57862 sc low incorrect balancebefore reading order in morphoyearnogwethstrategy deallocate function leads to wrong event emission
Submitted on Oct 29th 2025 at 09:31:54 UTC by @EagleEye for Audit Comp | Alchemix V3
- Report ID: #57862
- Report Type: Smart Contract
- Report severity: Low
- Target: https://github.com/alchemix-finance/v3-poc/blob/immunefi\\_audit/src/strategies/mainnet/MorphoYearnOGWETH.sol
- Impacts:
- Contract fails to deliver promised returns, but doesn't lose value
Description
Brief/Intro
The MorphoYearnOGWETHStrategy::_deallocate function incorrectly reads the wethBalanceBefore of the WETH after the withdraw from the vault is executed.
Vulnerability Details
The MorphoYearnOGWETHStrategy::_deallocate function is called by the vault through MYTStrategy::deallocate function to deallocate assets from the vault to the strategy:
function _deallocate(uint256 amount) internal override returns (uint256) {
@> vault.withdraw(amount, address(this), address(this));
@> uint256 wethBalanceBefore = TokenUtils.safeBalanceOf(address(weth), address(this));
uint256 wethBalanceAfter = TokenUtils.safeBalanceOf(address(weth), address(this));
uint256 wethRedeemed = wethBalanceAfter - wethBalanceBefore;
if (wethRedeemed < amount) {
@> emit StrategyDeallocationLoss("Strategy deallocation loss.", amount, wethRedeemed);
}
require(wethRedeemed + wethBalanceBefore >= amount, "Strategy balance is less than the amount needed");
require(TokenUtils.safeBalanceOf(address(weth), address(this)) >= amount, "Strategy balance is less than the amount needed");
TokenUtils.safeApprove(address(weth), msg.sender, amount);
return amount;
}
The problem in that function is that it first calls vault.withdraw and only afterward reads the wethBalanceBefore. Because both variables wethBalanceBefore and wethBalanceAfter are measured after the withdrawal, they have the same value and the wethRedeemed variable is always equals to 0. This means that the condition if (wethRedeemed < amount) is always true and the StrategyDeallocationLoss is always emitted.
Impact Details
The functions/systems that listen for the events from the protocol, will always receive an StrategyDeallocationLoss event, when there is no deallocation loss. The function doesn't lose value, but doesn't provide the correct event. It emitts always the StrategyDeallocationLoss event, even when there is no deallocation loss. Thefore, Low severity is appropriate for this issue.
References
Recommendation
Read the WETH balance of the strategy before the withdraw is done.
Proof of Concept
Proof of Concept
The following test shows that the variables wethBalanceBefore and wethBalanceAfter have the same value and the event about the deallocation loss is emitted, when the redeemed amount is the expected one:
function testDeallocate() public{
weth.mint(address(mockVault), 10*10**18);
//For test purpose I made the `_deallocate` function public
uint256 deallocated = strategy._deallocate(0.5 ether);
}
The result:
[121125] TestMorphoYearnOGWETH::testDeallocate()
├─ [44822] MockERC20::mint(MockVault: [0xF62849F9A0B5Bf2913b396098F7c7019b51A820a], 10000000000000000000 [1e19])
│ └─ ← [Stop]
├─ [63993] MorphoYearnOGWETHStrategy::_deallocate(500000000000000000 [5e17])
│ ├─ [26379] MockVault::withdraw(500000000000000000 [5e17], MorphoYearnOGWETHStrategy: [0x5991A2dF15A8F6A256D3Ec51E99254Cd3fb576A9], MorphoYearnOGWETHStrategy: [0x5991A2dF15A8F6A256D3Ec51E99254Cd3fb576A9])
│ │ ├─ [23322] MockERC20::transfer(MorphoYearnOGWETHStrategy: [0x5991A2dF15A8F6A256D3Ec51E99254Cd3fb576A9], 500000000000000000 [5e17])
│ │ │ └─ ← [Return] true
│ │ └─ ← [Return] 0
│ ├─ [541] MockERC20::balanceOf(MorphoYearnOGWETHStrategy: [0x5991A2dF15A8F6A256D3Ec51E99254Cd3fb576A9]) [staticcall]
│ │ └─ ← [Return] 500000000000000000 [5e17]
│ ├─ [0] console::log(500000000000000000 [5e17]) [staticcall]
│ │ └─ ← [Stop]
│ ├─ [541] MockERC20::balanceOf(MorphoYearnOGWETHStrategy: [0x5991A2dF15A8F6A256D3Ec51E99254Cd3fb576A9]) [staticcall]
│ │ └─ ← [Return] 500000000000000000 [5e17]
│ ├─ [0] console::log(500000000000000000 [5e17]) [staticcall]
│ │ └─ ← [Stop]
│ ├─ emit StrategyDeallocationLoss(message: "Strategy deallocation loss.", amountRequested: 500000000000000000 [5e17], actualAmountSent: 0)
│ ├─ [541] MockERC20::balanceOf(MorphoYearnOGWETHStrategy: [0x5991A2dF15A8F6A256D3Ec51E99254Cd3fb576A9]) [staticcall]
│ │ └─ ← [Return] 500000000000000000 [5e17]
│ ├─ [22690] MockERC20::approve(TestMorphoYearnOGWETH: [0x7FA9385bE102ac3EAc297483Dd6233D62b3e1496], 500000000000000000 [5e17])
│ │ └─ ← [Return] true
│ └─ ← [Return] 500000000000000000 [5e17]
└─ ← [Stop]
From the result we can see that the both variable wethBalanceBefore and wethBalanceAfter have the same value and the event is emitted, because the according to the _deallocate function, the redeemed amount is 0, which is incorrect.