram
sequenceDiagram
participant Allocator
participant VaultV2
participant StargateStrategy
participant StargatePool
Allocator->>VaultV2: allocate(strategy, prevAlloc, amount)
VaultV2->>StargateStrategy: allocate(data, amount)
StargateStrategy->>StargatePool: deposit amountRounded
StargateStrategy-->>VaultV2: return change = amount
VaultV2->>VaultV2: allocation += amount
Allocator->>VaultV2: deallocate(strategy, prevAlloc+amount, amount)
VaultV2->>StargateStrategy: deallocate(data, amount)
StargateStrategy->>StargatePool: redeem amountRounded
StargateStrategy-->>VaultV2: revert "Strategy balance is less than the amount needed"
Impact
- Permanent freezing of user funds: recorded allocations can never be withdrawn once dust is present (critical impact).
- Ongoing insolvency risk: repeated allocations widen the gap between vault accounting and strategy assets.
Risk Breakdown
- Difficulty: Low. Standard allocator operations trigger the bug.
- Prerequisites: Allocator privileges (normal vault role).
- User action: None; even honest deposits are vulnerable.
Recommendation
Return amountRounded from StargateEthPoolStrategy._allocate.
References
StargateEthPoolStrategy._allocate@src/strategies/optimism/StargateEthPoolStrategy.sol#42-53StargateEthPoolStrategy._deallocate@src/strategies/optimism/StargateEthPoolStrategy.sol#55-81VaultV2.allocateandVaultV2.deallocate@lib/vault-v2/src/VaultV2.sol#564-608
Proof of Concept
Proof of Concept
- Add the test code to the existing
StargateEthPoolStrategy.t.soltest file. - run the test with
forge t --mt testStrategyAllocateDeallocate_VaultV2_reverts_permanent_freeze -vvvv(higher verbosity to see the fails asexpectRevert()has been used) - The test allocates through the vault, leaves dust on the adapter, and shows
VaultV2.deallocatereverting with"Strategy balance is less than the amount needed".
Test Code
function testStrategyAllocateDeallocate_VaultV2_reverts_permanent_freeze(uint256 fuzzAmount) public {
// Allocate via the real vault/allocator path with an amount that is not divisible by 1e12.
uint256 amountToAllocate = bound(fuzzAmount, 1e12 + 1, testConfig.vaultInitialDeposit);
uint256 dust = amountToAllocate - (amountToAllocate / 1e12) * 1e12;
vm.assume(dust > 0);
uint256 amountToDeposit = amountToAllocate - dust;
bytes32 adapterId = IMYTStrategy(strategy).adapterId();
uint256 previousAllocation = IVaultV2(vault).allocation(adapterId);
vm.startPrank(allocator);
console.log("allocator allocate", amountToAllocate);
IVaultV2(vault).allocate(strategy, abi.encode(previousAllocation), amountToAllocate);
vm.stopPrank();
uint256 vaultRecordedAllocation = IVaultV2(vault).allocation(adapterId);
assertEq(vaultRecordedAllocation, previousAllocation + amountToAllocate, "vault believes full amount allocated");
uint256 initialRealAssets = IMYTStrategy(strategy).realAssets();
assertEq(initialRealAssets, amountToDeposit, "realAssets should exclude dust");
assertEq(address(strategy).balance, dust, "dust should remain as plain ETH");
console.log("real assets tracked", initialRealAssets);
console.log("dust remaining", dust);
vm.startPrank(allocator);
console.log("allocator deallocate", amountToAllocate);
vm.expectRevert(bytes("Strategy balance is less than the amount needed"));
IVaultV2(vault).deallocate(strategy, abi.encode(vaultRecordedAllocation), amountToAllocate);
vm.stopPrank();
}