Immunefi Audit Competitions58257 sc low in tokeautoeth deallocate can be dosed if the vault incuring losses
Submitted on Oct 31st 2025 at 18:58:27 UTC by @OxPhantom for Audit Comp | Alchemix V3
- Report ID: #58257
- Report Type: Smart Contract
- Report severity: Low
- Target: https://github.com/alchemix-finance/v3-poc/blob/immunefi\\_audit/src/strategies/mainnet/TokeAutoEth.sol
- Impacts:
- Permanent freezing of funds
- Contract fails to deliver promised returns, but doesn't lose value
Description
Brief/Intro
TokeAutoEthStrategy and TokeAutoUSDStrategy can revert during deallocation after a loss because they compute shareDiff = actualSharesHeld - sharesNeeded without guarding sharesNeeded > actualSharesHeld. If the vault price per share has fallen (loss), sharesNeeded can exceed the strategy’s share balance, causing an immediate underflow revert. Even if that check were bypassed, the strategies require returning exactly the requested amount of underlying, which can be impossible post‑loss, forcing top‑ups to succeed.
Vulnerability Details
Both strategies of tokeAuto convert the requested amount of underlying to shares, then subtract from the staked share balance before redeeming. The subtraction is unchecked for ordering and will underflow if the vault suffered losses.
TokeAutoETH:
// src/strategies/mainnet/TokeAutoEth.sol
function _deallocate(uint256 amount) internal override returns (uint256) {
uint256 sharesNeeded = autoEth.convertToShares(amount);
uint256 actualSharesHeld = rewarder.balanceOf(address(this));
// @audit underflow if sharesNeeded > actualSharesHeld
uint256 shareDiff = actualSharesHeld - sharesNeeded;
if (shareDiff <= 1e18) {
// account for vault rounding up
sharesNeeded = actualSharesHeld;
}
rewarder.withdraw(address(this), sharesNeeded, true);
uint256 wethBalanceBefore = TokenUtils.safeBalanceOf(address(weth), address(this));
autoEth.redeem(sharesNeeded, address(this), address(this));
uint256 wethBalanceAfter = TokenUtils.safeBalanceOf(address(weth), address(this));
uint256 wethRedeemed = wethBalanceAfter - wethBalanceBefore;
if (wethRedeemed < amount) {
emit StrategyDeallocationLoss("Strategy deallocation loss.", amount, wethRedeemed);
}
require(TokenUtils.safeBalanceOf(address(weth), address(this)) >= amount, "Strategy balance is less than the amount needed");
TokenUtils.safeApprove(address(weth), msg.sender, amount);
return amount;
}
TokeAutoUSD:
// src/strategies/mainnet/TokeAutoUSDStrategy.sol
function _deallocate(uint256 amount) internal override returns (uint256) {
uint256 sharesNeeded = autoUSD.convertToShares(amount);
uint256 actualSharesHeld = rewarder.balanceOf(address(this));
// @audit underflow if sharesNeeded > actualSharesHeld
uint256 shareDiff = actualSharesHeld - sharesNeeded;
if (shareDiff <= 1e18) {
sharesNeeded = actualSharesHeld;
}
rewarder.withdraw(address(this), sharesNeeded, true);
uint256 usdcBalanceBefore = TokenUtils.safeBalanceOf(address(usdc), address(this));
autoUSD.redeem(sharesNeeded, address(this), address(this));
uint256 usdcBalanceAfter = TokenUtils.safeBalanceOf(address(usdc), address(this));
uint256 usdcRedeemed = usdcBalanceAfter - usdcBalanceBefore;
if (usdcRedeemed < amount) {
emit StrategyDeallocationLoss("Strategy deallocation loss.", amount, usdcRedeemed);
}
require(TokenUtils.safeBalanceOf(address(usdc), address(this)) >= amount, "Strategy balance is less than the amount needed");
TokenUtils.safeApprove(address(usdc), msg.sender, amount);
return amount;
}
Additionally, the base interface enforces that deallocation must return exactly the requested amount, leaving no room to return less when the vault has losses:
// src/MYTStrategy.sol
/// @notice uint56 amount returned must be equal to the amount parameter passed in
function _deallocate(uint256 amount) internal virtual returns (uint256) {}
As a result:
- If
sharesNeeded > actualSharesHeld, the subtraction underflows and reverts immediately. - Even if clamped later, the
require(balance >= amount)will revert after redeeming fewer assets due to losses. - An admin could “make it pass” by deallocated a smaller amount but it will however break the accounting since the funds allocated will be inflated.
Impact Details
- Liveness risk: deallocation can brick under loss scenarios (can’t withdraw), blocking rebalancing/offboarding.
References
Proof of Concept
Proof of Concept
You can run the POC by copy pasting this code in a new test file and run forge test --mt test_Deallocate_poc
// SPDX-License-Identifier: MIT
pragma solidity ^0.8.21;
import "forge-std/Test.sol";
import {IERC20} from "lib/openzeppelin-contracts/contracts/token/ERC20/IERC20.sol";
import {VaultV2} from "lib/vault-v2/src/VaultV2.sol";
import {IVaultV2} from "lib/vault-v2/src/interfaces/IVaultV2.sol";
import {AlchemistAllocator} from "src/AlchemistAllocator.sol";
import {ERC20Mock,ERC20} from "lib/openzeppelin-contracts/contracts/mocks/token/ERC20Mock.sol";
import {ERC4626} from "lib/openzeppelin-contracts/contracts/token/ERC20/extensions/ERC4626.sol";
import {IMYTStrategy} from "src/interfaces/IMYTStrategy.sol";
import {AlchemistCurator} from "src/AlchemistCurator.sol";
import {TokeAutoEthStrategy} from "src/strategies/mainnet/TokeAutoEth.sol";
contract MockAavePool {
ERC20Mock public immutable usdc;
ERC20Mock public immutable aToken;
mapping(address => uint256) public balance; // principal snapshot
function addBoost(address a, uint256 b) external {
balance[a]+= b;
//pranking rebasing
aToken.mint(a, b);
}
constructor(ERC20Mock _usdc, ERC20Mock _a) {
usdc = _usdc; aToken = _a;
}
function supply(address asset, uint256 amount, address onBehalfOf, uint16) external {
require(asset == address(usdc));
// pull underlying and credit principal
usdc.transferFrom(msg.sender, address(this), amount);
balance[msg.sender] = amount;
aToken.mint(msg.sender, amount);
// write via assembly to map (avoid getter limitation in PoC)
}
function withdraw(address asset, uint256 amount, address to) external returns (uint256) {
require(asset == address(usdc));
uint256 totalUnderlyingBalance= balance[msg.sender];
uint256 userBalance= aToken.balanceOf(msg.sender);
// send exactly requested amount
usdc.transfer(to, amount);
// reduce principal first (not strictly needed for PoC semantics)
balance[msg.sender] = balance[msg.sender] - amount;
aToken.burn(msg.sender, (amount*userBalance)/totalUnderlyingBalance);
return amount;
}
}
contract MockAutoETHVault is ERC4626 {
constructor(IERC20 _asset) ERC4626(_asset) ERC20("MockAutoETHVault", "MEV"){}
}
contract MockRewarder {
ERC4626 public immutable autoETH;
mapping(address => uint256) public balanceOf; // principal snapshot
error InsufficientBalance();
constructor(ERC4626 _autoETH) {
autoETH = _autoETH;
}
function stake(address account, uint256 amount) external {
autoETH.transferFrom(msg.sender, address(this), amount);
balanceOf[account] += amount;
}
function withdraw(address account, uint256 amount, bool claim) external {
uint256 balance = balanceOf[account];
if (balance < amount) {
revert InsufficientBalance();
}
balanceOf[account] -= amount;
autoETH.transfer(account, amount);
}
}
contract MockRouter {
IERC20 public immutable asset;
constructor(IERC20 _asset) {
asset = _asset;
}
function depositMax(ERC4626 vault, address to, uint256 minSharesOut) external returns (uint256 sharesOut) {
uint256 amount = asset.balanceOf(msg.sender);
asset.approve(address(vault), amount);
asset.transferFrom(msg.sender, address(this), amount);
return vault.deposit(amount, to);
}
}
contract TokeAutoETHStrategyTest is Test {
ERC20Mock asset;
MockAutoETHVault autoETHVault;
MockRewarder rewarder;
MockRouter router;
VaultV2 vault;
AlchemistAllocator allocator;
TokeAutoEthStrategy strat;
address owner = makeAddr("owner");
address operator = makeAddr("operator");
address permit2= makeAddr("permit2");
function setUp() public {
vm.warp(1524785992);
vm.roll(4370000);
asset = new ERC20Mock();
autoETHVault = new MockAutoETHVault(asset);
rewarder = new MockRewarder(autoETHVault);
router = new MockRouter(asset);
vault = new VaultV2(owner, address(asset));
allocator = new AlchemistAllocator(address(vault), owner, operator);
strat = new TokeAutoEthStrategy(address(vault), IMYTStrategy.StrategyParams({
owner: owner,
name: "AaveV3ARBUSDC",
protocol: "AaveV3ARBUSDC",
riskClass: IMYTStrategy.RiskClass.LOW,
cap: 100_000e18,
globalCap: 10_000e18,
estimatedYield: 100e18,
additionalIncentives: false,
slippageBPS: 1}),address(autoETHVault),address(router), address(rewarder), address(asset), address(0), permit2);
AlchemistCurator curator = new AlchemistCurator(owner, owner);
vm.startPrank(owner);
vault.setCurator(address(curator));
curator.proxy(address(vault), abi.encodeCall(IVaultV2.submit, abi.encodeCall(IVaultV2.setIsAllocator, (address(allocator), true))));
vm.warp(block.timestamp + vault.timelock(IVaultV2.setIsAllocator.selector));
vault.setIsAllocator(address(allocator), true);
// curator.proxy(address(vault), abi.encodeCall(IVaultV2.submit, abi.encodeCall(IVaultV2.addAdapter, (address(strat)))));
curator.submitSetStrategy(address(strat), address(vault));
vm.warp(block.timestamp + vault.timelock(IVaultV2.addAdapter.selector));
curator.setStrategy(address(strat), address(vault));
curator.submitIncreaseAbsoluteCap(address(strat),1000e6);
vm.warp(block.timestamp + vault.timelock(IVaultV2.increaseAbsoluteCap.selector));
curator.increaseAbsoluteCap(address(strat),1000e6);
curator.submitIncreaseRelativeCap(address(strat),1e18);
vm.warp(block.timestamp + vault.timelock(IVaultV2.increaseRelativeCap.selector));
curator.increaseRelativeCap(address(strat),1e18);
vm.stopPrank();
}
function test_Deallocate_poc() public {
deal(address(asset), address(this), 10e18);
asset.approve(address(vault), 100e6);
// deposit 100e6 into the vault
vault.deposit(100e6, address(this));
vm.prank(owner);
// allocate 100e6 to the strategy
allocator.allocate(address(strat), 100e6);
assertEq(rewarder.balanceOf(address(strat)), 100e6);
uint256 balanceVault= asset.balanceOf(address(autoETHVault));
// simulate a loss of 25% of the vault
deal(address(asset), address(autoETHVault), balanceVault*3e18/4e18);
vm.startPrank(owner);
vm.expectRevert(stdError.arithmeticError);
allocator.deallocate(address(strat), 100e6);
vm.stopPrank();
}
}